Byrd v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 October 1994
• Parties: Carole BYRD, Appellant, v. Lila BROWN, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 192

617 N.Y.S.2d 192

208 A.D.2d 582

Carole BYRD, Appellant, v. Lila BROWN, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Oct. 11, 1994.

Jeffrey Spencer Schecter, Garden City, for appellant.

Michael D. Hampden, Westchester/Putnam Legal Services, White Plains (John T. Hand and Gary W. Bieber, of counsel), for respondent.

Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and O'BRIEN, RITTER and FLORIO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action for the partition and sale of real property pursuant to RPAPL article 9, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Burrows, J.), entered November 18, 1992, which granted the motion of the defendant Lila Brown for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her and declaring her to be the sole owner in fee simple of the subject property.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The court properly imposed a constructive trust on the subject property in favor of the respondent in this case. It is well settled that the four factors necessary to impose a constructive trust are: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise, express or implied; (3) a transfer in reliance on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment (see, Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72, 351 N.E.2d 721). Generally, evidence of a friendship, without more, between the plaintiff's decedent and the respondent would be insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a confidential relationship between them (see, Prado v. De Latorre, 194 A.D.2d 656, 657, 599 N.Y.S.2d 124; Bontecou v. Goldman, 103 A.D.2d 732, 477 N.Y.S.2d 192; cf., Penato v. George, 82 A.D.2d 877, 440 N.Y.S.2d 314). However, the four factors are not an "unyielding formula which limits a court's freedom to fashion this equitable remedy" and the requirements are not to be rigidly applied (Bontecou v. Goldman, supra, at 733, 477 N.Y.S.2d 192; see, Bankers Security Life Ins. Soc. v. Shakerdge, 49 N.Y.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 623, 406 N.E.2d 440; Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 380 N.E.2d 189). Rather, "[a] constructive trust will be erected whenever necessary to satisfy the demands of justice" (Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 26-27, 85 N.E.2d 168; see, Simonds v. Simonds, supra ).

In the present case, the respondent overwhelmingly established that she paid all costs related to the purchase of the subject property, that she made all mortgage payments on the property, and that she paid all expenses related to the repair and maintenance of the property. Further, there was evidence that the plaintiff's decedent's name was placed on the deed to the subject property as...