C.R.H., In re

Decision Date23 September 1993
Docket NumberNo. 2-91-1419,2-91-1419
Citation621 N.E.2d 258,251 Ill.App.3d 102
Parties, 190 Ill.Dec. 389 In re C.R.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.R.H., Respondent-Appellant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Paul J. Glaser, Kathleen J. Hamill, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for C.R.H.

Paul A. Logli, Winnebago County State's Atty., Rockford, William L. Browers, Deputy Director, Marshall M. Stevens, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Justice COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, C.R.H., appeals from the orders of the circuit court of Winnebago County adjudicating him a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. Respondent contends that, because his mother was not properly notified of the juvenile proceedings, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction and its orders are void. We reverse.

On October 11, 1991, the State filed a supplemental petition for an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to section 5-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 805-3 (now 705 ILCS 405/5-3 (West 1992))). The petition alleged that on October 9, 1991, respondent committed the offenses of home invasion (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12-11 (now 720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West 1992))), residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 19-3 (now 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 1992))), drinking as a minor (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 43, par. 134a (now 235 ILCS 5/6-20 (West 1992))), and battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12-3(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 1992))). The petition requested that an arraignment be held on October 11 and listed, under names and residences of the minor's parents, respondent's mother, along with her address, and respondent's father, "address unknown."

Respondent had a two-year history of dealings with the juvenile court when the supplemental petition was filed. Having admitted to a petition to adjudicate him a delinquent minor at age 13, respondent began an alternating sequence of probations and detentions, interspersed with drug and alcohol assessments and treatments. Respondent's mother attended most of the earlier proceedings held against respondent in juvenile court. His father, whose whereabouts were unknown to both respondent and his mother, failed twice to respond to notices by publication, causing the court to enter default orders against him.

At the arraignment and detention hearing on October 11, 1991, the judge inquired as to the whereabouts of respondent's parents and the parents of a co-minor, similarly charged. The prosecutor stated that "[t]hey have attempted to notify the parents." Respondent's juvenile probation officer told the judge, "I talked with the minor's mother this morning. She said she could not make it." Another probation officer made a similar representation regarding the absence of the co-minor's parents. The judge then said, "I will order summons to issue for the respondents, respondent parents or stepparents." After hearing testimony, the court ordered that respondent be kept in detention pending the outcome of the proceedings on the petition.

On October 30, the State filed an amended supplemental petition that repeated the allegations made in the first petition and added charges of criminal trespass to residence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 19-4 (now 720 ILCS 5/19-4 (West 1992))), criminal damage to property (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 21-1(1)(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 1992))), and theft (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(1)(A) (now 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 1992))). Respondent's parents' names and mother's address were listed. The record includes a summons addressed to Mrs. H., dated October 18, 1991, informing her that a hearing would be held on the cause on October 23. On the reverse side of the summons is stapled a short document in affidavit form, dated October 21 and signed by a Winnebago County deputy sheriff, stating that the summons was not served on Mrs. H. because, "[e]xpired/not enough time to serve." The record does not indicate that respondent's mother or father was present at the hearing held on October 23, at which time a new attorney was appointed to represent respondent.

The judge explained the new charges to respondent at an arraignment held on October 30. Neither respondent's parents nor his attorney was present. The judge entered a denial on respondent's behalf and scheduled the cause for trial.

An adjudicatory hearing was held on November 4, 1991. The record contains no indication that either of respondent's parents was present or that they were notified of the hearing. The court adjudicated respondent delinquent after finding that he had committed home invasion, residential burglary, drinking as a minor, battery, and criminal damage to property.

A dispositional hearing, first set for November 19, 1991, was held on November 20. Again, the record indicates that neither parent was present and that no notice of either dispositional hearing date was sent to them. Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term.

Respondent claims on appeal that the failure to give proper notice to his mother of the proceedings begun in October 1991 violated both respondent's and his mother's right to due process of law and rendered the lower court without jurisdiction to hold adjudicatory and dispositional proceedings. Therefore, respondent maintains, the lower court's adjudicatory and dispositional orders in this case are void. The State argues in response that respondent's objection to the court's jurisdiction on the ground of lack of service to his mother is waived. The State's sole basis for this assertion is an amendment to the Act, section 1-15(b) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801-15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1-15(b) (West 1992))). According to the State, section 1-15(b), which became effective July 1, 1990, supersedes previous law on the subject of notice to juveniles.

The Act requires that a petition to adjudicate a minor delinquent name the minor's parents, legal guardian, or persons having custody of the minor (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 805-13(2) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-13(2) (West 1992))) and that a summons with a copy of the petition attached be served on the persons so named (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 805-15(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-15(1) (West 1992))). Thus, the legislature, at least before the addition of section 1-15(b), determined that parents are necessary respondents who must be named and served with notice in order for the trial court to conduct an adjudicatory hearing. People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1, 6, 83 Ill.Dec. 339, 470 N.E.2d 297; In re E.D. Mc. (1991), 216 Ill.App.3d 896, 898, 159 Ill.Dec. 873, 576 N.E.2d 542.

Effective July 1, 1990, the General Assembly amended the notice provisions of the Act as follows:

"A party respondent who either has been properly served, or who appears before the court personally or by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing or at any earlier proceeding on a petition for wardship under this Act leading to that adjudicatory hearing, and who wishes to object to the court's jurisdiction on the ground that some necessary party either has not been served or has not been properly served must raise that claim before the start of the adjudicatory hearing conducted under any Article of this Act. No order or judgment is void because of a claim of inadequate service unless that claim is raised in accordance with this Section." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 801-14(b) (amended to Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801-15(b) (see Pub. Act 86-1475, eff. January 10, 1991)) (now 705 ILCS 405/1-15(b) (West 1992)).

No cases decided under the new provision have been cited by either party. Since it appears that we are the first court to review its application, we will examine section 1-15(b) under the rules of statutory construction.

When interpreting a statute, courts must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning and should look first to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. (Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n (1990), 139 Ill.2d 24, 50-51, 150 Ill.Dec. 578, 563 N.E.2d 465.) The amendment's wording is straightforward. "A party respondent * * * who wishes to object to the court's jurisdiction on the ground that some necessary party either has not been served or has not been properly served must raise that claim before the start of the adjudicatory hearing." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801-15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1-15(b) (West 1992)).) The plain language of section 1-15(b) indicates to us a legislative intent to place the ultimate responsibility for notifying necessary parties of an adjudicatory hearing on the party respondent.

The Act does not define "party respondent." As used elsewhere in the Act, the term refers to the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and also to his parents, guardian, legal guardian, responsible relative, or other person named as a respondent in the petition. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801-5(1) (now codified, as amended, at 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1992)); Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 805-15(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-15(1) (West 1992)).

In the instant case, respondent and both of his parents are named in the petition. Respondent's father was previously declared in default following the court's attempts to notify him through publication, and lack of notice to him is not an issue on appeal. Therefore, the potential party respondents in this case are respondent and respondent's mother.

The State contends that respondent alone is the party respondent targeted by the amendment, because he had notice of the adjudicatory hearing and because applying the section to his mother would produce an absurd result: if she wished to timely object to...

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2 cases
  • C.R.H., In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1994
    ...held that, because notice to C.R.H.'s mother was constitutionally required, jurisdiction was improperly assumed by the circuit court. (251 Ill.App.3d 102.) Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the orders adjudicating C.R.H. a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Cor......
  • C.R.H., In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 1, 1994

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