Byers v. Essex Investment Company
Decision Date | 02 March 1920 |
Citation | 219 S.W. 570,281 Mo. 375 |
Parties | ARTHUR H. BYERS, Appellant, v. ESSEX INVESTMENT COMPANY |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Thos. C. Hennings Judge.
Affirmed.
M. D Mugan and F. X. O'Brien for appellant.
(1) A landlord may be under no obligation to make repairs on the demised premises, but if he undertakes nevertheless to make repairs, and the same are negligently made, he is responsible in damages for the injuries resulting therefrom. 1 Tiffany on Landlord & Tenant, pp. 660, 649; Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo.App. 539; Little v. McAdaras, 38 Mo.App. 187; 2 McAdam on Landlord & Tenant, p. 1613; 2 Kent (14 Ed.), p 570; Mitchell v. Plautt, 31 Ill.App. 149; Mann v. Fuller, 63 Kan. 664; Gregor v. Cady, 82 Me. 131; Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477. (2) Whether the landlord is bound to repair his leased or demised premises or not, if he undertakes to make repairs, and the work of repair is done unskillfully or negligently, he is liable in damages to his tenant, to a subtenant and to all other persons rightfully on the premises by invitation or otherwise, for injuries arising therefrom. Grant v. Tomlinson, 138 Mo.App. 222; Hardt v. Koenig, 137 Mo.App. 589; 1 Tiffany on Landlord & Tenant, p. 649, sec. 96. (3) The circumstances attendant upon an accident are sometimes of such a character as to justify the jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the accident, in conformity with the maxim and under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 34 Cyc. 1665; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64; Ash v. Woodward, 199 S.W. 994, 997; Bryne v. Boston Woven Hose Co., 191 Mass. 40; Mooney v. Lumber Co., 154 Mass. 407; 29 Cyc. 590, 623; Ryan v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 200 Mass. 188; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567; Volkmer v. M. R. Co., 134 N.Y. 418; Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549; Chaperon v. Portland Electric Co., 41 Ore. 39. (4) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not limited to any particular class of cases. Thompson on Negligence, sec. 3885. (5) Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence will be presumed where the accident and injury are caused by an act which, in the ordinary course of things, would not have resulted in injury, if due care had been used in its performance. Schuler v. Omaha R. Co., 87 Mo.App. 618; Moore v. Parker, 91 N.C. 275. (6) Where the defendant owes the duty to plaintiff to use due care, and the thing causing the accident is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur if those who have the management or control use proper care, the happening of the accident, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is evidence that it arose from the lack of requisite care. Kahn v. Trist-Rosenberg Cap. Co., 139 Cal. 340; Bevis v. Baltimore R. Co., 26 Mo.App. 19; Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 29 Cyc. 591; Davis v. Baltimore R. Co., 26 Mo.App. 19; Armour v. Golwoska, 95 Ill.App. 492; Kahn v. Burett, 42 Misc. (N. Y.) 541, 543; Griffin v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188. (7) The maxim res ipsa loquitur was originally limited to cases of absolute duty or an obligation practically amounting to that of insurer under a contractual relation, but has been extended to actions sounding in tort, where no contractual relation existed, so that when the physical facts of an accident themselves create a reasonable probability that it results from negligence, the physical facts are themselves evidential and furnish what the law terms "evidence of negligence" in conformity with the maxim res ipsa loquitur. 29 Cyc. 591, 592; Chenall-Palmer Brick Co., v. Ratteree, 57 Ark. 429; Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331.
Percy Werner for respondent.
(1) The agreed statement of facts stands in lieu on a special verdict. If there is any omission of facts necessary to a recovery, no judgment can be based thereon. City of Stanberry v. Jordan, 145 Mo. 372; Folk v. St. Louis, 250 Mo. 138; Isenberg v. Anchor Line, 13 Mo.App. 415. (2) This is not a res ipsa loquitur case. The situation is susceptible of proof. Patton v. Public Service Ry. Co., 227 F. 810. (3) No obligation to repair rests on the landlord, in the absence of an agreement. Vai v. Weld, 17 Mo. 232; Peterson v. Smart, 70 Mo. 234; Ward v. Fagan, 101 Mo. 669. (4) The landlord is not liable for injuries to sub-tenants of his lessee arising from the defective condition of premises -- certainly not for anything less than a nuisance, which is not pleaded here. Quay v. Lucas, 25 Mo.App. 4; Peterson v. Smart, 70 Mo. 34; Saretsky v. Steinberg, 133 N.Y.S. 925; Thomas v. Lane, 221 Mass. 447; Malone v. Laskey, 2 K. B. 141. (5) Where an injury is occasioned by want of due care and skill in doing what one has promised to do, an action can only be maintained in favor of the party relying on such promise and injured by breach of it. Consequently there can be no recovery in this case for a double reason: first, because the promise was not made to plaintiff; second, because the repairs were made before plaintiff entered upon his tenancy. Glenn v. Hill, 210 Mo. 298. (6) Plaintiff, not being entitled to recover for breach of contract to repair, because not privy to contract, must sue in tort. Here he cannot recover as for mere negligence in the making of repairs. (a) Because the repairs were made before plaintiff entered on his tenancy. Quay v. Lucas, 25 Mo.App. 407; Stuerger v. Van Sicklen, 132 N.Y. 499; Ahern v. Steele, 115 N.Y. 203; Brady v. Klein, 133 Mo. 422. (b) Because there is no evidence that the defendant knew of the defective condition. Whiteley v. McLaughlin, 183 Mo. 160. (c) There can be no recovery as for maintenance of a nuisance, first, because it is not pleaded; second, because it was not in fact a nuisance. (d) There is no evidence of negligence on the part of respondent.
Appellant and his wife occupied rooms on the second floor of a building owned by respondent. The wife fell from the balcony and died as a result of her injuries. This is an action by the husband for damages for her death. The fall resulted from a breaking of a railing against which deceased leaned.
The petition charges, among other things, that: injuries which caused her death.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which is as follows:
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