C.J.J. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:14–cv–1925–Orl–22GJK |
| Parties | C.J.J. and C.R.J., Plaintiffs, v. WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Anthony Anderson Benton Dogali, Dogali Law Group, PA, Domenick Giovanni Lazzara, Dom Law, PA, Geoffrey E. Parmer, The Consumer Protection Firm, PLLC, Tampa, FL, Eugene Feldman, Arias, Sanguinetti, Stahle & Torrijos, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Jeremy M. White, Kerry Alan Scanlon, McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, Paul I. Margulies, Kaye Scholer, LLP, Washington, DC, Manuel Kushner, Kaye Scholer, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, Oscar Ramallo, Rhonda R. Trotter, Kaye Scholer, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Robert Michael Kline, McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
ANNE C. CONWAY, United States District JudgeThis cause comes before the Court on Defendant's, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. ("Defendant"), Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016. (Doc. No. 47). Plaintiff, C.J.J. by and through C.R.J. as Next Friend, Parent, and Natural Guardian ("Plaintiff"), filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion on July 1, 2016. (Doc. No. 65). Defendant filed its Reply on July 18, 2016. (Doc. No. 72). For the following reasons, this Court will grant Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff is a resident of Pinellas County, Florida living with autism
, hydrocephalus, and cranial cysts. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 70 and 74) (Complaint). He is generally in the care of his mother ("C.R.J."). (Id. at ¶ 73). She brought this action on his behalf. (Id. ). Plaintiff is incapable of waiting idly for long periods of time. (Doc. No. 65 p. 7). As a result, Plaintiff's family avoids places such as movie theaters, restaurants, and grocery stores. (Id. ). He also cannot understand the concept of visiting an attraction and receiving a return time to experience it at a future time. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 76). Additionally, Plaintiff has a propensity to experience attractions in a specific order and he must experience certain attractions repeatedly for hours at a time. (Id. at ¶ 79). Exposure to idle waits or not being able to follow his routine will cause Plaintiff to have a behavioral meltdown. (Id. at ¶ 71). His meltdowns are mild and nonphysical.
Defendant is one of the world's most popular amusement parks. (Doc. No. 47 p. 23). It is divided into four parks that are organized into six lands, comprising over one hundred rides and attractions. (Id. at p. 3 n.1). Until October 9, 2013, Defendant would issue a Guest Assistance Card ("GAC") to certain disabled guests at its parks. (Id. at p. 4). A GAC allowed these guests and their party nearly unlimited access to rides through alternative "backdoor entrances" or "Fastpass"1 lines. (Id. at p.5).
Defendant, however, abandoned the GAC system because of alleged abuse by both guests that needed GACs and those that did not. (Id. ). The most common way guests purportedly abused the former GAC system was by requesting the accommodation with no need for it altogether. (Id. ). Individuals were also creating counterfeit GACs, posting Craigslist advertisements offering unauthorized tours guided by GAC holders, and selling unexpired GACs online. (Id. ).
The Disney Disability Access Service ("DAS") was adopted to replace the GAC system. (Id. at 7). Starting October 9, 2013, guests needing accommodations for a cognitive disability at Defendant's parks had to obtain a DAS card from its Guest Relations personnel upon arrival. (Id. ). DAS affords guests with disabilities such as autism
the ability to "virtually wait" for attractions without standing in lines. (Id. ). A guest using DAS arrives at an attraction, presents the card, and receives a return time. (Id. ) This can be done for the duration of their visit. (Id. ). The virtual wait using DAS is the posted time for the attraction minus ten minutes. (Id. ). DAS cardholders thus have the opportunity to "avail themselves of the many other attractions throughout the park—other rides, shows, attractions, concerts, characters, restaurants, and stores" until their return time. (Id. ). In addition to DAS, some guests receive a number of "readmission passes" permitting them to enter the Fastpass line for any attraction without having to stand in line or wait virtually. (Id. at p. 8).
Plaintiff recounts two visits to Defendant's parks in March and May 2014. On the March visit, Plaintiff was told that he could not receive any accommodation other than DAS. (Doc. No. 1¶ 83). However, upon returning to their hotel, they were offered readmission passes. (Doc. No. 65 p. 8). On the May visit, Plaintiff had to wait idly for return times at various rides in which he wanted to ride repeatedly but was not allowed to do so. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 88 and 89).
Overall, Plaintiff and his family were disappointed with their experience and are discouraged and deterred from visiting Defendant's parks because of DAS. (Id. at ¶¶ 91 and 96). As a result, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief requiring Defendant to modify DAS to provide further accommodations. (Id. ).
Granting a summary judgment motion is proper if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co. , 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993).
A grant or denial of summary judgment hinges on whether there is a triable issue. Such issue exists when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, the Court must grant a motion if "the evidence ... is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making this determination, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ); Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc. , 558 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2009).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff claims that the Complaint alleges a failure to accommodate, disparate treatment (intentional discrimination), and a disparate impact. Defendant, however, argues that it asserts only a failure to accommodate.
The parties' discord on what the issues are stems from Count I in the Complaint, the only count pertaining to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff broadly alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.2 A close reading of the Complaint nonetheless shows that only one issue is in dispute: the ADA's specific prohibition for the failure to accommodate, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), as referenced at ¶ 11. Count I provides facts describing Plaintiff's experience with Defendant's accommodations. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 69–99). Though the Complaint mentions the ADA's general prohibition against discrimination, it lacks discernible allegations regarding denial of participation, participation in an unequal benefit, or a separate benefit. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i)-(iii).3 Furthermore, Count I makes no identifiable claims of disparate treatment or disparate impact. Instead, Count I only alleges that Defendant's accommodations are insufficient. Based on these three theories that Plaintiff purports are applicable, Plaintiff has only made allegations for a failure to accommodate.
Thus, Plaintiff's arguments of disparate treatment and disparate impact are now raised for the first time. Such tactic is impermissible. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez , 540 U.S. 44, 53, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003) ; Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co. , 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (). Plaintiff's proper course of action was to move for leave to amend the Complaint. See id. The deadline to do so has nonetheless passed.
Even if Plaintiff's Complaint is construed to allege disparate treatment and disparate impact, Plaintiff has not carried the initial burden of satisfying a prima facie case for either. Proving disparate treatment requires Plaintiff to show that a motivating factor behind Defendant implementing DAS was to impose an adverse effect on individuals with Plaintiff's disability. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). However, Plaintiff states that "Disney's entire goal was to eliminate its prior system [GAC], for business reasons." (Doc. No. 65 p. 12).
Furthermore, "[a] disparate impact case is one in which a facially neutral practice impacts more harshly on one group of people than on others." Mayberry v. Von Valtier , 843 F.Supp. 1160, 1164–65 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Defendant's "mantra" for an "equal wait time for all" is just that—a mantra. To the extent it is viewed otherwise, Plaintiff acknowledges, as the Court elaborates infra , that the ADA is intended to ensure that disabled patrons of public accommodations are afforded a like experience of those that are not disabled to the extent feasible. (Doc. No. 65 p. 13). Disabled or not, virtually no one visits Defendant's parks and accesses its attractions without having to wait. Therefore, the real issue is DAS, which is not facially neutral. It applies specifically to those with disabilities, not all of Defendant's guests. This precludes Plaintiff from establishing a disparate impact.
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