C.R.H., In re
| Decision Date | 23 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 76377,76377 |
| Citation | 644 N.E.2d 1153,163 Ill.2d 263,206 Ill.Dec. 100 |
| Parties | , 206 Ill.Dec. 100 In re C.R.H. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. C.R.H., Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Paul A. Logli, State's Atty., Rockford , for the People.
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Kathleen J. Hamill, Asst. Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.
This appeal arises from the orders of the circuit court of Winnebago County adjudicating respondent, C.R.H., a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. On appeal, C.R.H. argued that his mother was not properly notified of the juvenile proceedings and, therefore, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction and its orders were void. The appellate court held that, because notice to C.R.H.'s mother was constitutionally required, jurisdiction was improperly assumed by the circuit court. (251 Ill.App.3d 102.) Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the orders adjudicating C.R.H. a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. The appellate court further held that section 1--15(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801--15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1--15(b) (West 1992))) was unconstitutional because it infringes upon a parent's constitutional right to receive adequate notice of a juvenile proceeding involving a minor child. (251 Ill.App.3d 102, 190 Ill.Dec. 389, 621 N.E.2d 258.) We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 317). We now affirm the appellate court.
The record reveals the following facts. On October 11, 1991, the State filed a supplemental petition for an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to section 5--3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 805--3 (now 705 ILCS 405/5--3 (West 1992))). The petition alleged that C.R.H. was a delinquent minor because on October 9, 1991, he committed the offenses of home invasion (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12--11 (now 720 ILCS 5/12--11 (West 1992))), residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 19--3 (now 720 ILCS 5/19--3 (West 1992))), drinking as a minor (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 43, par. 134a (now 235 ILCS 5/6--20 (West 1992))), and battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12--3(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/12--3(a)(1) (West 1992))). The petition requested that an arraignment be held on October 11, 1991, and listed the Prior to the filing of the supplemental petition, C.R.H. had a history of dealings with the juvenile court over the previous two years. C.R.H. admitted to an earlier petition to adjudicate him a delinquent minor. Thereafter, C.R.H. began an alternating sequence of probation and detention, interspersed with drug and alcohol assessments and treatments. C.R.H.'s mother attended most of the earlier proceedings held against C.R.H. in juvenile court. Nevertheless, C.R.H.'s father, whose whereabouts were unknown to both C.R.H. and his mother, failed twice to respond to notices by publication. The court subsequently entered default orders against C.R.H.'s father.
[206 Ill.Dec. 102] names of C.R.H.'s parents along with his mother's address. C.R.H.'s father's address was listed as "unknown." The record does not include a summons to either parent
At the arraignment and detention hearing on October 11, 1991, C.R.H.'s parents were not present. The State indicated that it had attempted to notify the parents. C.R.H.'s probation officer stated that he had talked with C.R.H.'s mother, who indicated that she could not attend the proceedings. The court then ordered summons to issue for the parents. After hearing testimony, the court ordered that C.R.H. be kept in detention pending the outcome of the proceedings on the petition.
The record includes a summons addressed to C.R.H.'s mother, dated October 18, 1991, informing her that a hearing would be held on October 23, 1991. Attached to the summons is a short document in affidavit form, dated October 21, and signed by a Winnebago County deputy sheriff. That document indicates that the summons was not served on the mother because it had expired.
On October 23, 1991, the cause was reset for trial on November 4, 1991. There is no indication in the record that C.R.H.'s parents were present.
On October 30, 1991, the State filed an amended supplemental petition that repeated the allegations made in the first petition and added charges of criminal trespass to residence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 19--4 (now 720 ILCS 5/19--4 (West 1992))), criminal damage to property (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 21--1(1)(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/21--1(1)(a) (West 1992))), and theft (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 16--1(a)(1)(A) (now 720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(1)(A) (West 1992))). C.R.H.'s parents' names and his mother's address were listed on the amended supplemental petition. Nevertheless, the record is devoid of a summons to C.R.H.'s parents concerning this petition.
