C.M.J., Matter of, 74889

• Decision Date: 19 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74889,74889
• Citation: 259 Kan. 854,915 P.2d 62
• Parties: , 109 Ed. Law Rep. 417 In the Matter of C.M.J.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 62

915 P.2d 62

259 Kan. 854, 109 Ed. Law Rep. 417

In the Matter of C.M.J.

No. 74889.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 19, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the facts are uncontroverted, a trial court decision that double jeopardy applies is subject to de novo review on appeal.

2. A civil as well as criminal sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.

3. Whether a given civil sanction is punishment for double jeopardy purposes is a question for the court, not for the authority imposing the sanction.

4. The determination of whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes requires a particularized assessment of the penalty which the sanction may fairly be said to serve.

5. In deciding if a civil proceeding has a retributive, deterrent, or remedial purpose, a court must make a common-sense determination from the objective view point and not from the viewpoint of the defendant.

6. A sanction is deemed to have a remedial purpose if it protects the public from harm. Even though it may appear to have punitive effects and might be interpreted as punishment, if it can also support a construction as remedial, it will not form the basis for a challenge on the grounds of double jeopardy.

7. A civil sanction may invoke double jeopardy protections as a form of "punishment" only if it is grossly disproportional to legitimate State goals separate from those served by criminal prosecution.

8. Neither the severity of the sanction nor the fact that it has a deterrent purpose automatically establishes that it is a form of punishment.

9. The fact that remedial concerns require "punishing" individuals for violent or disruptive conduct in an institutional setting does not mean that the sanctions imposed constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.

10. The State has important nonpunitive purposes served by administrative expulsion of students from public schools, including the control and safety of such institutions.

11. Administrative expulsion of students from school is not an unreasonable and disproportionate sanction for the violation of reasonable regulations adopted to carry out the educational mission.

12. Under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in holding that constitutional double jeopardy principles prohibited the State from proceeding with a juvenile prosecution for possession of a loaded semi-automatic pistol in violation of K.S.A. 21-4204a, when the identical conduct had been the basis for the juvenile's expulsion from school in violation of school district policy.

Appeal from Johnson District Court, PATRICK D. McANANY, Judge.

Donna M. Pond, Assistant District Attorney, argued the cause, and Paul J. Morrison District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were with her on the brief, for appellant State.

Gregory M. Coggs, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee C.M.J.

LARSON, Justice.

The State of Kansas appeals the dismissal of a complaint seeking adjudication of C.M.J. as a juvenile offender based on his possession of a loaded semi-automatic pistol in the parking lot at Shawnee Mission Northwest High School, in violation of K.S.A. 21-4204a.

The trial court ruled C.M.J. could not be adjudicated a juvenile offender based on the same conduct that caused his expulsion from a public high school, without violating constitutional double jeopardy protections.

The State appealed. We have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1). We hold the trial court's ruling was erroneous and remand for further action pursuant to the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code.

Factual Background

On April 28, 1995, police and school officials, acting on an anonymous tip, conducted a facially consensual search of C.M.J.'s truck in the parking lot of Shawnee Mission Northwest High School, where C.M.J. was enrolled as a 10th grade student. The search revealed a loaded semi-automatic pistol with a barrel less than 12 inches long. As a result of this discovery, disciplinary proceedings against C.M.J. were begun by the school, and a separate juvenile proceeding commenced.

C.M.J. was immediately suspended from school for 5 days and a hearing was scheduled for May 1, 1995, to consider his expulsion. At that hearing, the suspension/expulsion committee found C.M.J.'s possession of a gun on school property violated school district policy and warranted expulsion for the remainder of the current semester (spring 1995) and the entire following semester (fall 1995). The committee's determination was appealed to the school board, which affirmed the expulsion.

The complaint in the juvenile proceeding was filed May 19, 1995, and sought to have C.M.J. adjudicated a juvenile offender for violating K.S.A. 21-4204a. C.M.J. argued that adjudicating him a juvenile offender based on the same conduct which resulted in his expulsion from school would constitute multiple punishment for the same offense, contrary to constitutional double jeopardy protections.

Harlan Hess, associate principal of Shawnee Mission Northwest, testified concerning C.M.J.'s expulsion. Hess stated his duties included disciplinary matters at the school. He testified that because possession of a gun on school property was a violation of school policy, C.M.J. was initially suspended for 5 days and a longer term of expulsion was recommended. Although Hess was unsure of the technical difference between remedial and punitive sanctions (he appeared to view remedial as synonymous with rehabilitation), he opined that both short-term suspension and expulsion were punitive in nature. According to Hess, expulsion helps maintain order by illustrating that violations of school policies bring consequences, and thus acts as a deterrent. Hess agreed that the school's duty is to promote a safe environment for teachers, administrators, and students, and stated that expelling students for conduct which threatens others promotes school safety.

Scope of Review

There is no dispute as to the underlying facts regarding C.M.J.'s expulsion and the subsequent attempt by the State to adjudicate him a juvenile offender. Where the facts are uncontroverted, a trial court decision that double jeopardy applies is subject to de novo review on appeal. State v. Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 1, 907 P.2d 847 (1995).

Arguments

The protection against double jeopardy has its source in both the United States and Kansas Constitutions:

"The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution states: '[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' The double jeopardy guaranty is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969). Kansas also enforces an analogous double jeopardy clause in Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. It states: 'No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.' The double jeopardy protection guaranteed in the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is equivalent to the protection guaranteed in the United States Constitution. See State v. Cady, 254 Kan. 393, 396-97, 867 P.2d 270 (1994)." Mertz, 258 Kan. at 749, 907 P.2d 847.

In Mertz, we summarized the scope of the double jeopardy protections:

"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides three different types of protection for a person charged with a crime. Double jeopardy protection shields an accused from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 3, 907 P.2d 847.

C.M.J. contends that prosecuting him as a juvenile for the crime of possessing a firearm subjects him to multiple punishments for the same offense because he has already been expelled from school. In making this argument he relies on United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), in which the United States Supreme Court found that in rare instances a civil sanction may qualify as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. We noted the rule developed in Halper when we held: "A civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment." Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 4, 907 P.2d 847.

Although associate principal Hess classified C.M.J.'s expulsion as punishment, that testimony is not determinative. "[L]abels do not control in a double jeopardy inquiry." Montana Dept. of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, ----, 114 S.Ct.1937, 1946, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 779 (1994). Whether a given civil sanction is punishment for double jeopardy purposes is a question for the court, not for the authority imposing the sanction. In Mertz, relying on Halper, we outlined the test to be applied:

"The determination of whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes requires a particularized assessment of the penalty which the sanction may fairly be said to serve." 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 4, 907 P.2d 847.

"In determining if a civil proceeding has a retributive, deterrent, or remedial purpose, a court must use common sense. The court makes this determination from the objective viewpoint and not from the viewpoint of the defendant." 258 Kan 745, Syl. p 6, 907 P.2d 847.

Although we said in Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 5, 907 P.2d 847, that "[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment," nevertheless, a civil sanction will rarely qualify as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. We recognized this in Mertz when we said:

"The rules announced in United States v....