C--- E--- J--- v. State

• Citation: 788 S.W.2d 849
• Decision Date: 08 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 05-88-01040-CV,05-88-01040-CV
• Parties: C___ E___ J___, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 849

788 S.W.2d 849

C___ E___ J___, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-88-01040-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

March 8, 1990.

Rehearing Denied April 26, 1990.

Maridell Templeton, Garland, for appellant.

Jeffrey B. Keck, Dallas, for appellee.

Before STEWART, BAKER and KINKEADE, JJ.

OPINION

STEWART, Justice.

C.E.J., a minor, was convicted by a jury in the juvenile court of Dallas County for the offense of capital murder and committed to the Texas Youth Commission for thirty years with a transfer to the Texas Department of Corrections at age eighteen, pursuant to section 54.04(d)(3) of the Texas Family Code. C.E.J. appeals and asserts eight points of error as grounds for reversal. In his first, second, and third points, C.E.J. complains that his disposition judgment is void because sections 53.045 and 54.04(d)(3) of the Texas Family Code denied him due process and equal protection of the law and required him to answer for a criminal offense not based on an indictment by the grand jury in violation of the United States and Texas constitutions. In his fourth and fifth points, C.E.J. complains that the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession and the fruit thereof because he was not adequately warned of the consequences of making the statement and because the confession was the result of an illegal arrest. Finally, in his sixth, seventh, and eighth points, respectively, C.E.J. complains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, that he was denied equal protection due to the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury by the State, and that the trial court erred in not sustaining his objections to improper prosecutorial argument. Because we find that C.E.J.'s seventh point concerning the State's systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury is dispositive of this appeal, we do not reach his other points. See Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (constitutionality of a statute not determined unless absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised). We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.

A recitation of the underlying facts giving rise to the charges brought against C.E.J. is necessary since the State relies on them to support its use of peremptory challenges. The facts adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are as follows. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).

C.E.J., a fourteen-year-old, and Timothy Poole, a nineteen-year-old, went to the home of Lexine Robinson. Timothy had dated Yolanda Foster, Lexine's seventeen-year-old daughter, until Lexine terminated the relationship because she thought that Timothy was a bad influence on Yolanda. Lexine and Timothy began to argue when Timothy said that he wanted to start dating Yolanda again. During the argument, C.E.J. went to the rear of the house, took a .25 caliber pistol from Lexine's purse, returned to the living room, helped Timothy disrobe Lexine, and watched Timothy sexually assault her; C.E.J. also attempted to sexually assault Lexine, but he was unable to effect penetration. Timothy then stabbed Lexine to death on the living room floor with a knife that C.E.J. had found in the kitchen and told C.E.J. to help him drag Lexine's body to a back bedroom, where they covered it with bedding.

C.E.J. took the keys to Lexine's van, and he and Timothy drove around the neighborhood. They saw Michael Bernard Robinson, Lexine's son, and gave him a ride. Michael later became upset and began yelling that he wanted to go home, so C.E.J. shot him with the pistol to "quiet him down." Michael then escaped from the van and ran into a nearby house, where he was caught by Timothy, brought back to the van, returned to the Robinson house, and forced inside. Michael ran to the back of the house, and C.E.J. pursued him, stabbed him twice, and returned to the living room to tell Timothy that he had stabbed Michael, at which time Timothy went to the back bedroom and shot Michael in the back of the head.

Shortly thereafter, Yolanda arrived home from school with Travonda Campbell, a friend from school, and C.E.J. and Timothy dragged them into the kitchen. C.E.J. and Timothy later forced Yolanda and Travonda into the van. Travonda was released near her home, and C.E.J. walked home. Travonda told her cousin what had happened and notified the police.

The next day, Dallas Patrol Officer Nancy Felix pursued the Robinson van in a high speed chase until the van, driven by Timothy, collided with another vehicle. The body of Yolanda, who had been shot in the back of the head, and Lexine's .25 caliber pistol were discovered in the van. Dallas Police Officer W.J. Marks went to the scene of the collision, saw Timothy, and remembered that he had seen Timothy with C.E.J. near the Robinson house the previous day shortly before the time that the murders of Lexine and Michael were estimated to have occurred.

Later that day, Officer Marks found C.E.J., who accompanied him to the Youth Detention Offices of the Dallas Police Department to be questioned by homicide detectives. Officer Jack Allison was questioning C.E.J. when he noticed what appeared to be dried blood on C.E.J.'s tennis shoes. When C.E.J. told Officer Allison that the red substance was ketchup, Officer Allison said that the substance looked like dried blood and that he was going to have the tennis shoes analyzed. Thereafter, C.E.J. orally admitted his involvement in the murders of Lexine and Michael to investigators and was warned by Judge Victor Ortiz pursuant to section 51.09 of the Texas Family Code. C.E.J. later gave a written confession, at which time Magistrate Joe H. Loving, Jr., out of the presence of investigators, discussed the statement with C.E.J. and certified that the statement was voluntary.

In his seventh point, C.E.J. complains that he was denied equal protection of the law due to the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury by the State. Specifically, C.E.J. argues that the trial court erred in finding that the State had rebutted his prima facie showing of racial discrimination by providing racially neutral reasons for striking five black veniremembers. The State replies that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), does not apply in civil cases, that C.E.J. failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review by timely objection at trial, and that the trial court correctly found that the State had rebutted C.E.J.'s prima facie case of racial discrimination by providing race-neutral reasons for striking blacks from the venire.

We must initially determine whether the dictates of Batson apply to juvenile delinquency trials. We have found no authority, nor has appellant cited any, addressing this issue. Hence, we agree with the State that this question is one of first impression in this State.

In Batson, the Supreme Court held that in the criminal trial of an adult, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. Thus, under Batson, an adult black defendant has the constitutional right to a petit jury which is selected without discrimination on account of race. Id. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1718.

Although a juvenile delinquency trial is a civil proceeding, it is quasi-criminal in nature. Smith v. Rankin, 661 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.) (orig. proceeding). The juvenile is guaranteed all the constitutional rights which he would have as an adult in a criminal proceeding, because the juvenile delinquency procedures seek to deprive him of his liberty. Id. He is even afforded additional rights to those enjoyed by an adult. Ex parte Menefee, 561 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Further, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1969).

Accordingly, we hold that, because Batson establishes a constitutional right that a black juvenile would have as an adult in a criminal trial, its dictates do apply to a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving a black juvenile. We reject the State's first contention.

The State next argues that C.E.J.'s Batson objection was not timely because he did not object to the exercise of the State's peremptory challenges until the day after the list of twelve jurors was called and the remaining veniremembers were excused from further service. Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (timely Batson objection made before jury is sworn and the venire panel is discharged). This Court recently has held that Henry no longer governs the timeliness of a Batson challenge in an adult's trial. Hill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990) (opinion on motion for rehearing) .

Following the decision in Henry, the legislature enacted article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) After the parties have delivered their lists to the clerk ... and before the court has impanelled the jury, the appellant may request the court to dismiss the array and call a new array in the case....

(b) If the court determines that the attorney representing the state challenged prospective jurors on the basis of race, the court shall call a new array in the case.

We recognize that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply to delinquency proceedings. Robinson v. State, 707 S.W.2d...