Byar v. Lee, CIV.03-5263.

Decision Date09 September 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.03-5263.,CIV.03-5263.
Citation336 F.Supp.2d 896
PartiesTamara Brackett BYAR Plaintiff v. Andy LEE, Former Sheriff of Benton County, Arkansas, in his official and individual capacities Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

N. Doug Norwood, Norwood & Norwood, P.A., Rogers, AR, for Plaintiff.

Jason Owens, Duncan & Rainwater, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant.

ORDER

HENDREN, District Judge.

Now on this 9 day of September, 2004, come on for consideration defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (document # 6) and Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (document # 9), and from said motions, the supporting documentation, and the responses thereto, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by the "Detainee Rules" of the Benton County Jail, alleged to have been promulgated by defendant in his capacity as "chief policymaker for Benton County in the area of law enforcement and the operation of the county jail." Plaintiff was required to read, sign, and follow these Rules while she was detained in the facility. She seeks declaratory, compensatory and punitive relief, as well as costs and attorney fees.

Defendant denied the material allegations of the Complaint, and both parties have moved for summary judgment.

2. Summary judgment should be granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696 (8th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless all the evidence points toward one conclusion, and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party. Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir.1995). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the non-existence of a genuine factual dispute; however, once the moving party has met that burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with facts showing the existence of a genuine dispute. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Electric Co-op., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.1988).

3. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the parties filed statements of facts which they contend are not in dispute. From those statements, the uncontested allegations of the Complaint, and undisputed evidence before the Court, the following significant undisputed facts are made to appear:

* Plaintiff was booked into the Benton County Detention Center ("BCDC") on November 18, 2001. While being booked, she was required to read and sign a copy of the Benton County Detainee Rules ("Detainee Rules" or "Rules").

* The Detainee Rules were promulgated by defendant, who was the elected Sheriff of Benton County, Arkansas, from January 1, 1989, until December 31, 2002. Defendant concedes that the Detainee Rules were modeled after the Ten Commandments.

* This was not defendant's first attempt at using the Ten Commandments as model rules for the BCDC. In April, 1998, he had caused the Ten Commandments — almost verbatim — to become the first 10 rules of the BCDC. A lawsuit followed the posting of those rules, styled Ashford v. Benton County Sheriff Andy Lee (Benton County Circuit Court Case No. CIV-98-261) (the "Ashford Case").

* Shortly before a hearing on May 1, 1998 in the Ashford Case, defendant — in consultation with legal counsel — reworded these ten rules in an effort to bring them into compliance with law. Defendant acknowledged at the hearing, however, that the revised rules were intended to track the Ten Commandments and that they were analogous to the Ten Commandments.

* While the issue raised in the Ashford Case was whether the rules then under consideration violated the Arkansas Constitution rather than the United States Constitution, defendant's counsel cited, quoted from and relied upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980).

* After hearing proof and arguments of counsel at the May 1, 1998, hearing in the Ashford Case, Judge Clinger stated:

I think that several things are, are clear from the evidence that has been presented and that is that Sheriff Lee, for whatever reason, has interjected himself into the religious business.

* * * * * *

I am confident that when the announcement was made that the Ten Commandments would govern behavior in the jail that Sheriff Lee knew, anticipated, perhaps even desired, litigation, because in today's climate as you made remark, Mr. Rainwater, about the proliferation of jail lawsuits, it is clear that this is the type of rule making that is going to provoke jail lawsuits, and here we are.

The violations it appears to me were so blatant that on the eve of our hearing there was an attempt to modify these religious rules in an attempt to meet constitutional or statutory muster without, without in any way taking away from their religious overtones of the message in each rule.

* * * * * *

... these rules, as modified, are being promulgated with the religious connotations being in large bold letters and the saving grace words, the words that attempt to pass constitutional and statutory muster, in fine print.

* * * * * *

... legitimate rules, all except for Satan ritual and killing, were already covered in plain, easy to read and easy to understand rules of conduct which are still in full force and effect which means these rules are redundant and duplicative and can only lead to confusion.

* * * * * * I am also of the opinion that as long as you have part of the rules that lead off written in the religious terminology of the Bible, then followed by straight standard secular language on all other rules, that there is a religious emphasis that is prohibited in my opinion.

* In another case challenging defendant's use of the Ten Commandments as a model for the rules of the BCDC, styled Elliott v. Andy Lee, et al., United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, case number 02-5152 (the "Elliott Case"), defendant testified by deposition on April 23, 2003, that when he posted the Ten Commandments, he was thinking "if these men and women who were in the jail would only follow the Ten Commandments, then they wouldn't ever be back in jail."

* When plaintiff was booked into the BCDC on November 19, 2001, there were eleven Detainee Rules. Like the rules under consideration in the Ashford Case and the Elliott Case, these Rules were clearly modeled after the Ten Commandments. The first ten — in their opening phrases — begin with the same language as one translation of the corresponding Ten Commandments from the Book of Exodus in the Bible. The second through the tenth Rules, in their initial dictates, track the second through the tenth Commandments, although each Rule contains many more requirements and prohibitions than do the corresponding Commandments. These additional prohibitions are tailored to the security needs of a detention facility.1

* Plaintiff was held in the BCDC for two days. During her detention she did not violate any of the Detainee Rules, nor would she have comported herself any differently had the Detainee Rules not existed.

* Plaintiff is an adherent of the Southern Baptist faith, and the position of her faith — as well as her own position — with regard to the Ten Commandments is that they should be obeyed.

* Plaintiff did not feel that the Detainee Rules expressed disapproval of her religious choices.

* After defendant left office and was succeeded by a new sheriff on January 1, 2003, the Detainee Rules were again changed, and there is no suggestion that the current version of the rules is in any way modeled after the Ten Commandments.

4. Defendant challenges plaintiff's standing to bring her claims, and that argument — being jurisdictional — must be addressed before any other.

Standing is an inescapable component of the jurisdiction of an Article III court, which exists to resolve cases or controversies. "[C]ourts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws. Constitutional judgments... are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court...." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (internal citations omitted).

Standing has three elements:

* Plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical.

* There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.

* It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a decision in plaintiff's favor.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

Applying the facts of this case to the law expressed in Lujan, the Court concludes that plaintiff has standing to sue.

The "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied because plaintiff, while detained in the BCDC, was required to read and sign the Detainee Rules which would govern her conduct during her stay at the BCDC. She was, therefore, directly affected by the Detainee Rules, rather than merely interested in the matter. Nor does it detract from her standing that she was not forced to obey religious tenets in which she did not believe. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) ("Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving...

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3 books & journal articles
  • Byar v. Lee.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 33, February 2005
    • February 1, 2005
    ...District Court CLAIMS Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). A former county jail detainee filed an action against a former county sheriff, alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising out of the sheriff's promulgation of a set of detainee rules for the county jail. The......
  • Byar v. Lee.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 33, February 2005
    • February 1, 2005
    ...District Court RELIGION Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). A former county jail detainee filed an action against a former county sheriff, alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising out of the sheriff's promulgation of a set of detainee rules for the county jail. T......
  • Byar v. Lee.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 33, February 2005
    • February 1, 2005
    ...District Court ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FORCED EXPOSURE REGULATIONS Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). A former county jail detainee filed an action against a former county sheriff, alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising out of the sheriff's promulgation of a set ......

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