Bydalek v. Brines
| Decision Date | 27 October 2000 |
| Citation | 29 S.W.3d 848 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 2000) Bobbi Bydalek, Plaintiff, v. James P. Brines and Joyce L. Brines, Husband and Wife, William L. Gehrs, Jr., and Betty Jo Gehrs, Husband and Wife, Defendants-Respondents, and Barbara Meeker and David Meeker, Counterclaim Defendants-Appellants. 23264 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Taney County, Hon. E. Mitchell Hough
Counsel for Appellant: Jerry L. Reynolds
Counsel for Respondent: Kerry D. Douglas and Craig R. Heidemann
Opinion Summary: None
In a non-jury case, the trial court entered a money judgment for "Defendants" on two of their counterclaims against Bobbi Bydalek ("Bydalek").1 Barbara and David Meeker ("Meekers"), who were ordered joined as parties in this litigation, appeal from that judgment. Meekers' first point has three parts, i.e., that reversible error occurred when the trial court denied Meekers' requests (1) for a continuance, (2) to be excluded from the trial of Defendants' cross-claims against Bydalek, and (3) for a jury. Meekers' second point maintains that real estate documents at issue are ambiguous, and the trial court erroneously interpreted the documents. We affirm.
This case began when Bydalek filed a declaratory judgment suit against Defendants in which she asked the court to decide the parties' respective rights and obligations arising out of a real estate transaction. Defendants responded by filing a multi-count counterclaim against Bydalek. On June 5, 1996, the trial court entered a summary judgment that decided issues adversely to Bydalek on her declaratory judgment suit and Count I of Defendants' counterclaim. Specifically, the trial court held Bydalek's option to repurchase the subject property from Defendants had expired September 12, 1995, and Bydalek had no further right, title, or interest in the land. This court affirmed that judgment in Bydalek v. Brines, 947 S.W.2d 135 (Mo.App. 1997) ("Brines I").
On February 28, 1997, while Brines I was pending before this court, Defendants filed a "Motion to Join Additional Parties." Specifically, Defendants moved for an "order joining Barbara and David Meeker as parties." At the time, the only unresolved claims were Defendants' counterclaims, specifically, their suit for slander of title (Count II), suit for interest allegedly due Defendants from Bydalek under an "Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Agreement" (Count III), and a declaratory judgment action relating to another potential obligation of Bydalek to pay interest under the "Addendum" (Count IV).2 To support their joinder request, Defendants alleged, inter alia:
. . . .
. . . .
On March 6, 1997, the trial court sustained Defendants' motion to add Meekers as parties.3 Next, on June 24, 1997, Meekers filed a motion seeking their dismissal from the suit. Defendants filed the next pleading on June 27, 1997. It was denominated "CROSS-CLAIM BY DEFENDANTS . . . AGAINST [MEEKERS]." Defendants' cross-claim concluded with this prayer for declaratory judgment relief:
"WHEREFORE, Defendants pray this Court enter judgment declaring the rights of the parties in the aforementioned [$350,000] promissory note, declaring that . . . Meekers are not bona fide purchasers of the note, declaring that . . . Meekers' rights in the note are subject to all defenses, offsets, and rights which Defendants . . . could have asserted against . . . Bydalek, and for such other relief as the Court deems just and proper."On July 8, 1997, Meekers sought dismissal of Defendants' "cross-claim," alleging it failed to state "a claim against [Meekers] upon which relief can be granted and wholly fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against [Meekers]."
On March 17, 1999, the trial court overruled all of Meekers' motions to dismiss. However, the Court treated Meekers' July 8, 1997, motion as a "Motion for More Definite Statement" and ordered Defendants "to amend Cross Claim Paragraphs 9, 13, and 14 to state specific facts." Continuing, the court's March 17, 1999, docket entry recited:
By June 28, 1999 (trial date), Defendants had amended their cross-claim and Meekers had moved to "continue the trial against . . . Bydalek . . . , or in the alternative to exclude . . . Meeker[s] from such trial and order that such trial shall not be res judicata or have any collateral estoppel effect upon [Meekers]." During the pretrial conference on June 28, 1999, the trial court ruled Defendants could file a second amended cross-claim against Meekers if filed within twenty days. Also, the trial court overruled Meekers' motion for continuance and their request for "exclusion" from the case against Bydalek.
As a final pre-trial matter, Meekers objected to going to trial without a jury. Repeatedly, Meekers asked for a jury, explaining their reasons therefor and pointing out they had always insisted on a jury trial on any issue that was relevant to them. Meekers asserted that resolution of the issues between Bydalek and Defendants was relevant to Meekers, in that, if Bydalek prevailed then Defendants had nothing to offset against the $350,000 note allegedly held by Meekers. Alternatively, Meekers argued for an interpretation of the Addendum, which if correct, would mean Bydalek only owed $185,000 to Defendants. Under such an alternative interpretation of the Addendum, Defendants' offset ($185,000) would be less than the $350,000 balance allegedly owed by Defendants on the promissory note assigned by Bydalek to Meekers. Continuing, Meekers voiced concern that when the cross-claims between Defendants and Meekers were tried, Defendants would invoke principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata to preclude Meekers from challenging the amount of Defendants' claimed offset.
Despite these arguments, the trial court denied Meekers' request for a jury to hear the counterclaims against Bydalek. The trial court's explanation was that Meekers could later have a jury hear the cross-claims between Defendants and them. The case was tried to the court with Meekers participating by cross-examining Defendants. On September 1, 1999, the trial court entered judgment for Defendants and "against . . . Bydalek on Counts III and IV of their counterclaim" for $1,119,163.35. Meekers appeal from that judgment.
Preliminarily, we address Defendants' argument that Meekers are not "aggrieved" by the judgment from which Meekers appeal. Fundamental to the right of appeal is that the party be aggrieved by the judgment from which he or she appeals. Gibbs v. McClain, 964 S.W.2d 850, 851[2] (Mo.App. 1998). This follows because the right to appeal in Missouri is statutory, In re Interest of A.H., 963 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo.App. 1998), and the applicable statute confers the right of appeal only upon a "party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court . . . ." Section 512.020, RSMo. 1994 (emphasis added).
The word "aggrieved" is not defined in section 512.020. However, case law provides many broad, definitive statements concerning when a person is "aggrieved" within the contemplation of section 512.020. For instance, Defendants cite Hertz Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 528 S.W.2d 952[2] (Mo.banc 1975), for the general rule that a party is "aggrieved" when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on a party's personal or property rights or interests and such effect is an immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence. Id. at 954. Many other efforts at defining an "aggrieved party" can be found,4 but an examination of the whole body of case law on this subject "impels the conclusion that whether or not a [party] is 'aggrieved' may not be determined by application of any definition or formula but depends upon the circumstances of the particular situation at hand." Listerman v. Day and Night Plumbing & Htg. Serv., 384 S.W.2d 111, 119-20 (Mo.App. 1964). The Listerman case also reminds us that statutes which authorize appeals should be liberally construed as appeals are favored in the law. Id. at 120[11]. Where doubt exists as to the right of appeal, it should be resolved in favor of that right. Id.
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