Y.O. by and through M. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., CIV. 3:96CV1922 (HBF).

Decision Date11 February 1998
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 3:96CV1922 (HBF).,CIV. 3:96CV1922 (HBF).
Citation1 F.Supp.2d 133
PartiesY.O., By and Through his parent and next friend, Ms. M. v. NEW BRITAIN BOARD OF EDUCATION
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Gregory B. Ladewski, Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C., Milford, CT, for Defendant.

Richard T. Roznoy, David C. Shaw, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FITZSIMMONS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Y.O. brings this action against the New Britain Board of Education for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the administrative proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs to challenge the special education services offered to him by the Board. The basis for this reimbursement claim is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") which permits "prevailing parties" to obtain attorney's fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B).

Pending is plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 16], Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs for Time Subsequent to May 27, 1997 [Doc. # 22] and Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Subsequent to July 14, 1997 [Doc. # 26]. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motions are GRANTED in accordance with this ruling.1

STANDARD

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court resolves "all ambiguities and drawls all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). See also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992).

In the context of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), disputed issues of fact are not material if the moving party would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if the disputed issues were resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Such factual disputes, however genuine, are not material, and their presence will not preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1992).

FINDINGS OF FACT

With this standard in mind, the court finds the following facts to be undisputed.

1. At the time of this action, Y.O. was a seventeen (17) year old student at New Britain High School in New Britain Connecticut. [Doc. # 18 ¶ 1].

2. New Britain Board of Education is the local educational agency charged with providing plaintiff with an appropriate education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Id. ¶ 2.

3. On October 25, 1995, Mrs. M. requested a PPT to evaluate Y.O. for Attention Deficit Disorder. Her request states in relevant part,

[Y] has a hystory [sic] of under achievement, Many of his part teachers have had this concern.

[Y] is concerned that his memory does not work well.

He currently has writing problems and has had speech problems throughout elementary school. [Y] gets easily distracted which affects his ability to concentrat[e]. This year [Y] is committed to succeeding in school, however, he lacks confidence in accomplishing his goal.

I believe that if [Y] is diagnosed with ADD, we then can appropriately address this condition. Thus, [Y] will then have a better understanding of himself and he would be able to receive the support he needs in order to become ... a productive citizen.

I hope he can have a PPT as soon as possible so that all parties involved in this process can start working together to help [Y] achieve his educational goals.

Pl.Ex. A.

4. Mrs. M. "believed he had attention deficit disorder (ADD) and/or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Y. had continual problems at school and difficulties in applying himself and in learning the materials and attending school." M. Aff. ¶ 5.

5. On November 15, 1995, Mrs. M. signed authorizations for psychological and educational testing of Y.O. by the Board. Neiff Aff. ¶ 9.

6. In December 1995, a psychological evaluation of Y.O. was completed by the Board. The psychological evaluation found that Y.O. has an I.Q. in the average range, and should be able to produce average work in school. The psychological evaluation further concluded, on the basis of "state of the art assessment tools," that Y.O. "does not demonstrate clinical significance for ADHD or depression." The psychologist evaluator noted that the validity of psychological and academic testing was in question as long as Y.O. continued to use illegal drugs, and concluded that Y.O.'s drug use "may be interfering with his educational progress." Neipp Aff. ¶ 10.

7. The psychological report stated in part,

While Y.'s mother states that he demonstrates some characteristics of attention problems and depression, these conditions are not manifested to a sufficient degree to be classified as clinically significant on the standardized behavior rating scales at this time.

[Y] should be able to produce average work in school.

Faith S. Churchill, School Psychologist, Heather M. DiMartino, School Psychology Intern, Confidential Study, New Britain Consolidated School, 12/12, 12/18/95.

8. In December 1995, the Board also conducted an educational evaluation of Y.O. The educational evaluator concluded that Y.O.'s skills were generally within the average range and that he "demonstrated extensive strengths" in all academic areas tested except general knowledge, in which he scored at the thirty-second (32%) percentile. The evaluator concluded that the results may underestimate Y.O.'s capabilities. Neipp Aff. ¶ 11.

9. Mrs. M. "requested that the New Britain Board of Education provide Y. with an independent neuropsychological evaluation conducted by a neuropsychologist capable of taking into account bilingual and bicultural issues, because [she] believed the Board's previous evaluators were biased and therefore their results were flawed." M. Aff. ¶ 6.

10. On May 3, 1996, Ms. M. requested a hearing to challenge the Board's refusal to provide an independent neuropsychological evaluation of Y.O. The letter states in relevant part

In March 18, 1996, there was the PPT to discuss the test result. That PPT was a frustrating experience for me and I was given a recommendation that I disagreed with: that [Y] be tested again in six months for neurological and personality difficulty. However, at that time I did not know the school's procedure for disagreements in PPTs and I accepted the only alternative that was offered to me.

Later, on I consulted with mental health professionals and I also personally met with Dr. Gerald Neipp. As a result, the PPT decision was changed to have [Y] tested now. Dr. Pat Brown then informed me that the school system will do it. However, I would like an external independent test. That is why I am now requesting that the State Department of Education grant me a do [sic] Process meeting.

[Pl.Ex. B].

11. At the time the hearing was requested, the Board refused to provide Y.O. with an independent neuropsychological evaluation and contended that its evaluations were appropriate. M. Aff. ¶ 7

12. At the PPT on May 6, 1996, Mrs. M requested a bicultural, bilingual neuropsychological evaluation. Mrs. M. requested that Dr. Julia Ramos McKay Grenier conduct the evaluation. Neiff Aff. ¶¶ 115-16.

13. Members of the PPT and the Board rejected plaintiff's request. The Board also objected to the demand that it pay for an evaluation by Dr. Julia Ramos McKay Grenier, whom the Board did not feel was appropriate to perform the evaluation. Neiff Aff. ¶¶ 17-18.

14. The PPT offered to provide a neuropsychological evaluation by Mike Regan, who is bilingual, and offered to provide services in the Special Education Inclusion ("SEI") program at New Britain High School. Neiff Aff. ¶¶ 20, 22.

15. A due process hearing was scheduled for June 13, 1996 but was postponed. Neiff. Aff. ¶ 23, M. Aff. ¶ 9.

16. A prehearing conference was held on June 25, 1996. M. Aff. ¶ 10. At the conference the parties discussed the issues and worked toward a resolution. A July 8, 1996 hearing, was also postponed while settlement discussion continued. M. Aff. ¶ 10.

17. On July 24, 1996, the parties stipulated and agreed to a resolution of the issues raised by Mrs. M. in her request for an administrative hearing. The stipulation states:

1. Diana Badillo Martinez shall perform an independent neuropsychological evaluation of [Y.O.].

2. Within ten (10) business days after receipt of the written independent neuropsychological evaluation, the Board shall convene a Planning and Placement Team (PPT) meeting to discuss the findings of the independent...

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