Byrd v. State
Decision Date | 22 November 1938 |
Docket Number | 12512. |
Citation | 200 S.E. 671,187 Ga. 328 |
Parties | BYRD v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1938.
Error from Superior Court, Henry County; G. Ogden Persons, Judge.
Ralph Byrd was convicted of rape, and he brings error.
In rape prosecution, evidence that defendant induced victim to consent by threats to tape her mouth and leave her on road to die of suffocation held to authorize conviction. Code 1933 §§ 26-1301 to 26-1303.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The defendant was convicted of the offense of rape. His motion for a new trial was overruled and he excepted. Held that the portions of the general charge to the jury of which he complained were not subject to the exceptions taken thereto.
2. There was no merit in the assignments of error on omissions to charge.
3. None of the assignments of error on the admission of testimony showed cause for a new trial.
4. The court did not err in excluding testimony offered by the defendant as to reputation for lewdness of the house in which the prosecutrix resided.
5. The two instructions given by the judge to the jury at the time of admitting evidence as to reputation of the prosecutrix for unchastity were not subject to the criticisms urged against them, namely, that one of such instructions intimated an OPINION that force had been used by the defendant upon the prosecutrix, and that each of them prevented the jury from considering such character evidence on the question of consent.
6. The evidence authorized the verdict. The court did not err in refusing a new trial.
Reuben A. Garland, of Atlanta, E. M. Smith and E. L. Reagan, both of McDonough, and Geo. Manley, of Decatur, for plaintiff in error.
Frank B. Willingham, Sol. Gen., of Forsyth, M. J. Yeomans, Atty. Gen., Ellis G. Arnall, Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. J. Clower, of Atlanta, for the State.
Ralph Byrd was convicted of the offense of rape, and recommended to the mercy of the court. His motion for new trial was overruled, and he excepted. It appearing that the female had attained the age of eighteen years, the prosecution was based upon the theory of actual want of consent, and did not involve the act of July 31, 1918, fixing the age of consent at fourteen years. Code, §§ 26-1301, 26-1302, 26-1303, Ga.L.1918, p. 259.
The testimony of the female, who may hereafter be referred to as the prosecutrix, was substantially as follows: She was 18 years of age and resided with her parents in Atlanta. On March 23, 1938, she was employed by a baking company, and was working on a night shift, the hours of which were from eleven at night until seven in the morning. She had been so employed for about four months. On the night in question she went to her work as usual, but on arrival was told by the superintendent that she would not have to work that night, but would come back the next night. It seems that some machinery was out of order. She left the place for the purpose of returning home by street car. On her way to catch the street car, she stopped at a lunch-stand where a young man whom she had known for about three months was employed. This young man had been 'very friendly and very nice' to her. On this occasion he introduced to her the defendant, Ralph Byrd, saying: Ralph stated that he would 'be glad to,' and he and the prosecutrix then entered an automobile which was standing nearby. After traveling for some distance in the direction of the home of the prosecutrix, which was about four miles away, he turned in another direction and 'kept on driving,' although she asked him many times to carry her home. On the Jonesboro road, he stopped at a filling station operated by a man that he said was, and who proved to be, a deputy sheriff.
The witness further testified that the defendant turned to the left at Hampton, and after traveling several miles stopped in what appeared to be a lonely section, otherwise shown to be in Henry County, and accomplished the act of sexual intercourse with her under the following circumstances: The witness further testified that the defendant hesitated about taking her back home until she assured him that she was 'not going to do anything about it,' but that she 'was afraid then that he would think he was going to be arrested and he was liable to have done anything.' She arrived at home about a quarter of six in the morning and made a report to her mother, as a result of which 'the police were notified right away and it did not take them but about seven minutes to get there.' The foregoing narrative is based upon the testimony given by the prosecutrix on direct examination. The evidence given by her on cross-examination was not such as to require a finding that it destroyed the effect of her direct testimony; and it need not be stated.
The defendant was arrested during the same morning. According to the arresting officer. ...
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