Byers v. State

• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SHAW.
• Citation: 856 So.2d 954
• Decision Date: 31 January 2003
• Parties: Reginald BYERS v. STATE of Alabama.

856 So.2d 954

Reginald BYERS
v.
STATE of Alabama

CR-02-0135.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

January 31, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 14, 2003.

856 So.2d 955

Reginald J. Byers, pro se

Andrew W. Redd, gen. counsel, and William F. Addison, asst. gen. counsel, Department of Corrections.

SHAW, Judge.

Reginald Byers appeals the circuit court's summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein he alleged that he was denied due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding. He was found guilty in the disciplinary proceeding of violating Rule No. 41 in Annex A to the Alabama Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulation No. 403 (making false statements or charges), and Rule No. 91 in Annex A to the Alabama Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulation No. 403 (conspiracy to commit a violation of departmental or institutional rules). Byers was sanctioned with removal from work release, 30 days' extra duty, and 45 days' loss of all privileges. Byers did not lose any good time.

In his petition, Byers contended that he was denied due process in the prison disciplinary proceeding because, according to him, the hearing officer's decision was based solely on hearsay, none of the witnesses to the incident testified, and the hearing officer did not make an inquiry into the reliability of the informant who provided the information used to find him guilty of the violations. Thus, he claimed, the evidence against him failed to meet the "some-evidence" standard and the hearing officer's finding was arbitrary and capricious. Byers attached to his petition copies of the disciplinary reports. The Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) that Byers's punishment did not involve the loss of a liberty interest; and (3) that, notwithstanding its position that Byers's punishment did not involve the loss of a liberty

856 So.2d 956

interest, Byers had, in fact, been afforded due process. The DOC attached to its motion to dismiss partial copies¹ of the disciplinary reports from Byers's disciplinary hearings and a copy of the institutional incident report completed by the arresting officer, on which the hearing officer relied. Byers filed a response to the DOC's motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition, stating, "The above-styled Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus having been considered by the Court along with the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion is well taken and the above-styled Petition is due to be dismissed and denied." (C. 30.)

The DOC, in its brief on appeal, cites established caselaw holding that confinement in segregation for disciplinary reasons, security or custody classifications, or the loss of privileges does not create a liberty interest or trigger the due-process protections under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). However, the DOC acknowledges that Byers's removal from work release did involve a liberty interest, see Ex parte Berry, 794 So.2d 307 (Ala.2000), but it maintains that Byers was afforded due process in compliance with Wolff.

In Wolff, 418 U.S. at 541-42, 94 S.Ct. 2963, the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires that a prisoner in a disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is implicated must be afforded advance (no less than 24 hours) notice of the charge against him; the right to be present at the disciplinary hearing; the right to present documentary evidence on his behalf; a qualified right to have a representative present on his behalf; a qualified right to call witnesses; and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision of the...