Byers v. Southeastern Newspaper Corp. Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 62999,62999
• Citation: 288 S.E.2d 698,161 Ga.App. 717
• Parties: , 3 Ed. Law Rep. 203, 8 Media L. Rep. 1597 Thomas H. BYERS v. SOUTHEASTERN NEWSPAPER CORPORATION INC. d/b/a Savannah News-Press.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 698

288 S.E.2d 698

161 Ga.App. 717, 3 Ed. Law Rep. 203,

8 Media L. Rep. 1597

Thomas H. BYERS v. SOUTHEASTERN NEWSPAPER CORPORATION INC. d/b/a Savannah News-Press.

No. 62999.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 1, 1982.

Certiorari Denied April 21, 1982.

Gilbert L. Stacy, Savannah, for appellant.

Thomas H. Gignilliat, Morton G. Forbes, Savannah, for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Defendant-appellee, Southeastern Newspaper Corporation, Inc., published an article in the May 27, 1979 edition of its newspaper which commented on the present status and past activities of plaintiff-appellant, Thomas H. Byers, as Dean of Savannah State College. Entitled "Byers Doubts Legality of Hall's Plan", the article quotes from a memorandum which appellant had written to Clyde Hall, Savannah State College's acting president, challenging Hall's authority and questioning the wisdom of Hall's plan to abolish the position which appellant held as Dean of the College. Subsequently, appellant instituted an action for libel against appellee alleging that he had sustained damages as the result of certain defamatory falsehoods contained in this article. Appellee answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting, among other defenses, an absence of malice and a constitutional privilege based upon its contention that the article commented "upon a matter of public interest involving a public official's activities in connection with the public office which he held." Following discovery, appellee moved for summary judgment based upon the pleadings, depositions and other matters filed with the court. From the order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, appellant brings this appeal.

In related enumerations of error appellant attacks the merits of the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee, contending that under the evidence of record genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination. Resolution of this question requires that we establish as a predicate the applicable legal principles and parameters within which the facts of the instant case must be considered. In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court recognized the necessity of balancing the interest of individuals in the protection of their reputation against the necessity of insuring compliance with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. Finding that certain rules of law historically applied in defamation cases created a potential for self-censorship of the press which "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate," the Court held liability could not be imposed for statements defaming a public official concerning his official conduct absent a showing "that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26. Subsequently, the "New York Times" rule applicable to "public officials" was extended to require proof of actual malice in cases involving defamation of a "public figure". See Curtic Publishing Co. v. Butts and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1995, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

In 1971, it appeared that this was a shift of emphasis from the status of the individual defamed to a focus on the nature of the controversy. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) the "public interest" test established in Rosenbloom was rejected in favor of a return to an analysis based upon the status of the individual defamed. In attempting to define who is a "public figure" for purposes of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Gertz created two subclassifications, to wit: (1) Persons who are public figures for all purposes; and, (2) persons who are public figures for the purposes of a particular public controversy. With regard to the first subclass, the Court reasoned that in some instances an individual may attain a position "of such persuasive power and influence" and "achieve such persuasive fame or notoriety", that he has become a public figure in all situations. Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 345, 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 3012. The Court further stated that "[a]bsent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013. Accord, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 165, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979). See generally, Williams v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 140 Ga.App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).

The Court in Gertz acknowledged that it is more common that persons will fall within the second category of "public figures"-- individuals who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. This limited-purpose public figure is "an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. In determining whether an individual is a public figure for a limited purpose the court must look "to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013.

Turning to the facts of the instant case, the newspaper article here at issue involves the proposed restructuring of the administration of a local public college which, apparently, was a matter of general public interest and concern within the publication's area of circulation. Furthermore, appellant concedes that the allegedly defamatory falsehoods contained in the article were not published with "actual malice" as that term has been defined by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, and its progeny. The determination of the "status" of appellant is thus critical to the existence of liability on the part of appellee. If appellant is a private individual, genuine issues of material fact remain for resolution by the finder of facts and, thus, summary judgment was improper. On the other hand, if appellant is a "public official" or "public figure", as urged by appellee, liability may not be imposed, there being no contention as to existence of actual malice.

Appellee argues that, by virtue of appellant's position as Dean of Savannah State College, he is a "public official" within the purview of the rule enunciated in New York Times Co., supra. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 at 85, 86 S.Ct. 669 at 675, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966), while discussing the concept of "public officials", the Court stated: "[T]he 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." The Court added: "Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performances of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, [the 'New York Times' rule applies]." 383 U.S. at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676.

While there are no Georgia decisions directly on point, other jurisdictions have found teachers and others holding positions of responsibility in a public educational system to be "public officials" under the "New York Times" rule. Based upon varying rationales, including but not limited to findings that the public has "an independent interest in the qualifications and performances of the person holding the position" and that the position invited public scrutiny, the following school personnel have been designated "public officials": A...