Byrd v. Sec'y, CASE NO. 8:96-cv-771-T-23TGW

Decision Date27 February 2015
Docket NumberCASE NO. 8:96-cv-771-T-23TGW
PartiesMILFORD WADE BYRD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

MILFORD WADE BYRD, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

CASE NO. 8:96-cv-771-T-23TGW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

February 27, 2015


ORDER

Milford Byrd's amended petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 34) challenges the validity of his state conviction for murder and his sentence of death. The amended petition asserts thirty-one claims for relief.1 The respondent moves to dismiss for procedural reasons all or portions of Claims I, III-V, VII, VIII-XI, and XIII-XXI. (Doc. 35) Byrd opposes dismissal. (Doc. 39) This order dismisses several claims that are not reviewable on the merits because federal review is procedurally barred. Another order will address the merits of the remaining claims after the additional briefing permitted by this order.

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THE FACTS OF THE MURDER2

Byrd and his wife, Debra, managed a motel in Tampa. Debra's body was found on the floor of the motel office at approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 13, 1981. An autopsy revealed that Debra had suffered four non-fatal scalp lacerations, four non-fatal gunshot wounds, and scratches and bruises on the neck. The pathologist determined that the cause of death was strangulation and that death had occurred between 9:00 p.m. on October 12 and 3:00 a.m. on October 13.

During interrogation on the morning of October 13, Byrd told police that, on the night of the murder, he had gone to a gym and then to two bars. He stated that he returned home to the motel around 6:45 a.m., found his wife's body and called the police. Later that morning Byrd requested that a desk clerk at the motel contact a life insurance company with reference to an insurance policy on Debra's life. Byrd was the sole beneficiary of the $100,000 policy. Five days later, on October 19, Byrd personally carried a copy of Debra's death certificate to the insurance company and twice inquired as to how long settlement of the policy claim would take.

Ronald Sullivan, a resident of the motel, was arrested for violation of parole on October 27 and was subsequently charged with Debra's murder. After interviewing Sullivan, the police decided that they had probable cause to arrest Byrd. At 2:30 a.m. on October 28, the police arrived at Byrd's residence at the motel where they awoke Byrd and arrested him for the first-degree murder of his wife. Although the arresting officers had no arrest warrant when they went to Byrd's residence, it is undisputed that they had probable cause to arrest Byrd. One of the arresting officers knocked on Byrd's door, identified himself to Byrd through a window, and mentioned that he had previously spoken to him with regard to the death of Byrd's wife. After a few seconds Byrd opened the door and stepped back. The detective then took a step inside, placed Byrd under arrest for the murder of his wife, and advised him of his rights. In the motel room with Byrd was his girlfriend, who was asked by the officers to accompany them to the police station. The woman voluntarily accompanied the officers.

At the police station Byrd was again advised of his rights. He signed a written waiver of his rights at 2:55 a.m. Byrd neither admitted nor denied involvement in the crime until approximately 4:40 a.m. when he told the police he would tell them the truth if he could speak privately

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with his girlfriend. The detectives allowed Byrd to spend some time alone with his girlfriend and, when questioning resumed, Byrd's girlfriend re-entered the interrogation room and Byrd gave a confession.

Byrd testified at trial that, at the time of his arrest, the arresting detectives said they had an arrest warrant. He stated that he opened the door and backed up as the detective stepped forward and arrested him.

When questioned about the murder, Byrd stated that he had fallen in love with his girlfriend and that his wife had denied his request for a divorce. He confessed that he had offered Sullivan and Endress, Sullivan's roommate at the motel, five thousand dollars apiece to murder his wife. He also stated that the murder was planned to look like a robbery. Byrd denied, however, that he was present when the murder occurred. After this initial confession, Byrd requested permission to use the telephone in the homicide squad room to call his father. Three police officers overheard this conversation and testified that Byrd informed his father that, although he had not committed the murder, he had had it done.