On October 30, 1991, a brief hearing was held at which the court explained the new charges to C.R.H. Neither C.R.H.'s parents nor his attorney was present. The court entered a denial on behalf of C.R.H., and scheduled the cause for trial on November 4, 1991.
On November 4, 1991, an adjudicatory hearing was held. The record contains no indication that either of C.R.H.'s parents was present or that they were notified of the hearing. The court adjudicated C.R.H. delinquent after finding that he had committed home invasion, residential burglary, drinking as a minor, battery and criminal damage to property.
A dispositional hearing was held on November 20, 1991. The record indicates that neither parent was present and that no notice of the dispositional hearing date was sent to them. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered C.R.H. committed to the Department of Corrections for an indefinite period of time.
The appellate court reversed the orders adjudicating C.R.H. a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. The appellate court held that jurisdiction was improperly assumed by the circuit court since C.R.H.'s mother did not receive notice, which is constitutionally required. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the orders adjudicating C.R.H. a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. It further held that section 1--15(b) of the Act is unconstitutional. As stated, we allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
The issue before this court is whether a minor's parents have a constitutional right of due process to receive adequate notice of a
[206 Ill.Dec. 103] juvenile proceeding, and whether section 1--15(b) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, par. 801--15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1--15(b) (West 1992))) is unconstitutional for infringing upon that right.
Initially, we note that the circuit court found C.R.H.'s father in default following failed attempts to notify him through publication. As a result, lack of notice to him is not an issue on appeal. The issue before us concerns whether adequate notice was given to C.R.H.'s mother.
The issue of parental notice in the context of a juvenile proceeding was first examined by the United States Supreme Court in In re Application of Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. In Gault, the Court established that the basic requirements of due process and fairness must be satisfied in juvenile proceedings. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31, 87 S.Ct. at 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d at 548.) The Court held that due process in a juvenile proceeding requires adequate notice to a minor and his parents. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. at 1446-47, 18 L.Ed.2d at 549.) Specifically, the Gault Court found that due process requires that a minor and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at an adjudicatory hearing on delinquency. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. at 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d at 549.) Such written notice must be given at the earliest practicable time and, in any event, sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. at 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d at 549.
This court has adopted the holding in Gault that due process of law requires that notice in juvenile proceedings be equivalent to that constitutionally required in criminal or civil cases (People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 81, 67 Ill.Dec. 813, 445 N.E.2d 293) and that adequate notice to a minor and his or her parents is a requirement of due process (In re J.P.J. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 129, 135, 92 Ill.Dec. 802, 485 N.E.2d 848). This court has also found that inadequate notice to a parent whose address is known violates the rights of parent and child to due process. (People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1, 6, 83 Ill.Dec. 339, 470 N.E.2d 297.) Consequently, a minor and his or her parents have a constitutional right of due process to receive adequate notice of a juvenile proceeding.
The State first argues that notice to parents is a mere prophylactic safeguard and not a constitutional right of due process. The State relies on United States v. Watts (10th Cir.1975), 513 F.2d 5, as support for this claim. In Watts, the minor appealed from a judgment finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and adjudging him to be a juvenile delinquent. The minor alleged that he was denied due process because his parents were not given notice of the charges against him. The court held that the right to parental notice recognized in Gault was merely a "prophylactic safeguard" intended to protect a minor's basic rights. (Watts, 513 F.2d at 8.) The court found that, because the minor was aware of the charges against him and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- W.C., In re
-
People v. Hauschild
...Ill.2d 216, 221, 258 Ill.Dec. 557, 756 N.E.2d 831 (2001) (same). Defendant, however, urges us to follow In re C.R.H., 163 Ill.2d 263, 274, 206 Ill.Dec. 100, 644 N.E.2d 1153 (1994), wherein this court interpreted the rule of waiver1 as an admonition to the parties and not a limitation on the......
-
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.
...body of precedent, override considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial nature of our system. In re C.R.H., 163 Ill.2d 263, 274, 206 Ill.Dec. 100, 644 N.E.2d 1153 (1994); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 224-25, 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967); accord 155 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5). In this case, fo......
- In re Jessica M.