Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 83-5556 and 83-5557,No. 83-5556,No. 83-5557,83-5556,83-5557,s. 83-5556 and 83-5557 |
| Parties | 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2083, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,152, 5 Employee Benefits Ca 2081 Charles M. BYRNES, James M. Beros, William M. Cherilla, Walter Chrzan, John Puskarich, Leslie Breman, Julius R. Casali, John W. Flanigan, James H. Hutchinson, Jr., and Joseph E. Zaucha, Trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund v. DeBOLT TRANSFER, INC. W.F. HARDY, Charles M. Byrnes, William M. Cherilla, Michael Garnder, Steve Missonak, Joseph P. Santone, John W. Flanigan, James H. Hutchinson, Jr., John O'Connor, and Joseph E. Zaucha, Trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Motor Carriers Welfare Fund v. DeBOLT TRANSFER, INC. Appeal of Charles M. BYRNES, et al., Trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, and W.F. Hardy, et al., Trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Motor Carriers Welfare Fund,Appeal of DeBOLT TRANSFER, INC., |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Charles J. Streiff (argued), Vincent P. Szeligo, Wick, Rich, Fluke & Streiff, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.
Debra D. Patti (argued), MacMullan & Associates, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before ALDISERT, WEIS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs, Charles M. Byrnes, et al., trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, and W.F. Hardy, et al., trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Motor Carriers Fund (the Funds), appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. They contend that the court erred in rejecting their requests that it apply a six-year statute of limitations and that it toll the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant, DeBolt Transfer, Inc. (DeBolt), a freight carrier, cross-appeals from the same judgment in which the court found it liable to plaintiffs for the sum of approximately $185,000. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Beginning in 1973, DeBolt agreed in a series of collective bargaining and trust agreements to make regular contributions to the Funds on behalf of a wide range of employees. 1 The payments it subsequently made were by means of a self-reporting system: when the Funds sent it the monthly invoices, DeBolt would adjust them, list the names of those individuals on whose behalf it contributed, and return the invoices to the Funds with the tendered payment.
In the middle of 1980, the Funds instituted an audit of DeBolt's records pursuant to the audit program authorized by the agreements. Based on both information uncovered by a preliminary audit and DeBolt's denial of access to employment records, the Funds' trustees brought suit on October 24, 1980, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 et seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 et seq., alleging that DeBolt had systematically failed to contribute on behalf of an entire range of individuals for whom the agreements provided that it contribute. On stipulated facts, the district court on June 30, 1983 entered summary judgment for plaintiffs with regard to each of the categories of employees for which they claimed defendant had wrongfully failed to contribute--non-union owner-operators, fleet owners, owner-operators at the Neville Island operation, and individuals who had worked less than 1,000 hours. The district court also held, however, that any payment that should have been made prior to three years before the date on which the suit had been filed could not be recovered because of the three-year statute of limitations in the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 43, Sec. 260.9a(g) (Purdon 1983). The district court also concluded that the undisputed facts did not justify tolling the statute of limitations. It entered summary judgments for the Pension Fund in the amount of $149,378.78 and for the Welfare Fund in the amount of $35,252.78. As noted above, each side appeals.
Defendant first contends that, under section 202 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1052, it need not have made contributions to the pension fund on behalf of employees until they worked 1,000 hours in a twelve month period. 2 The district court properly rejected this untenable argument.
The district court correctly noted that the 1,000 hour requirement has nothing to do with DeBolt's obligations in this case. That requirement merely establishes a statutory minimum after which pension rights begin to vest in employees. The requirement in no way purports to supercede the contracts entered into between the parties under which DeBolt agreed to contribute pursuant to the appropriate collective bargaining agreements on behalf of individuals who work beyond the thirty-day probationary period. See Talarico v. United Furniture Workers Pension Fund, 479 F.Supp. 1072, 1082 (D.Neb.1979). Accordingly, the court properly granted summary judgment on the 1,000 hour issue.
Defendant next contends that the district court erred in concluding that defendant's obligation to contribute under applicable collective bargaining agreements applied equally to union and non-union owner-operators. It claims that the agreements, as a matter of fact, do not extend to non-union drivers and, as a matter of law, may not extend to non-union drivers. We do not agree.