Shortly after the telephone call, Byrd signed a consent-to-search form for the search of a motel storage room. During the search of the room, detectives found a hacksaw, drill, solder, and copper and brass filings. Evidence was submitted at trial which indicated that Sullivan and Endress had fashioned a silencer for the murder weapon in the storage room.

Byrd retracted his initial confession two days after having given it and moved to suppress both the confession and the consent to search. The trial court, finding that the confession was voluntarily given and that the consent was valid, denied the motions.

In exchange for a negotiated plea, Sullivan testified against Byrd on behalf of the state. Sullivan, who was charged with first-degree murder, testified that the state had offered him a term of probation in exchange for his truthful testimony. Sullivan stated that Byrd had approached Endress and himself about having Debra killed. He also testified that he, Endress, and Byrd were present when Debra was murdered; that Endress shot Debra several times and hit her with the gun; and that the three, in turn, had choked her.

The defense produced testimony from three county jail inmates concerning inconsistent statements made by Sullivan while he was in jail. The inmates offered three different statements allegedly given by Sullivan which alternatively placed the blame for Debra's murder on himself, Endress, and unknown armed robbers. A defense motion for a

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mistrial, based on the state's method of impeaching one of the inmates, was denied.

Byrd testified on his own behalf and denied complicity in the crime. He stated that he had been at two bars the night of the murder. Byrd also testified that his initial confession was given only because of concern for his girlfriend. Attempts to expedite the insurance policy on Debra's life, he explained, were only to enable him to pay the funeral expenses.

At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense presented two witnesses, Byrd and his father. Byrd testified concerning his relationship with his girlfriend subsequent to his wife's death. His father testified as to Byrd's non-violent nature and Byrd's relationship with his wife. The jury returned an advisory recommendation of the death penalty.

After the jury had given its recommendation, the trial judge heard testimony from two experts in the field of psychiatry concerning Byrd's mental state at the time of the crime. The witnesses stated that Byrd was not under the influence of any extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was not acting under the substantial domination of any other person, was not acting under extreme duress, and was not suffering any mental illness.

The trial judge agreed with the jury's recommendation and imposed the death sentence. The judge found three aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. The judge specifically found that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain in that Byrd murdered his wife so that he could collect the proceeds of the $100,000 life insurance policy; that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and that the acts of Byrd exhibited the highest degree of calculation and premeditation. As a mitigating circumstance, the judge found that Byrd had no significant history of criminal activity.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Byrd's conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Byrd, 481 So. 2d 468. The denial of Byrd's first motion to vacate was affirmed on appeal. Byrd

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v. State, 597 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1992). The Florida Supreme Court denied Byrd's state petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Byrd v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1995).

Byrd initially petitioned in this court for the writ of habeas corpus in 1992. Byrd's petition was dismissed without prejudice to permit exhaustion of Byrd's state remedy. See Byrd v. Singletary, 8:92-cv-1042-T-23 (M.D. Fla. 1992). Byrd next petitioned in this court for the writ of habeas corpus in April 1996. (Doc. 1) In September 1996, the petition was abated, the action was stayed, and the case was closed administratively. (Doc. 17)

In September 2001, this case was re-opened. (Doc. 29) Byrd amended his petition. (Doc. 34) The respondent moved to dismiss. (Doc. 35) Byrd responded to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 39) On July 22, 2002, the case again was closed administratively and the action stayed pending the outcome of Bottoson v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002). (Doc. 40)

On July 9, 2009, Byrd v. State, 14 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 2009), affirmed the denial of Byrd's second motion to vacate his sentence, a motion filed in the state post-conviction court in 2002.

Byrd's motion to re-open this case was granted on October 28, 2009. (Doc. 43) Byrd's motion to stay the action was denied on March 19, 2012. (Doc. 49)

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GOVERNING STANDARDS

The respondent argues that federal review of several grounds for relief is precluded based on (a) failure to exhaust state court remedies or (b) procedural default.

A. Exhaustion

A petitioner must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal...

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