Retamar-Lopez v. Bd. of Educ. of the Dublin City Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-0161 |
| Parties | MAGALY RETAMAR-LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (ECF No. 19). Defendants' motion is unopposed.1 For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff "RE" is a minor child who suffers from a learning disability. Plaintiff's mother, Magaly Retamar-Lopez, brings this action on RE's behalf, as well as "in her own right as the parent of a disabled child." (ECF No. 15 ¶ 5.)
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that RE was in the Dublin City Schools District's special education program from first through fifth grades. He attended private school for grades six and seven and returned to the Dublin City public school system for eighth grade, at which time the facts underlying this dispute occurred.
Throughout RE's eighth grade year, Mrs. Lopez and Defendants disputed the appropriate individualized education program ("IEP") for RE and the means by which that IEP was to be implemented. Plaintiffs' grievances against Defendants include the following: failure to prepare a temporary IEP before RE's triennial evaluation meeting, failure to provide a copy of RE's evaluation report and corresponding document of determination of eligibility before that triennial meeting, failure to provide appropriate notice of the triennial meeting causing Mrs. Lopez to miss the same, and failure to address Mrs. Lopez's parental concerns listed on the IEP, among other things. Plaintiffs allege that these practices deprived RE of a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1414 et seq., commonly referred to as the "IDEA."
Defendants do not address the aforementioned claims in their motion to dismiss. Instead, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, they cannot maintain a claim under the IDEA. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to participate in an evidentiary due process hearing, as required by Ohio Admin. Code 3301-51-05(K)(12)(e), such that they failed to satisfy the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.
In support of their arguments, Defendants point to two dismissal orders in which a state independent hearing officer ("IHO") and a state level review officer ("SLRO") dismissed Plaintiffs' due process complaint during the state administrative review process ("Dismissal Orders").2 (ECF No. 19-1 & 19-2.) The IHO noted in his Dismissal Order that, because Plaintiffs failed to participate in an evidentiary hearing as required by Ohio law, he was unable to render a decision on Plaintiffs' claim. (ECF No. 19-1.) The SLRO affirmed the dismissal,stating that she could not consider Plaintiffs' claim since Plaintiffs failed to attend the required evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 19-2.)
Defendants bring their motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, while Rule 12(b)(6) provides that dismissal is proper if a plaintiff fails to state a claim under which a court may grant relief.
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the Court of jurisdiction to hear this case. Recent case law, however, suggests that Rule 12(b)(1) is not the proper vehicle through which to analyze a failure to exhaust argument. Defendants cite pre-2007 caselaw in which courts treated failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a jurisdictional question (thus invoking Rule 12(b)(1)), but those cases are of questionable precedential value given the United States Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In Jones, the Supreme Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement can be raised as an affirmative defense - it is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction that a plaintiff must plead in his or her complaint. Id. at 212-17. Several courts interpreting Jones in the context of the IDEA have concluded that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See, e.g., Gibson v. Forest Hills Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:11-cv-329, 2012 WL 1197896, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012) (); accord Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 867-71 (9th Cir. 2011); McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 2007) (). As such, the Court will consider Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).
A court analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may consider the complaint, public records, and documents central to the claim that are referenced in the complaint. Basset v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). The court must construe the pleading in favor of the party asserting the claim, accept the factual allegations contained therein as true, and determine whether those factual allegations present a plausible claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). To be considered plausible, a claim must be more than merely conceivable. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556; Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Assuming all well-pleaded allegations as true, "Rule 12(b)(6) is the appropriate vehicle to analyze the viability of the legal theories on which a plaintiff bases his or her claim." Perkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:11-cv-952, 2012 WL 5077712, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2012).
A plaintiff generally is not required to plead facts negating an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Jones, 549 U.S. at 212-16. A court may, however, grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the basis of an affirmative defense if the defense appears on the face of the complaint. Id. at 215 (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (); Doe v. Dublin City Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-738, 2010 WL 1434318, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 2010) (), aff'd, 453 F. App'x 606 (6th Cir. 2011). As such, the Court will not grant Defendants' motion unless Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust appears on the face of the Amended Complaint.
It is clear from the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs did not participate in an evidentiary hearing prior to filing suit. Plaintiffs allege that the IHO erred in dismissing their due process complaint because an evidentiary hearing was not required. They do not suggest that they attended any such hearing. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 51.) The only reasonable inference from those allegations is that Plaintiffs did not attend an evidentiary hearing on their due process complaint. Cf. Bishop, 520 F.3d at 520. The crux of this dispute is whether the evidentiary hearing was required in order to satisfy the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.
The Court also agrees with Defendants that it may consider the Dismissal Orders—which are referred to in the Amended Complaint and central to Plaintiffs' claims—in adjudicating Defendants' motion. See Basset, 528 F.3d at 430. Defendants, however, cite no authority that would allow the Court to accept the factual findings set forth in the Dismissal Orders. The Court therefore will consider the facts that the IHO and SLRO dismissed Plaintiffs' due process claim, to the extent such facts are relevant. The Court declines to adopt the factual findings set forth in the Dismissal Orders.
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1414 et seq., is a federal statute aimed at improving educational results for children with disabilities. It is well settled that a plaintiff may not bring a civil action under the IDEA unless and until he or she has exhausted administrative remedies. See, e.g., Doe v. Dublin City Sch. Dist., 453 F. App'x 606, 608 (6th Cir. 2011); Long v. Dawson Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 197 F. App'x 427, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2006); Donoho v. Smith Cty. Bd. of Educ., 21 F.App'x 293, 296-97 (6th Cir. 2001); Covington v. Knox Cty. Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2000). "Exhaustion 'enables the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to the problem, to exercise its discretion, and to correct its own mistakes, and is credited with promoting accuracy, efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial economy.' " Donoho, 21 F. App'x at 297-98 (quoting Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989)). If a plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, a court should dismiss the action without prejudice. Gibson v. Forest Hills Local Sch. Dist., No. 1;11-cv-329, 2012 WL 1197896, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012).
To determine what administrative procedures a plaintiff must exhaust, a court must look to both the IDEA and...
To continue reading
Request your trial