C and R Stacy, LLC v. County of Chisago
| Decision Date | 11 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-2302.,A06-2302. |
| Citation | 742 N.W.2d 447 |
| Parties | C and R STACY, LLC, et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF CHISAGO, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Barry L. Blomquist, Barry L. Blomquist Law Office, North Branch, MN, for respondents.
Paul D. Reuvers, Jason J. Kuboushek, Amber S. Lee, Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, MN, for appellant.
Daniel J. Greensweig, St. Michael, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Townships.
Thomas L. Grundhoefer, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.
Scott Simmons, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Association of Minnesota Counties.
Considered and decided by DIETZEN, Presiding Judge; HALBROOKS, Judge; and HARTEN, Judge.*
This case involves an access to County State Aid Highway 19 (CSAH 19) from respondents' land, Outlot A. Respondents sought to construct a gas station with commercial access to CSAH 19. Prior to construction, appellant County of Chisago (the county) barricaded respondents' commercial access. Respondents filed a claim in district court, alleging that the county had no authority to regulate access to CSAH 19 without a duly enacted enabling ordinance. Respondents further argued that the county's failure to enact an ordinance resulted in a taking of respondents' property and sought inverse-condemnation proceedings.
The county challenges the district court's determinations that (1) the county lacks the ability to regulate CSAH 19 outside of the statutory authority provided in Minn.Stat. § 160.18 (2006); (2) Minn.Stat. § 160.18 is not self-executing and requires adoption of an ordinance to regulate public roads; (3) a regulation of road access pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 160.18 is an "official control" as defined by Minn.Stat. § 394.22 (2006); and (4) as an "official control," appellant's failure to follow public-notice hearing procedures and failure to adopt an ordinance resulted in a taking of respondents' property rights without compensation.
Because the county's police power and the self-executing grant of power from Minn.Stat. § 160.18 give the county the ability to regulate public-road access and because regulation of road access under Minn.Stat. § 160.18 is not an "official control," we conclude that the county has properly regulated access to CSAH 19 and reverse the district court on these issues. But we conclude that whether such regulation is a taking that in this instance requires compensation is a fact question that must be determined by the district court. We therefore remand on that issue only.
Outlot A is part of the larger Sherman Oaks Plat 3, located in the City of Stacy (the city). Outlot A is bordered by Chisago County State Aid Highway 19/Stacey Trail (CSAH 19), which runs east and west along Outlot A's southern edge. Interstate 35 (I-35) runs north and south along the western edge of Outlot A. Sherman Oaks Road runs east and west, parallel to and north of CSAH 19. Sherman Oaks Road ends at the eastern edge of Outlot A. Both CSAH 19 and Sherman Oaks Road provide access to Outlot A.
Outlot A was originally part of a larger farm parcel that was severed when its owners conveyed a portion of the land to the State of Minnesota for construction of I-35. The deed that conveyed the land to the state also took all right of access to most of the property but stated that the landowner retained a right of access east of I-35. After construction of I-35 began, the driveway onto CSAH 19 provided the only access to the Outlot A portion of the original parcel.
In 1986, respondent AMW, Inc. acquired Outlot A. At the time that AMW purchased Outlot A, the driveway to CSAH 19 provided the only access to Outlot A. AMW agreed with the city in the developer's agreement that Sherman Oaks Road would be constructed as a commercial street and serve as access to Outlot A. The county required that a portion of CSAH 19 be dedicated to the public and otherwise approved the developer's agreement "without comment." AMW and the city agreed orally to have the city place barricades on the west end of Sherman Oaks Road during construction, which eliminated the access to Outlot A from Sherman Oaks Road. The remaining point of access from Outlot A to CSAH 19 was the driveway.
In 1991, Bauerly Brothers, Inc., a construction company, leased use of Outlot A from AMW to fulfill a contract with the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) for resurfacing I-35. During this lease, Bauerly Brothers used the driveway access to CSAH 19 to remove fill from Outlot A and for asphalt production on the property. MnDOT also used Outlot A during this resurfacing project as a temporary office and inspection station. In addition, AMW leased space along the west edge of Outlot A to Lamar Companies for two billboard signs visible on I-35. Lamar Companies has since used the driveway onto CSAH 19 to gain access to those signs on Outlot A.
