Byrd v. Manning

• Decision Date: 29 January 1992
• Citation: 253 N.J.Super. 307,601 A.2d 770
• Parties: Jeffrey BYRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew MANNING, Individually and as Mayor of the Borough of Sea Bright; Charles Rooney; James Foorsman; C. Reed Murphy; William Fitzpatrick; Linda Hoorsager; Joan Brearley, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Council of the Borough of Sea Bright; Thomas Johnson, Individually and in his capacity as the Chief of Police of the Borough of Sea Bright; Borough of Sea Bright, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey; William Moore, Individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Borough Police Department; John Sorrentino, individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Police Department; and Steven Spahr, individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Borough Police Department, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 307

253 N.J.Super. 307

601 A.2d 770

Jeffrey BYRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew MANNING, Individually and as Mayor of the Borough of Sea Bright; Charles Rooney; James Foorsman; C. Reed Murphy; William Fitzpatrick; Linda Hoorsager; Joan Brearley, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Council of the Borough of Sea Bright; Thomas Johnson Individually and in his capacity as the Chief of Police of the Borough of Sea Bright; Borough of Sea Bright, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey; William Moore, Individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Borough Police Department; John Sorrentino individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Police Department; and Steven Spahr, individually and as an officer in the Sea Bright Borough Police Department Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Dec. 10, 1991.

Decided Jan. 29, 1992.

Harold J. Cassidy, Red Bank, for plaintiff-appellant (Cassidy, Foss & San Filippo, attorneys, Kathleen A. Sheedy, on the brief).

Warren W. Wilentz, Woodbridge, for defendants-respondents Sorrentino and Spahr (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys, Warren W. Wilentz, Charles M. Moriarty and Jeffrey L. Menkin, of counsel, Jeffrey L. Menkin on the brief).

Dwyer, Connell & Lisbona, Montclair, for defendants-respondents (Manning, Rooney, Foorsman, Murphy, Fitzpatrick, Hoorsager, Brearley, Johnson and the Borough of Sea Bright joined in the brief filed by Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Woodbridge).

Before Judges HAVEY and CONLEY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HAVEY, J.A.D.

Plaintiff appeals from an order for summary judgment dismissing his action instituted against defendants under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. In dismissing the complaint, the trial judge found that the action was time-barred under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, since it was not instituted within two years from the date plaintiff's cause of action accrued. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because: (1) the legislative objectives of the statute were satisfied; (2) defendants contributed to plaintiff's delay in filing the complaint; (3) plaintiff would have risked waiving his constitutional right against self-incrimination in a related criminal proceeding had he filed his civil complaint in a timely fashion, and (4) he was under duress inflicted by defendants which caused the delay. We affirm.

On January 2, 1988, defendants John Sorrentino, Steven Spahr and William Moore, Borough of Sea Bright police officers, arrested plaintiff outside a local tavern for using offensive language. Defendants claimed that during the arrest, plaintiff kicked one of the officers in the groin and butted him in the face as they were placing plaintiff in a police car. Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2b, resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2, and aggravated assault upon a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a).

On April 5, 1988 plaintiff filed a cross-criminal complaint against Officers Sorrentino and Spahr charging them with aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1), and official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2. On May 6, 1988, the Monmouth County Grand Jury "no billed" the charges against Officers Sorrentino and Spahr. It also declined to indict plaintiff and recommended that the aggravated assault charges against him be downgraded to simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a. The disorderly conduct, simple assault and resisting arrest charges were remanded to the Sea Bright Municipal Court and transferred to the Rumson Municipal Court for prosecution as disorderly persons offenses.

On May 11, 1989, plaintiff filed motions in the Law Division and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking orders permitting him to take pre-complaint depositions of defendants Sorrentino, Spahr and Moore pursuant to R. 4:11-1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 27, respectively. Plaintiff's certifications supporting the motions state that he "expects to bring an action in the United States District Court based upon a violation of his civil rights ... against" defendants. The federal court denied plaintiff's petition on June 19, 1989. Plaintiff's state petition was denied on June 23, 1989 by Judge Fundler, who noted on the order:

No authority for discovery at this time cited. No basis for perpetuation of evidence or testimony present in supporting papers. No New Jersey Court action contemplated per certification. Rule 4:11-1 not applicable and procedural requirements not complied with if it were.

