Byers v. Territory

• Decision Date: 15 March 1909
• Citation: 100 P. 261,1 Okla.Crim. 677,1909 OK CR 22
• Parties: BYERS v. TERRITORY.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

100 P. 261

1 Okla.Crim. 677, 1909 OK CR 22

BYERS v. TERRITORY.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

March 15, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

Expert testimony is not admissible upon questions which the court or jury can decide upon the facts. When the relation of facts and their practicable results can be determined without special skill or study, the facts themselves must be given in evidence, and the conclusions and inferences must be drawn by the jury; but, to render the admission of such expert testimony reversible error, it must tend to solve or to determine some issue in the case adversely to the accused and if it be clear that its admission did not do so, or in some manner injuriously affected the accused, this court will not reverse the judgment of the court below because of its admission.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1059; Dec. Dig. §§ 471, 1169. ^[*]]

This court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, where the record before it shows that the accused had a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury and trial judge, simply because harmless error may have occurred at the trial.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3085; Dec. Dig. § 1162. ^[*]]

It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to overrule a motion for new trial based on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, if such evidence is unimportant, immaterial, or cumulative, and the submission of such evidence to the jury would not have produced, or tended to produce, a different verdict from that rendered in the case.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 938. ^[*]]

It is not error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury at the request of the accused, if such requested instructions, though proper, are fairly covered by the general instructions given the jury by the trial court.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ^[*]]

Error from District Court, Comanche County; F. E. Gillette, Judge.

A. N. Byers was convicted of manslaughter, and he brought error to the Supreme Court, whence the cause is transferred to the Criminal Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

At the August, 1906, term of the district court the grand jury of Kiowa county returned an indictment against the plaintiff in error (hereinafter referred to as the accused), charging that on the 27th day of December, 1904, he committed the crime of murder by taking the life of his wife, Salinda Byers. At the same term of court a change of venue was granted on application of the accused, and the case was transferred to Comanche county for trial. At the September, 1906, term of the district court of Comanche county, the accused was tried and found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and on the 12th day of October, 1906, judgment was pronounced, sentencing the accused to the penitentiary for a term of 15 years. On March 25, 1907, an amended motion for a new trial, on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, was filed, said motion being supported by several affidavits. The amended motion for a new trial was overruled on the 5th day of April, 1907. An appeal was prosecuted from said judgment to the Supreme Court of this state, where the same was pending at the creation of this court. Upon the creation of this court said case was duly transferred.

A. J. Morris and Stilwell H. Russell, for plaintiff in error.

Charles West, Atty. Gen., and Charles L. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BAKER J.

The accused relies upon the following assignments of error: "(1) The court erred in admitting certain evidence on behalf of the defendant in error; (2) the court erred in excluding evidence offered by the plaintiff in error; (3) the court erred in its instruction to the jury; (4) the court erred in overruling a motion for a new trial on behalf of the plaintiff in error; (5) the court erred in rendering judgment against the plaintiff in error; (6) the court erred in overruling plaintiff in error's motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence; (7) the court erred in refusing certain instructions requested by the plaintiff in error; (8) error of the court occurring at the trial and excepted to by the defendant."

The first error claimed is directed to the admission of testimony of Dr. Miller over the objection of the accused. The doctor was asked the following question: "I will ask you if a woman of the build and stature of Mrs. Byers, dressed in the manner and condition in which you found her at the time of her death, could have taken the pistol, a double action, say, with a barrel four inches in length, and have inflicted, holding it in her right hand, the wound on her person such as you found under the arm and on the left side of the body?" The doctor's answer was that it would have been impossible for the deceased to have inflicted the wound from which she died. A similar question was asked Dr. Voyles, and he was permitted, over the objections of the accused, to answer, and answered: "It is inconveniently possible, but not probable." It is urged by counsel for the accused that prejudicial error occurred in the admission of the testimony of said doctors, on the ground that the evidence does not relate to any trade, science, or profession, but relates solely to a physical fact, of which the jury, as a matter of common knowledge, were as competent to judge as the witnesses. This court recognizes the rule that expert evidence is incompetent if the facts proposed to be proved are within the common experience of mankind. This court believes that it is much safer to confine the testimony of witnesses to the facts, in all cases where it is practicable, and leave the jury to exercise their judgment and experience upon the facts proved; that it is generally safer to take the judgments of unskilled jurors than the opinions of hired, and generally biased, experts. Still we are not ready to discard expert testimony, as in many cases it is both essential and important.

The question therefore arises: Was the testimony complained of in the light of all the evidence in the case, prejudicial to the material rights of the accused, and was the testimony of such character as to prejudice the rights of the accused? In other words, did the admission of this testimony deprive the accused of a fair and impartial trial? The question can only be properly determined by a careful reading and investigation of all the evidence contained in the record. This we have done, and we find from the record that the evidence, though possibly improper as expert testimony, was not, in the light of all the testimony, harmful to the rights of the accused; the theory of the defense being that the accused was not guilty of the homicide, but that death resulted from wounds inflicted by the deceased, or in some way, in the struggle that ensued to prevent great bodily harm or possibly death to the accused. There is no controversy whatever about the cause of the death. No witness contradicted the statements made by the accused in explanation of the occurrence which resulted in the death of his wife. There is dispute about the location of the wounds, or the point of entrance, course, and exit of the bullets that produced the wounds found upon the body of the deceased. The accused was given the greatest latitude by the trial court in describing the scenes and occurrences at the time of the homicide. Other witnesses were permitted, without objection, to locate and describe the wounds upon the deceased, their entrance, course, and exit through the head and body, and all the surrounding facts and circumstances in detail. We find the case of Wells v. Territory of Oklahoma, 14 Okl. 436, 78 P. 124, on the question of harmless error in the introduction of expert testimony an instructive one, and seems to us to be the law. The second syllabus reads: "Where a witness, who is qualified as a medical expert, as coroner had made a careful examination of the body of the deceased and the surroundings shortly after the homicide, and, after having described the wound, points of entrance, and exit and direction of the bullet through the body, and all of the surrounding facts and circumstances in detail, was permitted to give his opinion as to the position of the deceased at the time that the wound was inflicted, and where the defendant admits the killing, and there is no issue on which the testimony could operate against him, held, if error, harmless, and would afford no ground for reversal." Another very carefully considered case is the case of Coyle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 604, 21 S.W. 765, the fourth syllabus reading as follows: "On a trial for murder, where the physician testified that from his examination of the wound and clothing of deceased immediately after the homicide, etc., it was his opinion that at the time the shot was fired the right arm of deceased was hanging at his side, slightly to the rear of a perpendicular line, held that, conceding the position of deceased's arm could not thus be proved, still to render the admission of such testimony reversible error it must tend to solve some issue in the case adversely to the defendant; and, if it be clear that its admission did not do so, nor in some way injuriously affect him, this court would not be authorized to reverse the judgment because of its admission." These cases we believe correctly state the law. We, therefore, approve them. See, also, cases cited in 12 Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 449. We think that in the light of all the testimony in this case, the testimony of both Dr. Miller and Dr. Voyles was not in the least harmful or prejudicial to the accused, and the court did not therefore...