Byrd v. Lawrimore
| Decision Date | 04 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | 16073. |
| Citation | 47 S.E.2d 728,212 S.C. 281 |
| Parties | BYRD v. LAWRIMORE, County Treasurer. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Georgetown County; L. D. Lide, Judge.
Proceeding by J Frank Byrd for an order requiring Charles W. Lawrimore, as Treasurer of Georgetown County, S. C., to perform his alleged official duty by collecting, from the International Paper Company county taxes claimed to be payable for the years 1942 to 1946 inclusive. From the decree, petitioner appeals.
Joint resolution of General Assembly exempting certain manufacturing enterprises from taxes in Georgetown county for 10 years is not violative of constitutional provision requiring uniformity in taxation notwithstanding manufacturing plants specified were private enterprises, not public utilities. Joint Resolution April 27 1937, 40 St. at Large, p. 356; Const. art. 10, § 5.
The order of Judge Lide follows:
J Frank Byrd, the petitioner herein, a resident, citizen and taxpayer of the County of Georgetown seeks an order from the Court requiring Charles W. Lawrimore, Treasurer of Georgetown County, to perform his alleged official duty as such Treasurer by collecting from International Paper Company county taxes claimed to be payable for the year 1942 to 1946, inclusive, aggregating $403,950.53.
Although not formally named as a party to the proceeding, petitioner has had the petition and the rule to show cause granted thereon served on International Paper Company as well as on the respondent, Charles W. Lawrimore, Treasurer of Georgetown County. Both the named respondent and International Paper Company have filed a return, and it is understood that both of them are before the Court just as if they had been named as respondents.
The petition alleges that International Paper Company is a corporation doing business gain and special benefit to the owners of its capital stock, that under Article 8, Section 8, of the Constitution it was entitled to claim exemption from all county taxes except for school purposes for the years 1937 to 1941, both inclusive, a period of five years, which exemption was granted, and that it also claims exemption for the years 1942 to 1946, include, an additional period of five years, under a joint resolution of the General Assembly of South Carolina passed in 1937, April 27, Acts 1937, No. 231, 40 St. at Large, p. 356. It is further alleged that the joint resolution of 1937 under which the exemption is claimed is null and void because in conflict with Article I, Sections 17 and 29, Article 8, Section 8, and Article 10, Sections 1, 4 and 5 of the Constitution of South Carolina, and with Section 2835, Code of 1942, and for the further reason that it is so indefinite as to be impossible of administration.
The return of Charles W. Lawrimore, as Treasurer of Georgetown County, and the return of International Paper Company each denies that it is the duty of the Treasurer or Georgetown County to collect the County taxes from International Paper Company for the years 1942 and 1946, inclusive, referred to in the petition, and in substance alleges that International Paper Company has been properly exempted from the payment of these taxes by the joint resolution of 1937 referred to in the petition and that such resolution was in all respects valid and effective.
The return of International Paper Company also contends that the proceedings herein are improperly brought in that the State is not made a party. Runion v. Latimer, 6 S.C. 126, may possibly lend some color to this contention, but the much later case of Milster v. City of Spartanburg, 68 S.C. 26, 46 S.E. 539, seems to hold to the contrary, and this contention of International Paper Company will, therefore, be overruled at this time and given no further consideration.
Neither return was in any way traversed by the petitioner other than the allegations in each of them to the effect that the location of the plant of International Paper Company in Georgetown County was beneficial to the County. The remaining allegations of the returns must, therefore, be accepted as true. Bryan v. Auditing Board, 94 S.C. 43, 77 S.E. 736; Pendarvis v. City of Orangeburg, 157 S.C. 496, 154 S.E. 756.
Although petitioner has not traversed the allegations of the returns other than as above stated, yet he has filed a motion to strike out certain allegations of the returns relating to the inducements leading up to the location of the plant of International Paper Company in Georgetown County and the benefits derived therefrom by the County. This motion is based on the ground that such allegations are irrelevant and redundant. It does not seem, however, that these allegations, in substance all relating to the enhancement of the public interests by the location of the plant in Georgetown County, are entirely without relevancy, and petitioner's motion to strike out will, therefore, be refused.
The joint resolution under which the exemption is claimed is as follows:
On the faith of the joint resolution of 1937 Southern Kraft Corporation erected and put into operation in Georgetown County a pulp and paper mill with a capacity of 450 tons of paper per day at an original cost of $8,140,000, and International Paper Company subsequent succeeded to all property, rights, privileges, powers, franchises and other interests of Southern Kraft Corporation and has expended the further sum of $12,330,000 for additions and improvements to the plant since acquiring it. It is admitted that International Paper Company comes within the terms of the joint resolutions and is entitled to the exemption therein provided for, if it is a valid legislative enactment.
It is not apparent how this joint resolution of 1937 can in any respect be in conflict with Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution providing that private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made therefor, or with Article I, Section 29, providing that the provisions of the Constitution shall be taken to be mandatory and prohibitory, and not merely directory, except where expressly made directory or permissory by its own terms, or with Section 2835, Code of 1942, providing that contracts entered into with intent to evade payment of taxes or in fraud of the tax laws of the State are against public policy. Nor am I able to see anything so indefinite about the joint resolution as to render it impossible of administration. In fact, petitioner's contentions in none of these respects seem to be seriously pressed, and in any event I am of the opinion that they are without substantial substance.
The real weight of petitioner's attack upon the validity of the joint resolution under which the tax exemption is claimed is based on these propositions: That the General Assembly has no power to exempt property from County taxes except such as is granted by Article 8, Section 8, or by Article 10, Section 1 or 4, of the Constitution, that the property of International Paper Company does not come within any of the classes of property thereby exempted or permitted to be exempted, and that Article 10, Section 5, is an express mandate requiring the property of International Paper Company to be taxed.
In Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481, 484, in discussing the rules by which the Court must be governed in considering the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature it is said:
'In determining this question it is to be observed that it is a well-settled rule in South Carolina that: A statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid; that a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; that every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; that it will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution; that all reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the validity of the Act; and that the Constitution of South Carolina is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, legislative power.
And in the same case the Court also went on further to say:
'The General Assembly has a right to pass such legislation as in its judgment may seem beneficial to the state, and to create such agencies of government as may be necessary to carry out its purpose, unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution. To the Legislature of South Carolina, consisting of the House and Senate, is granted the legislative power by the Constitution of 1895, article 3, § 1, in this broad language 'The...
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