Byers v. Beddow

• Decision Date: 13 July 1932
• Parties: BYERS et al. v. BEDDOW et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

142 So. 894

106 Fla. 166

BYERS et al. v. BEDDOW et al.

Florida Supreme Court

July 13, 1932

Commissioners' Decision.

Suit by Elizabeth S. Beddow and husband against Artnur M. Byers executor of the estate of Frank R. Shallcross, deceased, and others. From interlocutory orders overruling demurrers to the bill and denying the executor's motion to vacate the order overruling the demurrers, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, judge.

COUNSEL

Mitchell D. Price & Charles W. Zaring and Robert S. Florence all of Miami, for appellants.

OPINION

DAVIS C.

A bill of complaint was filed by the appellees in the circuit court of Dade county for the purpose of dissolving a trust created by a last will and testament and causing to be delivered to the cestui que trust the property so devised or bequeathed.

It is shown by the bill that the appellee Elizabeth S. Beddow is the daughter of Frank R. Shallcross, deceased, who by his last will and testament, a copy of which is attached to the bill as a part thereof, devised and bequeathed 'one-fourth (1/4) of my entire estate unto the Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia in trust to invest the same in such first mortgage bonds as are owned by the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society or in first mortgages or ground rents and to collect the income thereon and to pay it over half-yearly unto my daughter Elizabeth S. Beddow, the wife of Harry A. Beddow, during the term of her natural life. Upon the death of may said daughter Elizabeth S. Beddow, I give, devise and bequeath the principal of the said trust fund to the children of my said daughter in equal shares provided she is survived by issue. In the event, however, that my said daughter should die without leaving issue to survive the date of her death, then I give, devise and bequeath the principal of the said trust fund to my daughters, Edna S. Byers and Esther S. Briggs, in equal shares. In the event of the death of either of them, their issue shall take their mother's share.'

The will also contains a provision which reads as follows:

'My observation has been that but few persons succeed financially and that it is best for all persons to have some provision made for their maintenance during financial reverses. Hence I direct that the aforesaid bequest and devise of trust funds shall be held in trust for my said daughter Elizabeth S. Beddow during her natural life with the remainders aforesaid without the same being in any manner or under any circumstances, or any form of procedure subject to or liable for her present or future debts, contracts, or acknowledgements. The interest and income shall be paid to her as above directed and her receipts shall be sufficient discharge for the same. She shall not have the right to anticipate, borrow upon or sell her share of the said bequest derived from this will.'

It is also alleged that 'the said remaining heirs interested in said portion of said estate, namely, Edna S. Byers and Esther S. Briggs, who were the sole and only other remaining beneficiaries under paragraph Three of said will, and that the said two other heirs, Edna S. Byers and Esther S. Briggs, joined therein by their husbands, agreed that the interest of your complainant, Elizabeth S. Beddow, should pass to her directly rather than be placed in trust, as provided in paragraph Three of said will; that in accordance with said arrangements, letters of consent were signed by the said Edna S. Byers and husband, and Esther S. Briggs and husband, agreeing to the distribution of said fund so bequeathed to your oratrix, Elizabeth S. Beddow, rather than to be put in trust as set forth in said will'; that owing to legal technicalities, and the fact that the executor was unwilling to assume the responsibility without a court decree, the parties were unable to settle the matter; that because of an operation performed in 1928, the appellee, Elizabeth S. Beddow can never be survived by issue; that the estate is ready to be closed and 'in the event said Probate Estate should be closed and the trust estate, as provided in paragraph three of said will, placed in the hands of the said Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia thereby setting up and putting it into active force, that same will prevent the carrying into effect of the distribution of the estate of Frank R. Shallcross with particular reference to paragraph Three thereof, as requested by him in his last illness; that is, it would prevent your oratrix, Elizabeth S. Beddow, from receiving directly her one-fourth interest in and to said estate, as desired by the said Frank R. Shallcross prior to his death.'

Attached to the bill and made a part thereof are two letters, one from Mrs. Byers and her husband, as an individual, and not as executor, stating that they are willing that the appellee Mrs. Beddow be given her 'share in the estate, if it is possible,' and the other from Mrs. Briggs and husband, in which they say they are willing for said appellee to receive 'her share of Dad's estate outright, instead of it being held in trust' for her under the terms of the will.

General and special demurrers to the bill were filed, and these demurrers were overruled by the court. Thereupon the executor made a motion to vacate the order overruling the demurrers, and this motion was denied. From the interlocutory orders overruling the demurrers and denying the said motion, an appeal was taken to this court.

Section 5457 of the Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927 reads as follows: 'Every person of the age of twenty-one years, being of sound mind, shall have power by last will and testament in writing, to devise and dispose of his lands, testaments and hereditaments, and of his estate, right, title and interests in the same in possession, remainder or reversion, and of personal property.'

It is not alleged that the will should be set aside and disregarded because of testamentary incapacity at the time of its execution, or because testator was induced to sign the same by reason of fraudulent representations, duress, or undue influence brought to bear upon him, but because Mrs. Byers and Mrs. Briggs, 'the only other remaining beneficiaries under provision 3 of said will,' and their respective husbands, agree that Mrs. Beddow's interest 'should pass to her directly rather than be placed in trust.'

It has been repeatedly held here that 'the intention of the testator as therein expressed [in the will] shall prevail over all other considerations, if consistent with the principles of law.' Blocker v. Blocker (Fla.) 137 So. 249, 253, and authorities therein cited.

While we do not have the benefit of a brief for the appellees, the allegations of the bill do not warrant the inference that the trust provision of the deed is in conflict with legal principles. In the absence of such contention, we will assume that the validity of the will cannot be questioned.

'Equity tribunals have always exercised a supervisory power over the management of trust estates and the couduct of trustees, but they have never, save in exceptional cases, asserted the power to dissolve a trust before the expiration of the term for which it was created. Trusts which have become impossible of performance are among the exceptions, and so are marriage settlements where the marital relation has been annulled, and other kindred cases. There was also a larger class, where the Court would decree dissolution of the trust on the application of all the interested parties, but this was strictly limited to cases where the whole design and object of the trust scheme had been practically accomplished, and all the interest created by it had become vested and all the parties beneficially interested desired its...