Byck v. Com. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1954
• Citation: 269 S.W.2d 214
• Parties: BYCK et al. v. COMMONWEALTH LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 214

269 S.W.2d 214

BYCK et al. v. COMMONWEALTH LIFE INS. CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 25, 1954.

Raymond C. Stephenson and Hottell & Stephenson, Louisville, for appellants.

William H. Abell and Ogden, Galphin & Abell, Louisville, for appellee.

STEWART, Justice.

On June 1, 1949, Commonwealth Life Insurance Company issued to the police pension board of the City of Louisville a written policy of group insurance providing among other things for the payment of $3,000 at the death from a natural cause of any police officer of that city and for the payment of an additional benefit of $12,000 in the event that the death of such officer resulted from an accident while on duty, provided such death was not caused or contributed to by disease.

The pertinent part of the policy reads:

'1. The company will pay, subject to the terms and conditions hereof and of this policy and to the exceptions specified below, an additional indemnity, to the beneficiary, in addition to the other proceeds of this policy, upon receipt of due proof that the death of any member insured hereunder occurred as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injury effected after May 31, 1949 while performing the law enforcement duties of a law enforcement officer of the City of Louisville, Kentucky, effected solely and exclusively through external, violent, and accidental means evidenced, except in the case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy, by some mark or contusion visible on the exterior of the body, and that such death occurred prior to termination of this benefit and within one year after such injuries were sustained.

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'(3) This additional indemnity shall not be payable if deach occurs--(a) as a result of * * * disease or bodily or mental infirmity or medical or surgical treatment thereof or infection of any nature, unless such infection was incurred through an external visible wound, sustained through violent and accidental means after May 31, 1949 while performing the law enforcement duties of a law enforcement officer of the City of Louisville, Kentucky * * *.'

The chain of circumstances leading up to the death of officer James Bell, age 32, who was covered by the insurance plan, began at about noon on December 24, 1951. On that particular day the deceased and a patrolman named McDowell were called to the Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. office building in Louisville to investigate the occurrence of a suicide. They found that the suicide had fallen on a steel plate which covered certain steam exhaust pipes in the rear of the building. The plate was extremely hot and, when the two men began lifting the suicide's body off the plate, the back of Bell's left hand was severely burned. Subsequently, in an effort to locate the rest room in the office building from which the suicide had jumped, Bell made several hurried trips up and down the stairs inside from the fifth to the sixth floors to determine the window from which the suicide had leaped to his death. On the sixth floor he discovered a high-silled window and leaned out of it in search of some definite clue. As he did so, his feet slipped on the tile floor and he was about to fall out when he was grabbed by McDowell and a railroad employee who pulled him away from the window. Shortly thereafter, as the two patrolmen were leaving the scene of the tragedy, Bell complained of feeling ill and, because his condition grew progressively worse, McDowell took him directly to General Hospital in Louisville. A few hours later Bell suffered an occlusion as the result of a clot in the anterior descending branch of the left coronary artery; this is called coronary thrombosis by the medical profession. Death followed within several hours.

The $3,000 benefit was paid, but, upon appellee's refusal to pay the additional $12,000 accidental death benefit when demand was made therefor, this action was brought by Bell's widow and beneficiary, Jadwiga Bell, and the members of the above pension board.

Appellee took the position below and contends here that Bell died of a coronary occlusion by reason of a diseased condition of his heart. Appellants have maintained throughout that disease did not cause, concur in or contribute to Bell's death, nor did the clot in his heart occur in the normal course of events, but that Bell's death was due to accidental injuries sustained in the course of his employment. At the conclusion of all the evidence each side moved for a peremptory instruction which was overruled. The lower court submitted the theory of each of the parties to the jury, which returned a verdict for the appellee.

Appellants now urge as grounds for reversal: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor at the close of all the evidence; (2) that the court erred in giving the first and second instructions; (3) that the trial court should have given 'Instruction No. I' and 'Instruction No. II' offered by them; (4) that a certain part of appellants' evidence was improperly excluded; and (5) that the court coerced the jury into reaching a verdict. We shall consider these contentions in the order named.

The main difference between the parties lies in the interpretation of the medical testimony, which is rather voluminous and somewhat technical. Appellants introduced as physicians in their behalf Dr. George Dwyer, the coroner of Jefferson County, Dr. Paul Dent, a heart specialist, Dr. Samuel J. Brownstein, a retired physician who formerly examined police recruits, and Dr. John F. Breslin, the doctor who attended Bell in his last illness at the hospital. Appellee relied upon the expert testimony of Dr. Herbert L. Clay, a specialist in heart diseases, Dr. Patrick W. Cummings, a pathologist, and Dr. Harold W. Bradshaw, who performed an autopsy on Bell. These experts were in agreement as to the ultimate cause of Bell's death; that is, it was coronary occlusion. It would lengthen this opinion unduly should we detail the testimony of each of these witnesses; therefore, we shall give a summary of the conclusions, pro...