In 1998, AMW sold a portion of the southwest corner of Outlot A to respondent C & R Properties, Ent., Inc. (C & R). This portion of Outlot A was landlocked without access to CSAH 19 via the driveway used by Bauerly Brothers and Lamar Companies. The sale of this portion of Outlot A was conditioned on AMW applying for and receiving a conditional use permit (CUP). The proposed CUP illustrated the driveway access to CSAH 19. The city approved the proposed CUP and issued the CUP on March 18, 1999.
The county first contacted respondents concerning the driveway access to CSAH 19 in writing in early 1999. Although AMW stated that it had a right of access to CSAH 19, the county advised AMW that it had never approved any driveway access. On February 19, 1999, the county told C & R,
[D]irect access to [CSAH 19] will not be allowed. The North 91.93 feet (as shown on the plat) is in the State of Minnesota Limited Access Right of Way. The remaining 25.84 feet is not adequate road frontage for a commercial access. Minnesota Department of Transportation Access Dimensions must be followed on any State Aid Highway.
The Department of Public Works also notified respondent Mel Aslakson, as part owner of AMW,
"Outlot A" has no direct authorized access to [CSAH 19]. The County asks that this unauthorized driveway be removed. Remove culvert (if one exists) and restore ditch to original cross section. Build a berm or provide alternative to prevent future use of this area. We ask that this work be completed with-in 60 days from date of this letter. Failure to comply with-in 60 days will result in the County completing the required work and billing the accrued expense to you.
C & R subsequently submitted a building permit to the city that included language stating that it was "on proposed street off Co. Rd. 19." The city issued a building permit on October 25, 1999. In early November 1999, C & R commenced construction on the project that included a street connecting Outlot A to CSAH 19, as shown in the plans submitted to the city. On November 8, 1999, the county informed respondents that it would commence legal action to prohibit use of the driveway to CSAH 19. When respondents did not stop construction, the county erected barricades on the driveway, prohibiting access to CSAH 19, but removed the barricades that blocked access via Sherman Oaks Road. Respondents C & R Stacy, LLC; AMW, Inc.; Karl W. Gotfredson and Kelly J. Gotfredson, dba T & C Oil, Inc.; Shari L. Douglas; and C & R Properties Ent., Inc., brought suit in district court in 2004, seeking injunctive relief and damages for unlawful taking without compensation. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the county unlawfully took respondents' right of access without compensation and awarded damages to respondents. This appeal followed.
1. Does the county have the authority to regulate access to CSAH 19 absent a statutory grant of power?
2. Does the grant of authority to regulate public-road access in Minn.Stat. § 160.18 (2006) require an ordinance to be adopted?
3. Is regulation of public-road access under Minn.Stat. § 160.18 an "official control" as defined by Minn.Stat. § 394.22-.26 (2006)?
4. Did the county unlawfully take respondents' right of access to CSAH 19 without compensation?
The county challenges the district court's determination that it lacks the ability to regulate access to public roads absent the statutory authority contained in Minn.Stat. § 160.18 (2006). The county contends that it has authority to regulate public-road access pursuant to its police power and that Minn.Stat. § 160.18 is a codification of that police power. This court is not bound by and need not give deference to a district court's decision on a purely legal issue. Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003). We therefore review the district court's conclusions on police power and statutory construction de novo. Id.
At the most basic level, the Minnesota Constitution establishes that local-government units possess no inherent powers and are purely creations of the legislature. Minn. Const. art. XII, § 3; Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn.2006). Counties, like municipalities, are subject to these same limitations and have only the powers conferred upon them by the legislature. Altenburg v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pleasant Mound Twp., 615 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2000).
The state public-highway system is addressed expressly within the Minnesota Constitution. Minn. Const. art. XIV. The constitution mandates construction and maintenance of a public-highway system:
A county state-aid highway system shall be constructed, improved and maintained by the counties as public highways in the manner provided by law. The system shall include streets in municipalities of less than 5,000 population where necessary to provide an integrated and coordinated...
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