Byers v. State
| Citation | 856 So.2d 954 |
| Parties | Reginald BYERS v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Decision Date | 31 January 2003 |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Reginald J. Byers, pro se.
Andrew W. Redd, gen. counsel, and William F. Addison, asst. gen. counsel, Department of Corrections.
Reginald Byers appeals the circuit court's summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein he alleged that he was denied due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding. He was found guilty in the disciplinary proceeding of violating Rule No. 41 in Annex A to the Alabama Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulation No. 403 (), and Rule No. 91 in Annex A to the Alabama Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulation No. 403 (). Byers was sanctioned with removal from work release, 30 days' extra duty, and 45 days' loss of all privileges. Byers did not lose any good time.
In his petition, Byers contended that he was denied due process in the prison disciplinary proceeding because, according to him, the hearing officer's decision was based solely on hearsay, none of the witnesses to the incident testified, and the hearing officer did not make an inquiry into the reliability of the informant who provided the information used to find him guilty of the violations. Thus, he claimed, the evidence against him failed to meet the "some-evidence" standard and the hearing officer's finding was arbitrary and capricious. Byers attached to his petition copies of the disciplinary reports. The Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) that Byers's punishment did not involve the loss of a liberty interest; and (3) that, notwithstanding its position that Byers's punishment did not involve the loss of a liberty interest, Byers had, in fact, been afforded due process. The DOC attached to its motion to dismiss partial copies1 of the disciplinary reports from Byers's disciplinary hearings and a copy of the institutional incident report completed by the arresting officer, on which the hearing officer relied. Byers filed a response to the DOC's motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition, stating, "The above-styled Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus having been considered by the Court along with the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion is well taken and the above-styled Petition is due to be dismissed and denied." (C. 30.)
The DOC, in its brief on appeal, cites established caselaw holding that confinement in segregation for disciplinary reasons, security or custody classifications, or the loss of privileges does not create a liberty interest or trigger the due-process protections under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). However, the DOC acknowledges that Byers's removal from work release did involve a liberty interest, see Ex parte Berry, 794 So.2d 307 (Ala.2000), but it maintains that Byers was afforded due process in compliance with Wolff.
In Wolff, 418 U.S. at 541-42, 94 S.Ct. 2963, the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires that a prisoner in a disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is implicated must be afforded advance (no less than 24 hours) notice of the charge against him; the right to be present at the disciplinary hearing; the right to present documentary evidence on his behalf; a qualified right to have a representative present on his behalf; a qualified right to call witnesses; and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision of the disciplinary body. See Brown v. State, 592 So.2d 621, 623 (Ala.1991); and Zamudio v. State, 615 So.2d 156, 157 (Ala. Crim.App.1993). In Thompson v. State, 504 So.2d 747, 748 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), this Court, relying on Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), stated that in order to satisfy due process, there must be "some evidence" to support the decision by the prison disciplinary board that the inmate is guilty of the alleged violation. The relevant question is then whether there is some evidence in the record that could support the conclusions reached by the hearing officer. See Thompson, 504 So.2d at 748; see also Heidelburg v. State, 522 So.2d 337, 339 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).
The disciplinary reports in the record indicate that the hearing officer's finding of guilt was based on "the arresting officer's incident report, the statements given by Ms. Pruitt, and other statements [given by individuals] who wished not to be named." (C. 7, 10.) Each of the disciplinary reports contains the following findings of fact by the hearing officer:
(C. 7, 10.) The record reflects that the arresting officer testified during the hearing as follows:
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