J.C. v. Regional School Dist. No. 10, 3:99CV0873 (GLG).

• Decision Date: 28 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:99CV0873 (GLG).,3:99CV0873 (GLG).
• Citation: 115 F.Supp.2d 297
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: J.C., by his parents and next friend, Mr. & Mrs. C., Plaintiff, v. REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10, Defendant.

Page 297

115 F.Supp.2d 297

J.C., by his parents and next friend, Mr. & Mrs. C., Plaintiff, v. REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10, Defendant.

No. 3:99CV0873 (GLG).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 28, 2000.

Opinion

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Plaintiff J.C., by his parents and next friends, Mr. and Mrs. C., brought this action against Defendant Regional School District No. 10, pursuant to section 615(i)(3)(B) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA" or "the Act"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, seeking an award of attorneys' fees and costs as the "prevailing party" at an administrative "due process" hearing. The Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on June 13, 2000. For the following reasons, we GRANT Plaintiff's motion [Doc. # 13] and DENY Defendant's motion [Doc. # 16].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The parties agree that summary judgment is appropriate in this case because there are no genuine issues as to any material fact.

BACKGROUND

Based on the submissions of the parties the Court finds the following facts. J.C. was a tenth-grader during the 1998-99 school year attending Lewis Mills High School in the Defendant Regional School District No. 10, in which he has been enrolled since kindergarten. Defendant Region No. 10 is the local educational agency established by the laws of the State of Connecticut and charged with the responsibility of providing a free appropriate public education, including special education services if needed, to disabled children residing within its district.

Prior to the fall of J.C.'s seventh grade year, in August of 1995, Mrs. C. had requested that the Defendant evaluate J.C. for a suspected disability, however, no evaluation took place that year or the next. Mrs. C. again requested evaluation for special education needs in the fall of 1997 when J.C. was entering the ninth grade. Upon that second request, the Defendant convened a planning and placement team ("PPT")¹ pursuant to the procedural requirements of Connecticut's special education statutes, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1), and conducted psychological and educational evaluations. On the basis of those evaluations, the PPT concluded on December 3, 1997 that J.C. did not qualify for special education pursuant to IDEA, and they declined to write an individualized education program ("IEP") for J.C. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). The parents, who were not represented by counsel at that time, did not file a request for a due process hearing to contest the decision of the PPT.

In October of 1998, J.C. was suspended from school for vandalizing a seat on his school bus with a sharp instrument, allegedly a tool of some sort brought onto the bus by another student for use in shop class. Mr. and Mrs. C. were informed by letter dated November 5, 1998 that an expulsion hearing would be held on November 12, 1998. Due to the Defendant's view that the sharp instrument was a weapon, the possible consequence of the incident was expulsion for 180 days.

Not surprisingly, on November 11, 1998, the parents retained counsel and filed a request for a special education due process hearing with the Due Process Unit at the State Department of Education contesting the outcome of the prior year's PPT (within the two-year time limit for filing such a request, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-76h(a)(3)). The parents requested that the Defendant return J.C. to school, convene another PPT, fund an independent evaluation, determine J.C. to be eligible for special education or accommodations pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and provide compensatory education. The parents also invoked IDEA's "stay put" provision, which requires that a child's current educational placement be maintained pending the outcome of a due process hearing.

In response to the parents' request, the Defendant cancelled the expulsion hearing and scheduled a PPT for November 19, 1998. At or shortly after that PPT, the Defendant agreed to keep J.C. in school and to fund an independent neuro-psychological evaluation with an evaluator of the parents' choice. The evaluation was conducted in early December of 1998 by a licensed psychologist, who concluded that J.C. showed indications of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), primarily impulsive-type, mild neuro-psychological dysfunction, and mild learning disability. The evaluator recommended additional academic support in school.

Another PPT took place on January 25, 1999 to discuss the results of the evaluation. At that PPT, the Defendant found J.C. eligible for special education as "other health impaired." See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(I). The Defendant agreed that the incident of vandalism was a manifestation of J.C.'s disability, and wrote an IEP providing special education for J.C.

Plaintiff notified the hearing officer shortly thereafter that the dispute had been settled. The hearing officer dismissed the hearing on April 13, 1999, noting in his final decision and order that the issues had been resolved by the parties. Plaintiff demanded reimbursement of attorney's fees of $5,285.00 on April 16, 1999, claiming that he was the prevailing party because the school board provided the relief he sought after he requested a due process hearing. Defendant refused to pay the fees, arguing that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party since Defendant provided the educational services Plaintiff sought, not as a result of the legal action, but rather as a result of Plaintiff's request that a PPT be convened in order to reassess his educational needs and to determine his eligibility for special education. Plaintiff filed this action on May 11, 1999.

DISCUSSION

The issues before the Court are: (1) whether the Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the administrative proceeding, and is therefore eligible for an award of attorney's fees and costs under IDEA;² and (2) if so, the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded.

I. Prevailing Party Status

The IDEA ensures "all children with disabilities ... a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Courts have discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to parents who prevail in actions or proceedings brought under the Act to enforce their child's rights.³

"[P]laintiffs may be considered `prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). In making this determination, a court must consider whether the plaintiff: (1) obtained relief on a significant claim in the litigation; (2) whether the relief materially altered the parties' legal relationship; and (3) whether the relief is more than de minimis in nature. Id. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486.

"The most critical factor in determining prevailing party status is the degree of success obtained." Id. at 789, 109 S.Ct. 1486. In making this determination, courts compare "the relief sought by the plaintiff with the relief obtained as a result of the suit." G.M. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1999). In addition, the plaintiff must show a "causal connection" between the "relief obtained and the litigation in which the fees are sought." Id. (quoting Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir.1990)). "The fact that the parties resolved their dispute through settlement rather than through full adjudication does not preclude a plaintiff from claiming attorney's fees as a `prevailing party.'" Y.O. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 1 F.Supp.2d 133, 138 (D.Conn. 1998) (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980)); see also D.H. v. Ashford Bd. of Educ., 1 F.Supp.2d 154, 159 (D.Conn.1998). The Second Circuit in G.M. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d at 81, adopted the Third Circuit's explanation of the causal connection element, calling it "instructive and particularly relevant in assessing whether a plaintiff has `prevailed' in a case resolved by settlement." That explanation states:

Litigation is causally related to the relief obtained if it was a material contributing factor in bringing about the events that resulted in obtaining the desired relief. Litigation can be a material contributing factor if it changed the legal relations of the parties such that defendants were legally compelled to grant relief.

Alternatively, causation can be established through a "catalyst" theory, where even though the litigation did not result in a favorable judgment, the pressure of the lawsuit was a material contributing factor in bringing about extra-judicial relief.

Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted); see also Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir.1995) (noting the continued viability of the "catalyst" theory of recovery of attorneys' fees after Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)).

Based on the undisputed facts, the Plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of the IDEA. The record is clear that Plaintiff obtained all the relief he sought, viz., reinstatement to his pre-suspension school placement, cancellation of the expulsion hearing, the convening of a PPT, funding of an independent evaluation, the determination of eligibility for special education or accommodations, and the provision...