C. Stevenot v. Eastern Railway Company of Minnesota

• Decision Date: 10 May 1895
• Docket Number: 9375--(123)
• Citation: 63 N.W. 256,61 Minn. 104
• Parties: C. STEVENOT v. EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF MINNESOTA
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

63 N.W. 256

61 Minn. 104

C. STEVENOT v. EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF MINNESOTA

Nos. 9375--(123)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

May 10, 1895

Appeal by Eastern Railway Company of Minnesota, garnishee, from a judgment of the municipal court of St. Paul, in favor of plaintiff and against the garnishee for $ 31.68, entered in pursuance of an order for judgment by Orr, J. Reversed.

Judgment reversed.

C Wellington, for appellant.

The possession which a common carrier, as such, has of goods in transit is not sufficient to make the carrier liable as garnishee. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cobb, 48 Ill. 402; Bates v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 60 Wis. 296 19 N.W. 72. See Staniels v. Raymond, 4 Cush. 314; Cooley v. Minnesota Trans. R. Co., 53 Minn. 327, 55 N.W. 141; Western Railroad v. Thornton, 60 Ga. 300; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Chicago & M. L. S. R. Co., 1 Ill.App. 399. In Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164, it does not appear that the goods were not held by the carrier as warehouseman. By G. S. 1894, § 5325, the carrier cannot be compelled to deliver at a time or place not stipulated in the contract with defendant.

Alva Hunt, for respondent.

The statute makes no distinction between common carriers and others. Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164. The proviso of G. S. 1894, § 5325, does not apply to a common carrier having only a lien for carriage. See Jewett v Bacon, 6 Mass. 60.

OPINION

MITCHELL, J.

It appears that the property for which the plaintiff seeks to hold the garnishee liable was, at the time of the service of the summons, in the possession of the garnishee, merely as common carrier, for transportation from St. Paul, in this state, to West Superior, Wisconsin, the place of consignment; that the car in which the property was formed a part of a regular train operated in transporting freight between the places named; that the train was already made up, and was standing on a siding in St. Paul, ready to start for Superior; that thereafter the property was transported to West Superior, and there delivered to the consignee.

We do not deem important the fact that the train had not yet moved out of the St. Paul yard. The property was none the less in the possession of the garnishee, as common carrier, for transportation to the place of consignment. In contemplation of law, it was in transit.

The courts have not infrequently been confronted with the question whether a common carrier can be held liable to judgment on the process of garnishment merely on the ground that it may, at the time of the service of the process, have had property in transit on its route belonging to the defendant debtor. The objections, on grounds both of public policy and of injustice to the carrier, to holding the carrier liable under such circumstances, have been fully recognized by the courts, and have led them, notwithstanding the broad language of the statutes, to deny or limit the liability of the carrier under such circumstances. See Bates v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R Co., 60 Wis. 296, 19 N.W. 72; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cobb, 48 Ill. 402. In passing on the question, the courts have not, as a rule, gone further than was necessary for the purpose of deciding the particular case under consideration, and hence their decisions do not always lay down a definite rule of universal application; but we have found no case where a court has placed a literal and unlimited construction upon the broad language of statutes of garnishment, except Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164. In Cooley v. Minnesota Trans. R. Co., 53 Minn. 327, 55 N.W. 141, we held that a railway company, after the termination of the transportation of the property, and while holding it only as warehouseman, was liable to garnishment, but declined to consider whether goods in the possession of a common...