Buzzard v. McDanel, 68431
| Decision Date | 21 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 68431,68431 |
| Citation | 736 P.2d 157,1987 OK 28 |
| Parties | James C. BUZZARD and Martha N. Buzzard, Individually and as parents and next of kin of Froy Dean Buzzard, Deceased, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Mike McDANEL, District Judge, Respondent. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Naifeh & Woska by Clifton D. Naifeh, Oklahoma City, for petitioners.
Culp, Heath, Sushnick, Percival & Percival by John F. Percival and Mark E. Truex, Oklahoma City, for respondent real party in interest Farmers Ins. Co., Inc.
Troy Dean Buzzard was killed in a traffic accident involving a truck owned and operated by the City of Norman. At the time of his death Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., was the insurer on the vehicle operated by Troy Dean Buzzard and on another vehicle owned by the Buzzard family. Both policies contained uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions.
The date of the accident was August 19, 1982. A report of the accident was received by Farmers the next day. An adjuster assigned by Farmers made a statement on October 7, 1982 in a letter to the State Insurance Fund that the driver of the Norman City truck was primarily at fault in the accident. In January, 1983, following the submission of an accident report by an accident reconstructionist hired by the City of Norman, petitioners, individually and as next of kin of Troy Dean Buzzard, entered into settlement negotiations with the City of Norman. These conferences culminated on March 3, 1983 with a settlement with the City for the limits of its liability.
Throughout the period between the filing of the accident report and the settlement date, counsel for petitioners were in touch with Farmers regarding their claim under the underinsured motorist provisions of the insurance policies since the limits of the City's liability were less than the loss claimed as a result of the death of Troy Dean Buzzard. Farmers did not offer to honor the provisions of the insurance policies, and after March 3, 1983, refused to pay, arguing that the settlement had failed to preserve its right of subrogation.
Petitioners subsequently initiated an action against Farmers alleging that its refusal to honor petitioners' claims under the underinsured motorist provisions of its policies with petitioners had been in bad faith. At issue presently is an order of the trial court in that case granting Farmers' motion pursuant to 12 O.S.Supp.1984 § 2018(D) to require petitioners to first litigate, as a separate issue, whether petitioners were legally entitled to recover from the City of Norman before the question of Farmers' refusal to honor petitioners' claims could be submitted to a jury. Petitioners have requested that this Court assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the trial court's order.
In Umholtz v. City of Tulsa, 1 this Court stated the elements which would make prohibition appropriate in the present case:
1. A court, officer, or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power.
2. The exercise of said power is unauthorized by law.
3. And the exercise of that power will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.
The presence of the first element here is not contested. The trial court is clearly exercising judicial power to require petitioners to submit to a separate trial on the issue of their legal entitlement to recover against the City of Norman.
The second element here, however, is hotly contested. Farmers, in effect, maintains that the question of whether petitioners are legally entitled to recover as against the City controls as to whether it acted in bad faith in refusing petitioners' claim under the provisions of the insurance policy contract between it and petitioners. Farmers argues that it was within the trial court's discretion to grant a separate trial on the issue under 12 O.S.Supp.1984 § 2018(D).
Petitioners contend, however, that the question of whether they are legally entitled to recover from the City is not a separate or controlling issue in their action brought on a bad faith refusal to honor an insurance contract. Therefore, petitioners argue, respondent trial judge had no authority to require them to submit to separate trial on the question.
We agree with the position urged by petitioners. In McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Insurance Co., 2 this Court stated:
[T]he essence of the intentional tort of bad faith with regard to the insurance industry is the insurer's unreasonable, bad-faith conduct, including the unjustified withholding of payment due under a policy, and if there is conflicting evidence from which different inferences may be drawn regarding the reasonableness of insurer's conduct, then what is reasonable is always a question to be determined by the trier of fact by a consideration of the circumstances in each case.
In the present case petitioners' action brings into question Farmers' handling of petitioners' claim for benefits under the insurance policy. Farmers' actions, in this regard, must be assessed in light of all the facts known and knowable concerning the claim at the time petitioners requested Farmers to perform its contractual obligations. Thus, the issue of whether, in fact, petitioners had a legal right to recover from the City of Norman is not separable from the question of whether Farmers had a good faith belief, at the time its performance was requested, that it had a justifiable reason for withholding payment under the policy. 3
Respondent trial judge had no authority under 12 O.S.Supp.1984 § 2018(D), or any other provision, to require petitioners to submit to a separate trial as to the comparative fault of the City of Norman. While 12 O.S.Supp.1984 § 2018(D), grants the trial court discretion to provide for separate trials for distinct issues within a case it clearly does not authorize the action of the trial court here.
We therefore find that the second element stated in Umholtz v. City of Tulsa is clearly present.
Farmers has also contested the third element necessary for prohibition. Farmers argues that petitioners could use trial procedure, such as voir dire, to avoid any possible prejudice arising from the separate trial ordered by respondent trial judge. In view of this Court's preceding discussion we view this argument as spurious.
Farmers also argues that petitioners have an adequate remedy in appealing any adverse decision. While it is true that prohibition will not be granted where petitioners have an adequate remedy by way of appeal, it is apparent that appeal is not an adequate remedy in this case. Respondent trial judge in this matter clearly acted beyond its authority. In such an instance this Court may properly grant extraordinary relief to prevent clearly unnecessary litigation and its attendant expense. 4
Having found the necessary elements presented to this Court to render the granting of the extraordinary writ of prohibition appropriate, we assume original jurisdiction in this matter for the purpose of granting the requested writ.
Respondent trial judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing its order of March 13, 1987, bifurcating the trial of petitioners' cause.
KAUGER, J., not...
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