Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 12541--PR,12541--PR |
| Citation | 550 P.2d 1065,113 Ariz. 264 |
| Parties | Helen BYRNS, Individually, and Kevin Byrns, a minor, By and Through his Mother and next friend, Helen Byrns, Appellants, v. RIDDELL, INCORPORATED, a corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Jack M. Anderson, George Sorenson, Jr., and John S. Schaper, Phoenix, for appellants.
Maupin & Wilson by Donald R. Wilson and William G. Fairbourn, Phoenix, for appellee.
On October 2, 1970, the appellant, Kevin Byrns, received in 'on-side' kick while playing football as a member of the Alhambra High School varsity football team. He fell to the ground and was thereafter struck by at least one member of the opposing team. As a result of the injuries received during that play, appellants commenced this action.
The appellants initially named the Phoenix Union High School District and other unspecified parties as defendants. The complaint was later amended, upon stipulation, adding appellee as a party defendant. Appellants' claim against Phoenix Union High School District was thereafter dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. A trial by jury was held in Maricopa County Superior Court. At the close of appellants' case, the court granted appellee's motion for a directed verdict and denied appellants' motion for a new trial. An appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals. We granted the petition for review in this matter. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. Byrns v. Riddell, memorandum decision filed January 15, 1976.
This court must determine whether the trial court properly granted appellee's motion for a directed verdict. In order to narrow the focus of our inquiry, it is necessary to consider several areas of proof presented by the appellants, and later developed by appellee on cross-examination. We will confine our consideration of the record to that evidence which relates to proof of strict liability in tort.
In their first amended complaint, appellants allege that the helmet manufactured by appellee, a corporation involved in the manufacture and sale of football helmets nationally, was defective by design and manufacture and by reason of such defects was inherently dangerous to the user. The appellants also charged appellee with the failure to provide a warning of the defects.
Fred Rappleayea, a witness, was produced by appellants in order to prove the existence of a defect in the Riddell TK--2 helmet worn by appellant, Kevin Byrns. Rappleayea stated that the helmet was defective and unreasonably dangerous insofar as it 'bottoms out' or transmits the energy of the blow to the head of the wearer without absorbing a sufficient amount of energy within the helmet cushioning system itself.
Testimony by appellants' physicians revealed that the injury to appellant's head consisted of a swelling of the right temporal lobe of the brain. One doctor testified that such an injury would result from a blow in front of the right ear and behind the right eye, or from a blow to the opposite side of the head. When asked by counsel for appellee whether a blow to the top of the head would cause an injury to the side of the head, the doctor could draw no definite conclusion.
Rappleayea testified that the front and back portions of the TK--2 helmet were tested and did not meet a crash helmet standard known as Z90.1, which he felt was applicable to a football helmet when the application was limited to the test's impact standard. Another of appellants' witnesses, Anderson Irving, testified that the TK--2 failed the Z90.1 impact test in terms of energy-absorbing characteristics in the forehead, rear and temporal areas of the helmet.
Appellee presented evidence relating to the inapplicability of the Z90.1 standard to the testing of football helmets. Gerald Morgan, chairman of the board of the appellee corporation, stated that the Z90.1 standard is inapplicable since the test conditions do not simulate the results of an impact to the human skull. Appellee further established on cross-examination that the top of the TK--2 helmet had not been tested by appellants' experts. Mr. Rappleayea concluded that the top of the helmet was the best place to be hit from the point of view of rating the effectiveness of the suspension system.
The relevancy of the focus on the effectiveness of the top of the helmet with respect to its energy-absorbing characteristics was developed by appellee in its analysis of a moving picture film of the game, which includes shots of the accident.
Appellee argued on its motion for a directed verdict that there was no proof of a defect in the TK--2 helmet, nor was there proof that a defect in the helmet caused the injury. Support for these arguments was provided by means of the game film and the testimony of Coach Hakes. Appellee argued that the game film shows a clear top-of-helmet to top-of-helmet impact. Coach Hakes testified that the two players hit 'head-to-head.' Appellee concludes that since the top of the helmet is not defective and since the film shows a blow to the top of the head, it is clear that the injury was not caused by a defect in the helmet.
The trial court found that the film clearly demonstrated that the impact was not a frontal impact, nor was it at the base, nor was it over the ears. Thus, the court stated reasonable minds could not differ as to the place of impact. In its conclusion, the trial court further held that since the strongest (top) portion of the helmet was not tested, it would be mere speculation on the part of the jury to determine that the top of the helmet was defective. The trial court therefore directed a verdict for appellee.
The law of strict liability in tort has followed a steady course of development since its early foundations in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). This court, in its decision in O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968), adopted the theory of strict liability set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). In view of the steady growth in this area of the law, coupled with the singularity of the facts in this case, a further review and analysis of the law of strict liability in tort is necessary. It is to this analysis that we first turn our attention.
The California Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), rejected the 'requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product 'unreasonably dangerous' . . .' a standard set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). In O. S. Stapley, supra, we specifically adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and its concept of an 'unreasonably dangerous' defect, and as such rejected the California approach.* The term 'unreasonably dangerous' has been considered by many courts in the jurisdictions that have adopted § 402A. A recent survey of cases which considered the concept of an 'unreasonably dangerous' defect states that this concept is especially effective as a means of limiting the strict tort liability doctrine 'in cases in which the issue is the nature of the duty of a manufacturer with respect to safe design, or in situations in which injury does not follow as a matter of course from the defect, and in which there are serious questions as to the effect to be given harmproducing conduct or misuse on the part of the injured person.' Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 352, 358 (1973).
The United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, adopted the following test of 'unreasonable danger': 'whether a reasonable manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition as he sold it to the plaintiff With knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences the trial just revealed.' Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp. 753, 759--760 (E.D.Pa.1971), Aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3rd Cir. 1973). The court went on to state: 'And in measuring the likelihood of harm one may consider the obviousness of...
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