Byrd v. Byrd

Decision Date08 June 1942
Docket Number34922.
Citation193 Miss. 249,8 So.2d 510
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesBYRD v. BYRD.

O F. Moss, of Lucedale, for appellant.

John W. Backstrom, of Leakesville, for appellee.

ALEXANDER Justice.

The basis upon which a former reversal of the case rested was the alleged invalidity of the tax sale to the state and its patent to appellee. In adjudging this question sufficient emphasis was lacking upon the fact that the assessment upon which the tax sale was founded was approved by the board of supervisors at its July 1930 meeting, which was a meeting "for the transaction of business under the revenue law" at which the board "may continue in session as long as business may require." Code 1930, Sections 202, 3162. Since the July meeting was finally adjourned on a day prior to the expiration of its allowable limits, the authorities cited in our former opinion (Sharp v Smith, 180 Miss. 887, 178 So. 595; Davis v Grice, 141 Miss. 412, 106 So. 631; Hunter v Bennett, 149 Miss. 368, 115 So. 204; City of Grenada v. Grenada Company, 167 Miss. 814, 150 So. 657; and Price v. Harley, 142 Miss. 584, 107 So. 673) are not applicable.

We are led therefore to reexamine the effect of a recess by the board from one day to a later day, both of which are within the statutory limits of the time authorized for a regular meeting. This question was raised but left undetermined as unnecessary to the decision in Davis v. Grice, supra. We are now confronted directly with the question whether the order of the board on Friday, July 11, 1930, to reconvene the following Monday constituted the latter session an "adjourned meeting" under Code 1930, Section 203, at which no business could be disposed of unless the order therefor "shall specify each matter of business to be transacted thereat." While it is true that the board at its session on Wednesday, July 9th, ordered that on such date the board should "in regular session, proceed to examine, pass upon and equalize each and all assessments of property both real and personal, listed and contained in the said assessment rolls, and that it continue so to do until it complete the equalization of all property so contained in said rolls of the county", it is conceded that the recessing order of Friday, July 11th, did not specify each matter of business to be transacted the following Monday, and that on Wednesday, July 16th, it entered its order finally approving the assessment rolls as equalized.

In determining whether the meeting on Monday, July 14th, was an "adjourned meeting" within the purview of the statute or a mere recess during and as a continuation of a regular meeting, it is appropriate to consider the evident purpose of the Legislature in requiring that at an adjourned meeting the board may consider only such matters as have been designated in the order providing for such meeting. It is important that all persons interested in the business to be transacted by the board be advised by proper notice so that they may know when they may present claims, petitions or other matters, and also keep advised of its proceedings so as to remain alert to any discussions or proposed action which may affect their interests. The statute furnishes such notice as to all regular meetings, at which there may be transacted all business over which the board is given jurisdiction. Moreover, at its July meeting it must equalize its tax rolls. When the board has finally adjourned its regular meeting, not only may the nature of its transacted business be revealed by its minutes but all interested parties are thereafter free to suspend their attention to and scrutiny over its proceedings until the next regular meeting. So long as the board remains in regular session and its minutes show no final discontinuance thereof, all persons are charged with notice that it is free to transact all matters proper at such meeting, and it should be presumed that they would consider such business as the law required them to consider, especially when, as here, it had on a previous day expressed by an order its intention to take up the matter of equalization and continue until it was completed.

If a final adjournment is to be construed as an assurance to the public that no other matters would be considered and done until the next regular meeting, and since public necessity or emergency might require a consideration of other business too urgent to await the next regular meeting, special and adjourned meetings are provided for. As to these the public would not be charged with notice. Hence it is required that at such meetings, as distinct from a regular meeting, only such business may be transacted at an adjourned meeting as shall theretofore have been specified by an order entered at a regular meeting, and in a newspaper as to special meetings. Code 1930, Section 203.

It should be clear that since...

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8 cases
  • Tally v. Board of Sup'rs of Smith County
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 10 November 1975
    ...where specifically required by statute or in unusual circumstances, in order for the Boards to conduct their business. Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510 (1942). This statutory notice of the regularly scheduled meetings satisfies the constitutional guarantees of due process. See North......
  • COAST MATERIALS v. Harrison County
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 31 December 1998
    ...statute or in unusual circumstances, in order for the Boards to conduct their business. Tally, 323 So.2d at 548 (citing Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510 (1942)). Since Coast Materials was on constructive notice of public board meetings the lower court correctly found no due process ......
  • City of Picayune v. Mississippi Power Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 18 June 1952
    ...A regular meeting of this Board continues until terminated by an order of final adjournment, or by operation of law. Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510; Ex parte Mirande, 73 Calif. 365, 14 P. 888; Culpepper v. Phenix City, 216 Ala. 318, 113 So. 56; 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §......
  • $30,000 Road and Bridge Bonds of 1960, Sup'rs Dist. No. 3, Neshoba County, In re, 42062
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 25 September 1961
    ...minutes the items of business to be considered at the adjourned meeting. This opinion was, however, withdrawn in the case of Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 511, primarily on the ground that the matter taken up at the adjourned meeting was a revenue matter allowed by the above Sec. 202......
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