Byrd v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1953
• Docket Number: No. 38799,38799
• Citation: 65 So.2d 249,217 Miss. 761
• Parties: BYRD et al. v. RESERVE LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 249

65 So.2d 249

217 Miss. 761

BYRD et al. v. RESERVE LIFE INS. CO.

No. 38799.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 8, 1953.

William S. Murphy, Lucedale, for appellants.

William A. Bacon, Jackson, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

Prentiss M. Byrd brought this suit in the Chancery Court of George County against Reserve Life Insurance Company, seeking the recovery of monthly disability benefits under the provisions of an accident insurance policy issued to him by the company. At the conclusion of the evidence introduced on behalf of the complainant, a motion was made by the defendant to dismiss the original bill and this motion was sustained and accordingly a decree was entered dismissing the original bill with prejudice. It is from this decree that this appeal is prosecuted. During the pendency of this appeal, the said Prentiss M. Byrd died and the cause was revived in the name of his widow and two minor children.

The facts with reference to the injuries claimed to have been sustained by the said Byrd, and for which the monthly disability benefits are claimed, have heretofore been before this Court. In the case of Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, Miss., 60 So.2d 645, which involved a claim by the said Byrd for compensation for the same injuries, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1942, Sec. 6998-01 et seq., and wherein an award of compensation was approved, it was held that the injuries in question were accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment of the claimant.

The pertinent provisions of the policy under review on this appeal are as follows:

'Reserve Life Insurance Company, Dallas, Texas, hereinafter called company, hereby insures Prentiss M. Byrd, hereinafter called insured, subject to all of the provisions and limitations hereinafter contained, against loss of life, limb, sight or time resulting directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury sustained while this policy is in effect, said bodily injury being hereinafter referred to as such injury.'

The injuries of the deceased Byrd arose as follows: He was employed by the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation at Pascagoula, Mississippi, as a chipper. He was required to perform his work in the innerbottom of a ship, which was a small compartment about two feet wide, three feet long, and three and a half feet high. His work consisted of chipping off the burrs or surplus metal left in the process of welding, and in the performance of his work he used a chipping hammer, which is an instrument directed by hand and operated by about 90 pounds of air pressure. Because of the small dimensions of the compartment in which he worked, he usually got on his knees and braced his back against a strip of iron about four feet wide called a 'strong back' and installed in the compartment to steady the bulkhead. This was done to protect himself from the vibration resulting from the operation of the chipping hammer. The particular compartment in which he was working at the time he sustained the injuries in question was of such small dimensions, however, that he squatted on his feet and braced his back against the strong back. While so engaged in his work on the occasion involved, he felt a severe pain in his back. Thereafter, he began to experience numbness in his limbs, and on consultation with a doctor and after an operation to which he was subjected in a hospital in Mobile, it was discovered that he had an angiomatous malformation, being a growth or malformation of blood vessels which extended from the level of the twelfth through the ninth vertebrae. He did not know of this condition at the time he entered his employment, and in fact, he was subjected to a physical examination upon entering his employment and found to be physically fit to engage in hard labor. The doctor testified that the condition known as angiomatous malformation is considered in medical science to exist at birth or to develop very shortly after birth. The doctor further testified that it was revealed as a result of the operation and examination of the patient that these massed blood vessels were markedly swollen and that this caused a compression of the spinal cord and resulted in the paralysis of the said Byrd. Such condition, he said, was caused by trauma and was brought about by the repeated and severe vitrations of the chipping hammer, and that such trauma produced the paralysis. The doctor further testified that but for the trauma caused by the repeated vibration of the chipping hammer, Byrd may have lived indefinitely without experiencing any trouble from the angiomatous malformation. As a result of the condition thus brought about, the said Byrd was completely and wholly disabled.

The only controverted question presented on this appeal is whether the injuries sustained as aforesaid by the said Byrd were within the coverage of the aforesaid provisions of his accident insurance policy. The solution of this question lies in the distinction between the language 'accidental bodily injury' and the language 'bodily injury accidentally sustained or sustained through accidental means' as found in different accident insurance policies. It will be observed that the policy under review insures against loss from accidental bodily injury sustained while the policy is in effect. It does not insure against loss from bodily injury accidentally sustained or sustained through accidental means. In the case of Lavender v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Company, 171 Miss. 169, 157 So. 101, 104, the Court said 'There is a distinction between accidental death, and death resulting from accidental means.' In the case of Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 463, 78 L.Ed. 934, 90 A.L.R. 1382, the Court said: 'This distinction between accidental external means and accidental result has been generally recognized and applied where the stipulated liability is for injury resulting from an accidental external means.' The death in that case was caused by a sunstroke while the victim was voluntarily engaging in a game of golf, and the Court held in that case the means to be natural although the result was accidental. It frequently happens that where an injury occurs, the means employed are voluntarily adopted but the result is unintended and unexpected and undesigned. The result, therefore, is accidental but the means may not be. With this distinction in mind, we refer to the cases of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilson, 184 Miss. 823, 185 So. 802, and United States Casualty Co. of New York v. Malone, 126 Miss. 73, 87 So. 896, which are so strongly relied upon by the appellee in this case as to provoke the statement in appellee's brief that if the decree of the court below be reversed, it will be necessary to overrule these cases. It must be borne in mind, however, that in cases of this nature the parties are governed by the contract of insurance. Herein lies what we deem to be the distinction between the case at bar and the Wilson case, supra, and the Malone case, supra. The Wilson case involved a liability insurance policy. One Edward D....