After hearings conducted on July 12 and August 30, 1989, plaintiff was convicted in the Rumson Municipal Court of two counts of simple assault and acquitted on the resisting arrest charges. The original charge of disorderly conduct was dismissed pursuant to In re H.D., 206 N.J.Super. 58, 501 A.2d 1016 (App.Div.1985), which had declared N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2b unconstitutional. On February 9, 1990, plaintiff was again convicted of simple assault after his trial de novo in the Law Division, Criminal Part. ¹

On February 23, 1990, 52 days after the two-year statute of limitations expired, plaintiff filed a § 1983 action against defendants in the federal district court seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained during his January 2, 1988 arrest. Plaintiff filed an identical complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division on March 30, 1990. ² By order dated August 29, 1990, the federal court dismissed the complaint as being time-barred. Plaintiff thereupon moved for summary judgment in the state proceedings, arguing that his failure to institute suit within the two-year limitation was excusable, and defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. An order granting defendants' summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff's complaint was entered on June 25, 1990. ³ On September 28, 1990, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order was denied.

It is undisputed that state law determines the pertinent statute of limitations governing claims brought under § 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1943, 85 L.Ed.2d 254, 262 (1985). Plaintiff concedes that he failed to file either his federal or state § 1983 complaint within the two-year time limitation under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. However, he argues that the policy underpinnings to the statute were satisfied, thereby justifying a relaxation of the statute under the present circumstances.

The legislative objectives of statutes of limitations are to: (1) stimulate litigants to pursue their causes of action diligently so that answering parties will have a fair opportunity to defend; (2) prevent the litigation of stale claims; (3) penalize dilatoriness, and (4) serve as measures of repose. Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 90 N.J. 108, 112, 447 A.2d 163 (1982); Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 191-92, 412 A.2d 122 (1980). Our Supreme Court in Galligan noted:

Unswerving, "mechanistic" application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing these legislative purposes. See White [v. Violent Crimes Compensation Bd.], 76 N.J. at 378-379 [388 A.2d 206 (1978) ]. On numerous occasions we have found "such particular circumstances as to dictate not the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice." Kyle [v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc.], 44 N.J. at 109 [207 A.2d 513 (1965) ]. See, e.g., Kaczmarek [v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth.], 77 N.J. at 388 [390 A.2d 597 (1978) ]; Fox v. Passaic Gen'l Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 125-126 [363 A.2d 341 (1976); Lopez [v. Swyer ], 62 N.J. at 273-274 [300 A.2d 563 (1973) ]. A "just accommodation" of individual justice and public policy requires that "in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed." Id. at 274 Whenever dismissal would not further the Legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitation, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim. See Kaczmarek, 77 N.J. at 338 ; White, 76 N.J. at 379 . [82 N.J. at 192-93, 412 A.2d 122.]

Thus, "where defendants are on notice of the claims, and no significant prejudice results, the policy reasons for upholding a strict statute of limitations recede." W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 563, 562 A.2d 222 (1989). However, the Court has repeatedly cautioned that:

[i]n effect, the legislature has drawn an arbitrary line in creating any statute of limitations. Because that line fixes the time within which suit must be brought, it does not invite variations depending upon what the equities of a case may be. [Rivera v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co, 104 N.J. 32, 40, 514 A.2d 1296 (1986).]

Citing Galligan, plaintiff argues that the "unswerving" application of the statute of limitations here inflicts unnecessary harm without advancing the statute's legislative purposes. In Galligan, plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death complaint in the federal district court. The federal court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction because of lack of diversity and citizenship. However, while the motion to dismiss was pending in the federal court, plaintiff filed his state action 22 days after the statutory time period had expired. 82 N.J. at 190-91, 412 A.2d 122. The court found that the complaint should not be time-barred because a timely, albeit jurisdictionally deficient federal complaint had been filed and, further, that defendants had conceded that the mere lapse of 22 days had not prejudiced them in the defense of the action. Id. at 193, 412 A.2d 122.

This is not a case of a mistaken selection of a judicial forum having questionable or defective jurisdiction, as in Galligan. Here there was no question from the outset that both the...