Byrd v. State
| Decision Date | 11 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 481,2010.,481 |
| Parties | Calvin BYRD, Defendant Below, Appellant,v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, RIDGELY, Justices, and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc.HOLLAND, Justice:
The defendant-appellant, Calvin Byrd (“Byrd”), appeals from final judgments of conviction in the Superior Court for Burglary in the Second Degree, Theft, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest and Criminal Mischief. In this direct appeal, Byrd argues that the trial judge violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution by allowing an impermissibly suggestive in-court identification of him by a police officer. We have concluded that argument is without merit.
On November 20, 2009 the New Castle County Police received a tip about suspicious activity in front of a home on Old Forge Road. Officer Richard Blackston responded to the call for a burglary in progress, reportedly involving three black male subjects. When he arrived at the house in question, Officer Blackston observed that the door had been forced open.
Upon entering the house, Officer Blackston testified that there were no lights on inside of the house. He observed that there was a staircase that came down from the second floor and faced away from the front door towards the rear sliding-glass door. The base of the staircase was fifteen feet away from him and the sliding glass door was another three feet away. Officer Blackston testified that he could not see the stairs from his location at the front door.
After hearing movement upstairs, Officer Blackston shouted “County Police,” and then heard two individuals run down the stairs. According to Officer Blackston, after the two men reached the bottom of the steps they continued out the rear sliding-glass door, but each man glanced at him for a brief “second.” Officer Blackston testified that the two men were black males, one was “heavyset, had what appeared to be like a small Afro” and was of medium complexion, while the other was not as heavy as the other man, had cornrows in his hair, light in color, and wearing a black jacket.
While Officer Blackston was pursuing the two men, Lieutenant Treadwell arrived in the neighborhood. He saw one black male wearing a white t-shirt and blue jeans running down the street. Lieutenant Treadwell did not know whether that man was involved in the incident. He then observed Officer Blackston chasing a heavy-set black man. Lieutenant Treadwell assisted in that individual's apprehension. After the heavy-set black male was in custody, the police found a portable game system in his possession and identified him as Michael Newkirk (“Newkirk”).
Lieutenant Treadwell then called in the description of the first black male he had seen running down the street. Tyree Pollard (“Pollard”) was taken into custody on the other side of the neighborhood after matching the description given by Lieutenant Treadwell. No one else was seen running by the other officers or taken into custody that day.
While Newkirk and Pollard were being arrested, Officer Golden arrived at the scene. He observed a black male standing in front of a house on Old Forge Road that was adjacent to the crime scene property. Officer Golden secured the crime scene property, and then returned to interview the black male, Denzel Butler (“Denzel”), and his mother Michelle Butler (“Michelle”), who both told him that they resided next door. Denzel told Officer Golden that earlier in the day he had observed three men in the street. He spoke briefly to one of the men, “Cal,” with whom he had attended Christiana High School. Michelle also stated that she observed three men in the street, but that she could not identify any of the individuals.
Later that day, the Butlers were again interviewed by Detective Mayer, the Chief Investigating Officer. During this second interview, the Butlers did not provide any new information to the police. During Detective Mayer's investigation, neither the Butlers nor Officer Blackston were ever asked to identify the men they had observed. At trial, Detective Mayer testified that he never asked Officer Blackston to identify the men because he
A warrant for Byrd's arrest was issued seventeen days after the burglary. Byrd was indicted on charges of Burglary in the Second Degree, Theft, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest, and Criminal Mischief. Byrd and Pollard went to trial together.
At trial, Officer Blackston testified that Byrd was one of the two men whose face he caught a glimpse of for one second at the Old Forge Road property crime scene. He also stated that he believed that Newkirk was the other individual he saw in the house. Following this testimony, Byrd made a motion to strike the in-court identification by Officer Blackston as impermissibly suggestive in violation of the due process clause contained in the United States Constitution. The trial judge denied that motion.
Denzel testified that before the incident at the Old Forge property, Byrd came to his door and asked to use the bathroom. Denzel allowed him to do this while the other two men remained in the street. After Byrd left, Denzel testified that he and Michelle remained in their home for approximately 20–25 minutes until they saw the police arrive. Denzel testified that he never told the police this information because he was never asked. He also testified that he could not remember what Byrd wore, that he did not see anyone go into the Old Forge property, and that he did not know whether Byrd was involved in the incident.
Michelle testified that she saw three men when she came to the door. Contrary to her police interviews, she testified that she knew one of the men because he had been to her house before. Michelle stated at trial that she did not provide the information identifying Byrd or his use of her bathroom because the officers had been rude to her, which the officers denied. Michelle also testified that Pollard was with Byrd that day. Consistent with Denzel's testimony, she testified that Denzel allowed Byrd to use the bathroom, and that approximately ten minutes after Byrd left her house the police arrived. Michelle could not remember what Byrd was wearing but testified that he was carrying a black backpack.
The State did not present any physical evidence linking Byrd to the crime scene, nor did it present any evidence from either of his co-defendants linking Byrd to the crime. Byrd requested a jury instruction with respect to identification. The trial judge issued a modified version of the requested instruction. At the conclusion of the trial, Pollard was acquitted while the jury convicted Byrd of burglary and the other related offenses. Byrd was sentenced to one year in prison followed by various levels of probation.
The trial judge denied Byrd's motion to strike the in-court identification made by Officer Blackston. The trial judge agreed with Byrd that the identification was suggestive, but ruled that the suggestiveness did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The trial judge found that several factors militated against a finding of unconstitutionality:
First, your client is, has unique physical features in terms of complexion, cornrows, or whatever. And, secondly, the officer himself is African–American. We do not have a cross-racial identification issue that has been so frequently mentioned as, an issue in eyewitness identification by experts and courts, and so forth and so on. Thirdly, we have the chase that went on outside which covered some distance, based on his testimony. Now, while he may not have turned around, and he doesn't recall whether he turned and looked, I'm satisfied that there is sufficient basis to add to his identification of him here in the courtroom, granting that it was suggestive but not to the level of it being unconstitutionally so. Therefore, the motion to strike is denied.
In-court identification is “probably the most dramatic and persuasive” evidence.2 The general rule is that, absent an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure, questions as to the reliability of a proposed in-court identification affect only the in-court identification's weight and not its admissibility. However, to satisfy due process, pretrial identifications resulting from a suggestive process must comport with the two-part analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers.3
Byrd acknowledges that there was no pretrial identification of him at all by Officer Blackston. Nevertheless, in this appeal, Byrd contends that the admissibility of the in-court identification of him by Officer Blackston should have been determined under the two-step analysis set forth in Biggers.” The first step is to determine whether the identification procedure was impermissibly or unnecessarily suggestive.4 At this stage of the inquiry, the defendant has the burden of proof. If the defendant carries his burden of proof, the second step examines the five factors enumerated in Biggers to determine whether the identification procedure was so suggestive as to render the identification unreliable and, hence, inadmissible.
At the second step of the Biggers inquiry, the State has the burden of proof. In Biggers, the Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy due process, pretrial identifications resulting from a suggestive process...
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