A. C. Chock, Limited v. Kaneshiro

• Decision Date: 12 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 4769,4769
• Citation: 51 Haw. 87,451 P.2d 809
• Parties: A. C. CHOCK, LTD., a Hawaii corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Floyd Tokusel KANESHIRO, Jessie Mitsue Kaneshiro and the State of Hawaii, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 809

451 P.2d 809

51 Haw. 87

A. C. CHOCK, LTD., a Hawaii corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Floyd Tokusel KANESHIRO, Jessie Mitsue Kaneshiro and the

State of Hawaii, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 4769.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March 12, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A proceeding against property in which the State of Hawaii has an interest is a suit against the State and cannot be maintained without the consent of the State.

2. General statutory laws are not applicable to the State unless the legislature in the enactment of such laws made them explicitly applicable to the State.

3. By provisions in R.L.H.1955, 1965 Supp., Chapter 103A, and legislature authorized the Board of Land and Natural Resources to develop, subdivide and sell public lands for personal residential purposes and required that every agreement of sale contain a provision requiring a 'purchaser to construct a dwelling of such size and value within such time as shall be prescribed by the board.' R.L.H.1955 § 193-41 provides that the interest of the vendor in the land is subject to mechanic's and materialman's liens where contract of sale requires the vendee to make improvement of the real property. Our legislature in enacting Chapter 103A did not intend to waive sovereign immunity on the part of the State nor authorize a mechanic's or materialman's lien on the State's interest in lands sold by the State under agreement of sale. Such general language of the statutes should not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity.

4. Section 103A-21 recognizes the 'rights of holder of security interest' whose security interest has been recorded with the Bureau of Conveyances and the Board of Land and Natural Resources of the State of Hawaii and provides for the protection of these interests or rights. A mechanic's or materialman's lien cannot be filed in the Bureau of Conveyances therefore it is clear that the legislature did not intend to include such lien within the provisions of § 103A-21.

5. Statutory laws which contravene sovereign rights are to be strictly construed.

6. Mechanic's and materialman's liens are purely statutory remedies and where there is no statutory authorization for the imposition of such liens on public lands in favor of laborers and materialmen, this court will not usurp legislative power and enter into the legislative field.

Norman K. Chung, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

T. S. Goo, Deputy Atty. Gen., (Bert T. Kobayashi, Atty. Gen., and Francis M. Izumi, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., MARUMOTO, ABE and LEVINSON, JJ., and Circuit Judge KING, assigned by reason of vacancy.

ABE, Justice.

The State of Hawaii, as vendor, and Floyd Tokusei Kaneshiro and Jessie Mitsue Kaneshiro, as vendees, on March 30, 1965, entered into an agreement of sale of a residential lot in the Diamond Head subdivision. A covenant of this agreement required the vendees to construct a dwelling on the premises of a specified minimum value and within a specified period.

Subsequet thereto, plaintiff entered into a contract with vendees to construct a driveway leading to the premises. The proposed improvement was approved by the State. Plaintiff fully performed its contract; however, vendees failed to pay any portion of the contract price.

Plaintiff filed a notice of mechanic's lien and brought suit in the First Circit Court to enforce its mechanic's lien.

The trial court dismissed the State on the ground that the State, and its interest in the land, were immune from the suit. Judgment was entered accordingly and plaintiff appealed.

It is conceded by the plaintiff and it is the law in this jurisdiction that a proceeding against property in which the State of Hawaii has an interest is a suit against the State and cannot be maintained without the consent of the State. W. H. Greenwell, Ltd., v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, 50 Haw. 207, 436 P.2d 527 (1968); Helela v. State of Hawaii, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 (1966).

Plaintiff's contention is that R.L.H.1955, § 193-41, provides that the interest of the vendor in the lnd is subject to the lien where a contract of sale requires the vendee to make improvement on the real property. From that premise plaintiff argues that when the State in the contract of sale required as one of the conditions that the vendees construct a residence of a specified sum on the land, the State's interest in the land became subject to the mechanic's lien.

It has been conceded by plaintiff and it is general principle of law that statutory laws of general application are not applicable to the State, unless the legislature in the enactment of such laws made them explicitly applicable to the State. United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190, 30 S.Ct. 35, 54 L.Ed. 153 (1909); Helela v. State of Hawaii, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 (1966); Marks v. Ah Nee, 48 Haw. 92, 395 P.2d 620 (1964); Hilo Meat Co. v. Antone, 23 Haw. 675 (1917).

Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), where the Court held that a citizen of Alabama may bring suit against the State of Alabama under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Court stated at page 192, 84 S.Ct. at page 1213:

'It remains the law that a State may not be sued by an individual without its consent. Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act. By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States empowered Congress to create such a right of action against interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interestate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have consented to suit.'

Here the State of Hawaii under its laws developed, subdivided and sold a portion of its public land for a houselot. We cannot hold that where the State has acted under authority of law, it has agreed to waive its sovereign immunity. This case is distinguished from Parden v. Terminal Railway, supra, and we will not follow the ruling of that case.

Our legislature in recognition of the scarcity of available houselots authorized the Board of Land and Natural Resources to subdivide public lands and sispose of the same for personal residential purposes. Further, to discourage speculation the legislature provided that in all agreements of sale a provision be incorporated whereby a purchaser should be required to construct a dwelling of such size and value and within such time as may be prescribed by the board. ¹

We recognize the plight of the plaintiff in this case, and we are not deaf to its argument that the action of the trial court results in an injustice in that plaintiff, an innocent party, which has contributed labor and material to improve land owned by the State, is left without remedy.

Plaintiff has ingeniously argued before us that when the legislature enacted R.L.H.1955, 1965 Supp. Chapter 103A, and authorized the Board of Land and Natural Resources to develop, subdivide and sell public land for personal residential purposes and required that every agreement of sale contain a provision requiring a 'purchaser to construct a dwelling of such size and value and within such time as shall be prescribed by the board', the legislature committed the State to engage in the business of land developer and by dling so the State fell within the term of the word 'vendor' as used in § 193-41 and thereby waived its sovereign immunity.

We cannot agree with plaintiff's contention. We believe that our legislature in enacting Chapter 103A did not intend to waive sovereign immunity on the part of the State nor authorize a mechanic's or materialman's lien on the State's interest in lands sold by the State under an agreement of sale. We hold that such general language cannot be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity.

In Marks v. Ah Nee, 48 Haw. 92, 395 P.2d 620 (1964), where plaintiffs brought an action for partition naming the State of...