Byers v. Navarro Cnty.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-1792-D
• Parties: JENNIFER KAYE BYERS, Plaintiff, v. NAVARRO COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

JENNIFER KAYE BYERS, Plaintiff,

v.NAVARRO COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-1792-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

Dated: March 1, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDER

A pretrial detainee with mental issues who was placed by jail officials in a restraint chair and in a cell with a detainee who physically attacked her brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against a county and four individual jail employees for injuries she allegedly suffered. For the reasons that follow—including on the basis that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity—the court grants partial summary judgment and raises sua sponte that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's remaining federal-law claims.¹ The court declines to reach plaintiff's pendent state-law claims.

I

This is an action by plaintiff Jennifer Kaye Byers ("Byers") against defendants Navarro County d/b/a Navarro County Sheriff's Department ("Navarro County"), RichardHolloway ("Holloway"), Cindy Hightower ("Hightower"), Mervie Henry ("Henry"), and Brenda O'Pry ("O'Pry")² to recover on claims under § 1983 and state law.³ Byers was confined as a pretrial detainee at the Navarro County jail from approximately March 2008 to May 23, 2008. Holloway was formerly employed as a deputy sheriff, Hightower and Henry are employed as jailers at the Navarro County jail, and O'Pry was formerly employed at the jail. Byers avers that defendants are liable for their conduct during her pretrial detention. She alleges an excessive force claim under § 1983 against Holloway, Hightower, Henry, and O'Pry; she sues Navarro County under § 1983 for the use of excessive force by county officials; she alleges under § 1983 that the individual defendants failed to protect her against a fellow detainee; she asserts that Navarro County is liable under § 1983 for denying her medical and psychiatric care;⁴ and she sues all defendants under state law for assault, battery, and other state-law claims.

All defendants except for O'Pry move for summary judgment.⁵ Byers opposes the motion.

II

Because defendants are moving for summary judgment on claims as to which Byers will bear the burden of proof at trial, they can obtain summary judgment as to the claim in question by pointing the court to the absence of evidence on any essential element of the claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once they do so, Byers must go beyond her pleadings and designate specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Byers on the claim in question. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Byers' failure to produce proof as to any essential element of the claim renders all other facts regarding that claim immaterial. See Trugreen Landcare, L.L.C. v. Scott, 512 F.Supp.2d 613, 623 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Fitzwater, J.). Summary judgment for defendants is mandatory as to the claim in question if Byers fails to meet this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

The court can raise sua sponte that summary judgment is warranted on a particular claim, provided it affords Byers notice and a fair opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Jackson v. Fed. Express Corp., 2006 WL 680471, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2006) (Fitzwater, J.)(citing Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aries Marine Corp., 932 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1991)).

III

Byers asserts an excessive force claim under § 1983 against Holloway, Hightower, Henry (collectively, the "individual defendants"), and O'Pry. The individual defendants move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity,⁶ and the court raises sua sponte that O'Pry is also entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

A

"Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law." Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 504 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984)). "Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it designates. Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate toliability under § 1983." Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)).

The doctrine of quality immunity protects government officials from suit and liability for civil damages under § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Once qualified immunity is asserted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).

First, Byers must show a violation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Second, Byers must establish that the right at issue was clearly established at the time and in the specific context of the alleged misconduct. See id. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). "The defendant's acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant's circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the United States Constitution or the federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff." Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tx., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (citing Anderson v.Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)); see also, e.g., Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 500 F.3d 401, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Zarnow I") ("If reasonable public officials could differ as to whether the defendants' actions were lawful, the defendants are entitled to immunity.") (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "The 'defendant's circumstances' includes facts know[n] to the defendant." Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457. Thus an official who has violated another's constitutional rights may still be eligible for qualified immunity. Id. (citing Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000); Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1997)).⁷

B

Byers relies in her brief on five instances of alleged excessive force that she maintains occurred between May 21 and 22:

(1) putting Plaintiff in the restraint chair the first time on May 21, 2008; (2) dislocating her jaw while she was already restrained; (3) leaving her in the restraint chair for a long period of time and after she had already calmed down; (4) putting her back in the restraint chair after she returned from the emergency room and was asleep due to the morphine she had been given for the pain; and (5) leaving her in the restraint chair all night the night of May 21-22, 2008.

P. Br. 21-22.⁸ She bases her excessive force claim on the following facts. On May 21, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Holloway and Henry were called to Byers' separation cell in response to reports that she was "yelling and kicking on her cell door." P. App. 9, 12. Byers was banging her head against the wall. Holloway arrived first. Byers alleges that Holloway entered her cell "with gas and a mask like he was going to gas [her]," id. at 9,⁹ which Holloway denies. After Holloway allegedly "put the gas down" and handcuffed Byers, Henry entered. Id. at 9, 461. Together, they brought Byers to the "rubber room"—i.e., the violent cell—which is padded. Byers continued to bang her head against the wall as she was being escorted down the hallway. She alleges that "[o]n the way to the rubber room [Holloway] allowed me to bang my head on the wall. He would laugh and say for me to bang my head more." Id. at 9. Holloway denies this. When they arrived at the rubber room, Holloway observed that a male was present in the neighboring separation cell, so he instead took Byers to another separation cell.¹⁰ They did not reach that cell, however, because, according to Holloway, Byers kicked her feet from under herself and fell to the floor whilethey were walking. Holloway called for a restraint chair, and they escorted Byers down the hall to the chair, which was allegedly near Captain Tommy Nichols' ("Captain Nichols'") office.

According to Byers, Henry, Hightower, and (she "believe[s]") O'Pry were involved in strapping her into the restraint chair. After she had been fully restrained, Holloway "put a finger or knuckle in the right side of [her] neck" or used a "choke or other type of hold," and she "felt a sharp pain."¹¹ P. Br. 10; P. App. 10. Byers then "started hollering over and over, 'he's hurting me.'" P. App. 10. The officers then moved her chair to the recreation yard, where "the left side of [her] face began to swell and [her] lip began [drooping]." Id.

The individual defendants contest several of Byers' assertions. They first challenge her allegations that Henry, Hightower, and O'Pry were involved in the incident. Holloway stated in a report submitted the next day, and testified by deposition, that Henry and Sharon Williams ("Williams"), a detention officer, strapped Byers into the restraint chair. Henry denies being present. She maintains that her shift ended at 4 p.m. that day and that she was only informed when she returned to work at 8 a.m. the following day that Byers had been left...