C.M. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Children & Families
| Decision Date | 22 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 18-P-715 |
| Citation | 147 N.E.3d 527,97 Mass.App.Ct. 343 |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
| Parties | C.M. v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES & others. |
Eric B. Tennen for the plaintiff.
Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General (Abigail Fee, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the defendants.
Present: Meade, Agnes, & Henry, JJ.
This case presents the question of the degree of immunity accorded a defendant social worker in a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 when it is alleged that the social worker "knowingly and willingly misled" the Juvenile Court in order to allow the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to obtain temporary custody of a child. Here, a mother, C.M., alleges that DCF improperly obtained custody of her then seven year old child by filing an ex parte care and protection petition supported by an affidavit that contained knowingly false statements and by testifying falsely during the hearing on that petition. DCF obtained and maintained physical custody of the child for fifty-one days, until a Juvenile Court judge ordered DCF to return the child to her mother's care. DCF kept legal custody of the child for another five months until May 2012, when a Juvenile Court judge ordered the care and protection case dismissed.
The mother brought this action in Superior Court against the commissioner of DCF and two DCF employees, Marcie Plouffe and Candice Gemski. The mother sought injunctive relief against DCF and monetary damages against Plouffe and Gemski for violations of § 1983. While discovery was ongoing, DCF moved for summary judgment, and Plouffe and Gemski moved for judgment on the pleadings. Both motions were allowed and a separate and final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974), entered in their favor.3 The mother appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Background. In reviewing the ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, we are required to take the allegations of the complaint as true. See Jones v. Brockton Pub. Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 388, 340 N.E.2d 484 (1975). In considering the ruling on DCF's motion for summary judgment, we are required to review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the mother. See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991).
The child was born in 2003. DCF's involvement with the mother and her daughter dates back to 2004, when DCF received a report that the child's father was a level three sex offender. The child's father did not live with the child, but had frequent visitation.4 DCF investigated the report and closed the case after the parents voluntarily entered into their first safety plan with DCF. This plan provided that the father would not be left alone with the child "except for short intervals such as mother's going to the bathroom, doing chores around the house, etc."
Several years later, in 2009, DCF received a report indicating that the father was a level three sex offender, the child had been telling others that her vagina hurt, and the child was "touching herself." After investigating, DCF made a finding of neglect and again closed the case after the parents agreed to a second safety plan. The second safety plan provided that at all times that the father was with the child and not at a public venue, he would be supervised by the mother or his girlfriend and that in case of an emergency, "all reasonable efforts will be made to provide alternative supervision." When an alternative could not be found, the father would care for the child "until such alternative care can be found." Emergency was defined as including "[d]eath in the immediate family"; "[i]llness/emergency care for [the child]"; and "[the mother's] illness or hospitalization."
That brings us to the events that led to the removal of the child from the mother's care and custody. In May 2011, when the child was seven years old, DCF received a G. L. c. 119, § 51A, report that the child might be having unsupervised contact with the father. The report identified -- and the mother admitted -- two sets of circumstances in which the child had been left unsupervised with the father. First, the mother left the child with the father at an urgent care doctor's appointment while the mother went to a previously scheduled dentist appointment for replacement of a crown. The child's doctor ordered her to have X-rays. The father transported her to the hospital for X-rays and then home, where the mother met them immediately. Second, when the doctor ordered the mother to keep the child home until she had completed five days of medication, the mother left the child home alone with the father for two days because the mother could not take time off from work or find alternate care. A DCF investigator interviewed the child, who was able to tell the difference between a good and bad touch and stated that her father had never touched her inappropriately.
DCF again found the mother to be in neglect for allowing the child to have unsupervised contact with the father. The mother contends that no circumstance mentioned above should have supported the finding of neglect because the contacts involved emergencies.5 Following the finding of neglect, Plouffe, a DCF case worker, began working with the family.
Plouffe's relationship with the mother often was acrimonious. As alleged in the mother's amended complaint, Plouffe did not work to "strengthen and encourage family life," and instead "simply identified perceived deficits in, and problems with," the mother's support system. Plouffe did not identify supports to help the mother with day-to-day issues. The mother further alleged that Plouffe faulted the mother for her behavior, first criticizing her for being too upset and then criticizing her for being too calm.
As alleged in the first amended complaint, in August 2011, the parents agreed to the father having no unsupervised contact with the child "for the time being." The mother alleges that at an August 30, 2011, meeting, Gemski, a DCF area program manager and Plouffe's supervisor, incorrectly maintained that the mother was allowing the father to have ongoing contact with the child and was not following DCF's safety plan.
On October 5, 2011, DCF proposed a third safety plan. "All the parties agreed on the provisions prohibiting unsupervised contact between [the child] and her father." The plan, however, contained many provisions the mother had not agreed to, including requirements that the mother and the child attend therapy, that the mother sign "open releases of ... private health information to DCF," and that the father leave the house if the mother was showering. When the mother expressed concerns regarding these additional provisions, Plouffe ended the conversation.
On October 31, 2011, without any further conversation regarding the third safety plan, Plouffe informed the mother that DCF would be seeking temporary custody of the child. On November 1, 2011, DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Juvenile Court seeking temporary custody of the child. The mother alleges that the reasons Plouffe stated in her affidavit in support of the petition that the removal was necessary -- the mother "refusing to sign the October 5, 2011 draft of a revised [s]afety [p]lan, the refusal to agree to forcing [the child's] father to leave the home if [the mother] took a shower, and refusal to force [the child] into sexual abuse therapy -- were wholly unsupported by any evidentiary basis for seeking them." The mother alleged that Gemski approved Plouffe's actions.
The mother also alleged that at a hearing on the petition, Plouffe falsely testified on two points: (1) that the mother "is allowing ... the father, a level three sex offender, [to have] unsupervised contact with the child"; and (2) that the mother "has refused to sign the safety plan." As alleged in the mother's complaint, these statements were false, were approved by Gemski, and were knowingly and willingly made to mislead the Juvenile Court.6
Following the hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered temporary custody of the child to DCF. The case then proceeded to a seventy-two hour hearing after which the child remained in DCF's physical and legal custody. The child was placed in foster care and a new school. The mother alleges that Plouffe and Gemski did everything in their power to keep the child away from the mother even if she agreed to no contact with the father during the pendency of the care and protection proceeding.
On December 19, 2011, the Juvenile Court ordered the child returned to the mother pending final disposition of the matter. In April 2012, a court appointed investigator submitted a written report to the Juvenile Court recommending that the care and protection proceeding be dismissed contingent upon the family's agreement to a new safety plan drafted by an independent psychologist. The mother asserts that the parties adopted this safety plan (the 2012 plan), which called for a DCF case manager/coordinator to evaluate the family's progress after six months to a year. The parties do not agree whether this 2012 plan or any safety plan is currently in place, and if it is, whether DCF is a party to it. DCF contends that to the extent the mother considers herself subject to a current safety plan, it does not involve DCF; rather, it involves the independent psychologist. The Juvenile Court dismissed the care and protection petition on May 14, 2012. DCF closed the case in July 2012.
In a careful decision, the motion judge ruled that Plouffe and Gemski are absolutely immune from liability for the mother's allegations pursuant to § 1983 for the functions of investigating and prosecuting the removal proceeding. The judge rightly noted that the mother's allegations, if true, should be of grave concern to DCF and the citizens of the Commonwealth. The judge...
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C.M. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Children & Families
...absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for the averments in Plouffe's affidavit. C.M. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Children & Families, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 355, 147 N.E.3d 527 (2020).We granted the defendants’ application for further appellate review, limited to the question of......