Byrd Companies, Inc. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 06 December 1991
• Citation: 591 So.2d 844
• Parties: The BYRD COMPANIES, INC. v. Charles William SMITH, et al. 1900586.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 844

591 So.2d 844

The BYRD COMPANIES, INC. v. Charles William SMITH, et al.

1900586.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 6, 1991.

Jesse P. Evans III of Najjar, Denaburg, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Joseph B. Mays, Jr., Frank C. Galloway III and Michael S. Dennison of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellees.

ALMON, Justice.

The defendant appeals from a judgment enjoining it from trespassing on the plaintiffs' land and requiring it to remove all water pipes and other materials that it had installed on the plaintiffs' land. The trial court stayed the injunction pending this appeal. The issues are whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiffs to join indispensable parties and whether the court erred in holding that the defendant's actions had extinguished an easement on the plaintiffs' land.

The plaintiffs are the Vestaclaire Office Condominium Association, Inc. ("Vestaclaire"), and four individuals, Charles Smith, Laura Smith, Laurence Bannon, and Charlotte Bannon. The property that is the subject of this action ("the Vestaclaire property") is a lot with a building known as "the Vestaclaire Office Condominiums." The Smiths and the Bannons own condominium units within the building and, therefore, fractional shares of the common areas of the Vestaclaire property.

According to testimony at the hearing held by the trial court, Vestaclaire is responsible for the care, maintenance, and administration of the Vestaclaire property. The defendant, Byrd Companies, Inc. ("Byrd"), is the owner of land adjacent to the Vestaclaire property. The boundary line between the Byrd property and the Vestaclaire property is the center line for a 10-foot-wide easement for public utilities.

In his order, the trial judge described the arrangement of the land as follows:

"Lot F is a corner lot bounded on the south by Kentucky Avenue and on the west by Montclaire Lane. [Vestaclaire owns Lot F.] On the north or northeast boundary is Lot G, which in turn is adjoined on its northeast boundary by five lots extended in an arc and numbered in descending order, 14 through 10, each lying northeast of the next adjacent lot. On the east boundary of Lot F, Lot G, and Lots 10 though 14, is a very large tract identified as Lot 15. [Byrd owns Lots G, 10 through 14, and 15.]

"The plat of the survey of First Addition to Vestavia Hills Shopping Center is recorded in Map Book 45, Page 81, in the Probate Office of Jefferson County, Alabama, and shows on its face an easement labelled, '10 ft. easement for public utilities,' extending a width of an equal distance on each side of the boundary line between Lots F, G, and 10 through 14 on one side of the boundary line, and Lot 15 on the other side of the boundary line.

"It is this ten foot easement extending five feet on each side of the boundary line between Lot F and Lot 15 which is the subject of the present controversy."

Byrd's property and the Vestaclaire property form an entire block surrounded by four streets. Thus, no other property is affected by the easement at issue. For several years, Byrd has operated a shopping complex on its land, using its seven lots as a single unit. A few months prior to the filing of this action, Byrd began renovation and remodeling of the shopping complex. As part of the renovation and remodeling, Byrd had a new building constructed. The building occupied Byrd's land up to a point one inch from the boundary line between the Vestaclaire property and Lot 15. Byrd's construction of the building on the five feet of the easement located on Byrd's property effectively prevented use of Byrd's land for installation of public utilities.

The trial judge's order described the situation as follows:

"As owner of the land on both sides of the easement beginning with Lot G and proceeding through Lots 10 through 14, all of which have a common boundary with Lot 15, Byrd has effectively vacated the easement for all practical purposes by constructing buildings on the ten feet lying along the boundary line and indicated on the plat as reserved for public utilities.

"In addition to eliminating the ten foot easement from Lot G proceeding northeasterly in an arc through Lots 10 through 14, Byrd has also closed off or eliminated five feet of the ten feet reserved for the easement between Lot F and Lot 15 by building on the five feet of the easement located on the Lot 15 side of the boundary line between Lot F and Lot 15.

"It is the remaining five feet of the ten foot easement lying on the Lot F side of the boundary line between Lot F and Lot 15 which is the subject of the present controversy."

To provide the new building with water, Byrd installed water pipes on the Vestaclaire land. After notifying Byrd that trespass would not be tolerated, the plaintiffs filed their complaint, requesting an injunction and damages for trespass. After a hearing, the trial court found that Byrd's construction of the building extinguished the easement for public utilities and granted the injunction. The trial court also stated in its order that the amount of damages due to Byrd's trespass would be determined following Byrd's removal of the water pipes from the Vestaclaire property. ¹

Byrd first argues that the injunction is void because of the plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable parties, namely, the other two owners of condominium units within the office building, James Chamg and the estate of Charles Estes.

As Byrd correctly points out, all owners of condominium units also own an undivided interest in the common elements of the condominium property, as set forth in the declaration of condominium ownership. Ala.Code 1975, § 35-8-6. Condominium property includes not only all of the property covered by the declaration, but also any easements, rights, and interests belonging to the land or intended for the benefit of the land. Ala.Code 1975, § 35-8-2(6). Chamg and the estate of Charles Estes are therefore owners of an undivided interest in the real estate and the easement involved. However, the plaintiffs' failure to join them in this action, prior to obtaining the injunction, does not render the injunction void.

Rule 19, Ala.R.Civ.P., provides for joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. Its purposes include the promotion of judicial efficiency and the final determination of litigation by including all parties directly interested in the controversy. Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 69, 300 So.2d 100, 105 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Bardin v. Jones, 371 So.2d 23 (Ala.1979). Where the parties before the court adequately represent the absent parties' interests and the absent parties could easily intervene should they fear inadequate representation, no reason exists why the trial court could not grant meaningful relief to the parties before the court. Ross v. Luton, 456 So.2d 249, 257 (Ala.1984). Also, joinder of the absent parties is not absolutely necessary where determination of the controversy will not result in a loss to the absent parties' interest or where the action does not seek a judgment against them. Morgan Plan Co. v. Bruce, 266 Ala. 494, 497-98, 97 So.2d 805, 808 (1957). A defendant's delay and its self-serving purpose for raising the issue have also been held to be proper considerations in determining whether a judgment is proper in the absence of a particular party. J.R. McClenney & Son, Inc. v. Reimer, 435 So.2d 50, 52 (Ala.1983). See also, Geer Bros., Inc. v. Walker, 416 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Ala.Civ.App.1982).

This Court has also held, however, that in cases where the final judgment will affect ownership of an interest in real property, all parties claiming an interest in the real property must be joined. Johnston v. White-Spunner, 342 So.2d 754, 759 (Ala.1977). However, Johnston is not applicable to this case. Johnston involved a boundary line dispute within a subdivision, and the trial court's judgment in Johnston established the boundary line to properties owned by parties who were not before the court. This Court held that, because the effect of the trial court's judgment would be to determine the boundary lines of property owned by absent parties, the absent parties were indispensable and the judgment entered in their absence was void. In the present case, the trial court's...