Wimbush v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 22 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-4654(FLW) |
| Parties | PRESTON WIMBUSH Plaintiff, v. JOHN JENKINS, et al. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Preston Wimbush1 ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint in state court arising out of injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained on February 4, 2011. The Complaint, which includes claims sounding in, inter alia, tort, supervisory liability, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, was removed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447, based on this Court's federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims. See id., § 1367. Presently before the Court are several motions to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the various Defendants. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint is timely filed only with respect to Plaintiff's false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and derivative claims, and accordinglydismisses all other claims in the Complaint on the basis that they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity or are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident. Compl. On February 4, 2011, Plaintiff was on the premises of property in Trenton belonging to Defendant Candlelight Lounge, Inc. and Eulogio C. Bradley (collectively, "Candlelight"). Id. at Count Six, ¶ 2. While walking outside on Candlelight's property, Plaintiff was shot at several times by Defendant John Jenkins ("Jenkins")—then an employee of Defendant New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC")—who was using his NJDOC issued firearm3, causing Plaintiff to sustain severe injuries that required treatment. Id. at Count One, ¶¶ 1, 3-4. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant City of Trenton Police Department for aggravated assault. Id. at Count Seven, ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff's criminal charges were later dismissed by the state court. Id. at ¶ 6.
On February 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a thirteen-count Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey against Defendants Jenkins, Candlelight, NJDOC, as well as Defendant Jason Snyder ("Snyder") and the City of Trenton Police Department and City of Trenton (together, "Trenton Police") (collectively, "Defendants"). In Counts One through Three, Plaintiff brings personal injury tort claims against Jenkins. In Counts Four and Five, Plaintiff brings negligent supervision and respondeat superior claims against NJDOC, arising out of Jenkin's allegedconduct. In Count Six, Plaintiff brings a negligent premises liability claim against Candlelight. In Counts Seven through Nine, Plaintiff brings malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and gross negligence claims against Snyder, as well as unnamed defendants, arising out of Plaintiff's arrest and criminal proceedings, as well as a conspiracy to prevent wrongdoing claim in Count Twelve. In Counts Ten and Eleven, Plaintiff brings negligent supervision and respondeat superior claims against Trenton Police. Lastly, in Count Thirteen, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of his constitutional rights against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Trenton Police timely removed Plaintiffs Complaint to this Court on August 1, 2013. Defendants Jenkins, Snyder, and Trenton Police each filed an Answer. The Defendants then filed the following motions: (i) a motion to dismiss by Jenkins; (ii) a motion for summary judgment by Snyder; (iii) a motion for summary judgment by Candlelight; (iv) a motion for summary judgment by Trenton Police; and (v) a motion to dismiss by NJDOC. Plaintiff has opposed each of these motions.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[s] whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). As such, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not attack the merits of the action but merely tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (). In other words, to survive a Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
However, Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff need not meet any particular "probability requirement" but must show that there is "more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has act unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, "context matters in notice pleading" and a complaint will fail to state a claim if the "factual detail in the claim is so underdeveloped that it does not provide a defendant with the type of notice of a claim which is contemplated by Rule 8." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). For the plaintiff to prevail, the "complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief;" it must "'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35). However, the Third Circuit has emphasized that notwithstanding the foregoing, "a claimant does not have to 'set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.' . . . The pleading standard 'is not akin to a 'probability requirement," . . . . [T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Covington v. International Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted)).
A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996). The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, the opposing party must identify "specific facts which demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Orson, 79 F.3d at 1366.
Not every issue of fact will be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; issues of fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Further, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon mere allegations; he must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). In conducting a review of the facts, the non-moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences and the record is construed in the light most favorable to that party. See Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, it is not the Court's role to make findings of fact, but to analyze the facts presented and determine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 105 n.5 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249); Big Apple BMW v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint is poorly pleaded. In some Counts it initially appears that Plaintiff is bringing state law claims; only a thorough reading leads to the inference that Plaintiff is instead intending to bring a claim under § 1983 for a violation of his federal rights, asserting violations by certain Defendants "under color of law."Moreover, certain Counts refer ambiguously to "defendants," forcing the Court to attempt to discern from context which particular Defendant(s) are encompassed in each Count. Plaintiff's opposition papers do little to help resolve these problems.
Turning to the motions at issue, other than NJDOC, Defendants' motions are based solely on the contention that Plaintiff's Complaint was untimely filed.4 In addition to the statute of limitations defense, NJDOC has also moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, that Plaintiff failed to timely serve NJDOC, and that NJDOC cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in this matter. I address NJDOC's argument that all claims against it are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity first, as that implicates this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over NJDOC, and then proceed to the remaining Defendants' claims.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." The amendment precludes federal jurisdiction over a state...
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