C.P. v. Tenn. Dep't of Educ. & Rutherford Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-02938 |
| Parties | C.P., R.P., and V.P., Plaintiffs, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and RUTHERFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Upon the consent of the parties, this case was transferred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and enter a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 30.) Now pending are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Rutherford County Board of Education (RCBOE) and Tennessee Department of Education (TDOE). (Doc. Nos. 6, 13.) For the following reasons, both motions are GRANTED.
The following facts are taken from C.P.'s complaint and its accompanying exhibits, which are presumed to be true for purposes of these motions.
When the complaint in this action was filed, C.P. was 17 years old. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 4, ¶ 12.) C.P. is nonverbal, functions at the level of a toddler, and has self-destructive and compulsive behaviors that impede his education. (Id.; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 52; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 172.) C.P. uses an "augmentative and alternative communication" device to express himself. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 7, ¶ 30.) He has been diagnosed with autism and epilepsy and is eligible to receive special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (Id. at PageID# 4, ¶ 12; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 52; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 172.) C.P. was receiving services under an IEP in North Carolina before he and his parents moved to Rutherford County, Tennessee in the summer of 2015. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 5-6, ¶¶ 23, 26.) Through the North Carolina IEP, C.P. received "Speech and Language, Special Education, Occupational Therapy, American Sign Language ('ASL') instruction, Assistive Technology ('AT'), Adaptive Physical Education and Behavioral Supports." (Id. at PageID# 6, ¶ 26.) C.P. also received "1:1 aide services" at his North Carolina school. (Id. at PageID# 8, ¶ 34.)
C.P.'s parents wanted him to receive the same services at his new school in Rutherford County, but found the RCBOE's initial efforts at establishing C.P.'s accommodations lacking. The personnel invited to C.P.'s first IEP meeting did not include a board certified behavior analyst, school medical representative, sign language teacher, or an adaptive physical education teacher, all of whom the parents had found to be essential components of C.P.'s North Carolina plan. (Id. at PageID# 6, ¶ 28.) The IEP team who convened on September 1, 2015, also did not include a "regular education teacher." (Id. at PageID# 7, ¶ 29.) The parents were asked to consent to allow the school to evaluate C.P. to determine his eligibility to receive special education in Tennessee. (Id.; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 53; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 172-73.) The parents were told that there was to be no evaluation for the assistive technology that C.P. used to communicate and that the school might not supply the device C.P. used. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 7, ¶ 30.) They also learned that the detailed medical information they had provided the school would not be incorporated into the IEP; instead, an Individual Health Plan would be developed. (Id. at PageID# 7, ¶ 31.) The parents expressed their concerns with these decisions. (Id. at PageID# 7-8, ¶ 32.)
At the second IEP meeting on September 9, 2015, the parents received an updated draft of the IEP which contained fewer services than the North Carolina IEP had provided and eliminated "1:1 aide services."1 (Id. at PageID# 8, ¶ 34.) The parents allege that they received no explanation for the reduction in services. (Id.) At the end of the meeting, the parents informed the district that they would be seeking legal representation. (Id. at PageID# 8, ¶ 35.) They also decided not to allow C.P. to attend school until the district agreed to provide him with 1:1 aide services, a demand that they supported with a letter from C.P.'s physician. (Id. at PageID# 9, ¶¶ 40, 41.)
At a third IEP meeting on October 29, 2015, school officials again declined to provide all the services included in the North Carolina IEP, at least until the district had completed its own evaluations. (Id. at PageID# 9, ¶ 43.) However, the school did state that C.P. would receive 1:1 aide services if he returned to school. (Id. at PageID# 10, ¶ 44; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54.) The parents rejected the offer, stating that, without behavioral and ASL supports,2 1:1 aide services would not be enough to "ensure C.P.'s well-being." (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 10, ¶ 44.)
On September 28, 2015, between the second and third IEP meetings, Plaintiffs' counsel sent an administrative complaint to the TDOE alleging that the RCBOE had violated the IDEA. (Id. at PageID# 9, ¶ 42; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 173.) TDOE commenced an investigation, the results of which the parents received in a letter on November 20, 2015. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 10, ¶45; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 173.) The TDOE found that the RCBOE had unlawfully failed to include a regular education teacher at the IEP meetingsand ordered the RCBOE to train its staff on that unmet obligation (Id.; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54). It also required RCBOE to provide a written summary of the next IEP meeting. (Doc. No. 14, PageID# 173.) Plaintiffs' counsel then requested the documentation that RCBOE had furnished TDOE during the investigation. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 10, ¶ 47.) TDOE complied, producing emails exchanged by RCBOE and TDOE that Plaintiffs claim reveal a "clear bias" of the TDOE to "decid[e] complaints in the favor of the school districts." (Id. at PageID# 10, ¶ 48.) That bias, Plaintiffs argue, is a "systemic problem" with the TDOE's complaint resolution process. (Id. at PageID# 2-3, ¶ 7.)
Convinced that C.P. would not be able to receive "a free and appropriate public education while enrolled in Rutherford County Schools," the parents chose to move the family to Williamson County. (Id. at PageID# 11, ¶¶ 51, 52.) Plaintiffs never requested a due process hearing. (Id. at PageID# 3, ¶ 9; Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54.)
Plaintiffs filed this complaint on November 19, 2016, alleging violations of the IDEA, the ADA, and § 504 and seeking a declaration that Defendants violated plaintiffs' rights under all three laws, reimbursement for the logistical and emotional expenses associated with their relocation to Williamson County, an order that TDOE "revise [its] administrative complaint procedure so that it complies with IDEA," attorney's fees, and any other relief the Court finds just. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 12-13.) Defendants RCBOE and TDOE filed their motions to dismiss on January 13, 2017 and January 24, 2017, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 6, 13.) Plaintiffs responded to those motions (Doc. Nos. 15, 19) and Defendants filed replies (Doc. Nos. 23, 25). With the Court's permission, Plaintiffs filed one sur-reply to RCBOE's reply. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.)
Defendants initially argue that Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA either deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant lawsuit, or requires dismissal for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 7, PageID# 54; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 174-75.) Alternatively, the Defendants argue that (1) compensatory damages are not available under any of the statutes that Plaintiffs have invoked and therefore their claims must be dismissed (Doc. No. 7, PageID# 68; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 183); (2) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the ADA and § 504 (Doc. No. 7, PageID# 66; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 183); and (3) that those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations (Doc. No. 7, PageID# 68-69; Doc. No. 14, PageID# 172 n.1). In a joint motion filed on January 23, 2018, the Defendants withdrew their argument that Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust deprives this Court of jurisdiction, citing Sophie G. v. Wilson County Schools, 265 F. Supp. 3d 765 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). (Doc. No. 35.) The Court therefore analyzes Defendants' arguments made under under Rule 12(b)(6).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that the claim is "plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A plaintiff must plead more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertions devoid of furtherfactual enhancement." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
A claim brought under the IDEA may be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to exhaust the act's administrative remedies, Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dublin City Sch. Dist., 453 F. App'x 606, 609 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011), but only if the failure to exhaust "appears on the face" of the complaint. Retamar-Lopez v. Bd. of Educ. of Dublin City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-CV-0161, 2014 WL 221944, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2014) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
The IDEA ensures a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities. 20...
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