The district court properly found that, on their face, the collective bargaining agreements at issue here plainly contradict DeBolt's contention that it never incurred an obligation to contribute on behalf of non-union owner-operators. Article 40(2)(a) of the Eastern Conference Area Iron & Steel Rider defines employees under the agreements to be "any driver, chauffeur or driver-helper operating a truck, tractor ... or any other vehicle ...." Article 40(2)(c) and Article 55(4) likewise state that "hired or leased equipment shall be operated by an employee of the certificated or permitted carrier." In sum, these provisions of the collective bargaining agreements negate DeBolt's contentions that it was obligated to contribute only on behalf of union employees. The defendant can point to no provision in any of the agreements that supports its claim that only union members were to receive the benefits of DeBolt's contributions.
The absence of any distinction in the agreements between union and non-union members can be easily explained: the law does not permit such a distinction. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3), provides as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
The Supreme Court made clear in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42, 74 S.Ct. 323, 335-337, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954), that section 8(a)(3) meant precisely what it said: an employer may not encourage or discourage union membership by means of discrimination. The district court found that DeBolt's practice of making contributions to the Funds on behalf of union members only will encourage union membership. Not even DeBolt disputes this observation. Accordingly, section 8(a)(3) prohibits such a practice.
On appeal, DeBolt seems to recognize the futility of claiming that it may contribute only on behalf of union owner-operators. Thus, it seeks to subtly shift the trappings of its argument, contending that it incurred no obligation to contribute on behalf of non-union owner-operators because non-union owner-operators are not "employees" within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreements. Such an argument lacks merit.
As noted above, Article 40(2)(c) of the Iron & Steel Rider specifically sets forth the employees covered by the agreement. With regard to hired or leased equipment, the agreement provides that:
In all cases, hired or leased equipment shall be operated by an employee of the certificated or permitted carrier. The Employer expressly reserves the right to control the manner, means and details of and by which the owner-operator performs his services, as well as the ends to be accomplished. (Emphasis added.)
Article 55(4), the provision devoted to owner-operators, repeats verbatim the conditions of Article 40. Now, however, DeBolt contends that non-union owner-operators are not employees because DeBolt simply does not exercise control over them. In short, DeBolt asks us to relieve it of its obligations under a series of collective bargaining agreements, resorting to subtle and specious reasoning. We decline to do so.
DeBolt places great weight on Todd v. Benal Concrete Construction Co., 710 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.1983). In Todd, defendant Benal, a construction company, had obligated itself in a collective bargaining agreement to treat owner-operator ditch trenchers as employees and thus to contribute on their behalf to four trust funds. Benal subsequently failed to make such contributions. The Ninth Circuit permitted Benal to get out from under its contractual obligation because it concluded that, under the common law agency test adopted by that court, the unregulated ditch trenching operations at issue there demonstrated that those owner-operators were in fact independent contractors rather than employees, regardless of the contractual provision to the contrary.
Whatever the merits of the Todd v. Benal approach, we decline to extend the principle of that case to cover the undisputed facts before us. As noted above, DeBolt agreed that "all ... hired or leased equipment shall be operated by an employee of [DeBolt]." It likewise agreed...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Arcand v. Brother Intern. Corp.
...The elements of fraudulent concealment must also be plead under the heightened standards of Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620, 626 (3d Cir.1984). BIC argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege a material misrepresentation, a reasonable reliance on the part of the ......
-
O'CONNOR v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc.
...the language of Transfer's collective bargaining agreement in a decision upheld by the Third Circuit in Byrnes, et al. v. DeBolt Transfer, 741 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.1984)). 2. "Withdrawal liability" owed to the Plaintiff Pension Fund in the amount of $355,108.00, was assessed against DeBolt Tran......
-
Sarpolis v. Tereshko, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-5521
...PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., CIV.A. 11-7928, 2013 WLPage 133090823, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2013) (citing Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620, 626 (3d Cir.1984)), which requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). A pl......
-
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig.
...Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity. See Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620, 626 (3d Cir.1984).In asserting that they have alleged sufficient facts to sustain their heightened pleading burden under Rule 9(b), plaint......
-
Erisa: Fumbling the Limitations Period
...1990); Teamsters Pension Trust Funds v. John Tinney Delivery Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1984); Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1984); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.9a(g) (West 1992). For the benefits due lawsuit, see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 11......