C.O. v. Doe, No. A07-0826 (Minn. App. 11/20/2007)
| Decision Date | 20 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A07-0826.,A07-0826. |
| Parties | C.O., petitioner, Appellant, v. John Doe, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Washington County, File No. F6-06-71919.
Mark A. Olson, Olson Law Office, (for appellant).
Michelle L. MacDonald, MacDonald Law Firm, LLC, (for respondents).
Considered and decided by Dietzen, Presiding Judge; Randall, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant C.O. challenges the district court's order to vacate the contact agreement between him and the adoptive parents of his biological daughter. We affirm.
Appellant's daughter, A.D., was born on November 12, 2003.1 Two days after A.D.'s birth, the New Life Family Services adoption agency placed her with respondents John and Jackie Doe. The parental rights of appellant and A.D.'s biological mother were terminated by district court order dated April 12, 2005, and respondents legally adopted A.D. in August 2005.
Approximately one month before appellant's parental rights were terminated, he entered into a contact agreement with respondents pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 259.58 (2006). This agreement provided that after respondents adopted A.D., appellant could continue to have limited contact with her under the terms of the agreement.
The contact agreement placed certain duties on each of the parties. Respondents' obligations included keeping appellant informed of important events in A.D.'s life, allowing appellant to visit A.D. every third weekend, and taking A.D. to visit appellant's family in Panama. The agreement also specified that appellant's real relationship to A.D. would remain unknown; he was to be referred to only as "Papa Carlos." Appellant agreed to call respondents only at reasonable times and intervals and only for the purpose of contact with A.D. Lastly, appellant and respondents agreed to hold the welfare of A.D. paramount and to subrogate their own interests when necessary to ensure that A.D.'s best interests were served. If a dispute concerning contact with A.D. arose, the agreement required the parties to attempt to mediate the dispute. If mediation did not resolve the dispute, the procedures outlined in Minn. Stat. § 259.58 regarding enforcement and modification of contact agreements governed.
Within months of signing the agreement, a conflict arose between respondents and appellant regarding contact with A.D. This resulted in the parties agreeing to amend the contact agreement in September 2005. But disagreements between the parties continued, culminating when appellant moved in district court to enforce his rights under the contact agreement. In their reply motion, respondents requested termination of the contact agreement pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 259.58(c). Following a hearing, the district court granted respondents' motion. This appeal follows.
Minn. Stat. § 259.58 (2006) states, in part:
Adoptive parents and a birth relative or foster parents may enter an agreement regarding communication with or contact between an adopted minor, adoptive parents, and a birth relative or foster parents under this section. An agreement may be entered between:
. . . .
(c) An agreed order entered under this section may be enforced by filing a petition or motion with the family court that includes a certified copy of the order granting the communication, contact, or visitation, but only if the petition or motion is accompanied by an affidavit that the parties have mediated or attempted to mediate any dispute under the agreement or that the parties agree to a proposed modification. The prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The court shall not modify an agreed order under this section unless it finds that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the minor adoptee, and:
(1) the modification is agreed to by the parties to the agreement; or
(2) exceptional circumstances have arisen since the agreed order was entered that justify modification of the order.
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion because no exceptional circumstances have occurred that justify modification or termination of the parties' agreement and that he was not given an evidentiary hearing.
"On appeal, a [district] court's findings of fact are given great deference, and shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's findings, Trondson v. Janikula, 458 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 1990), and defer to the district court's credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). We will determine that a finding is clearly erroneous only if we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at 101 (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 259.58(c) authorizes a district court to modify a contact order only if it finds that "exceptional circumstances have arisen since the agreed order was entered" and that the modification would be in the "best interests of the minor." The terms of the contact agreement here required each party to meet certain conditions in order to comply with the agreement, and there were contractually defined consequences for failure to meet those conditions.
The dissent characterizes respondents' position as "buyers' remorse" and suggests that respondents used the contact agreement as "bait" to secure appellant's agreement to voluntarily terminate his parental rights. We respectfully disagree. The record here supports the district court's factual findings, with a few exceptions, and provides a proper basis for the district court's conclusion that exceptional circumstances have arisen that make modification of the agreement in A.D.'s best interests.
The district court made multiple factual findings in this matter, including:
5. [Appellant] has made threats to disrupt the adoption, and used destructive language regarding the child's adoption.
6. The [appellant] has failed to comply with and abide by the contingencies in the contact agreement and order by his failure to abstain from consumption of alcohol, and his failure to attend substance abuse support group meetings. He has failed to submit to reasonably requested random breath analysis, and has refused to allow the Respondents to inspect and approve of his living environment.
7. Additionally, the [appellant] has failed to abide by the contact agreement and order requiring him to attend an adoption class or adoption counseling in order to learn more about the process of adoption.
8. [Appellant] has made verbal threats to disrupt the adoption, including a threat to go to Respondents' house [safe place] and remove the child. The [appellant] left a voice mail message in which he threatened to take the child from the Respondents' home. [Appellant's] conduct shows an overall disregard and contempt for the duly entered decree of adoption.
9. The parties' agreement provides that "failure to comply with the terms set forth in this paragraph may be grounds for termination of the agreement as it applies to the birth father [appellant]."
10. [Appellant] made no showing with respect to his compliance with the terms set forth in the parties' contact agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the [appellant's] contact with the child was contingent upon his compliance with the specific terms as set forth in the agreement.
11. [Appellant] has repeatedly used destructive and disrespectful language when referring to the child and her adoption by the Respondents. The Respondents are fearful of the [appellant].
12. At the hearing before [the district court], the [appellant] continued to refer to the child as "his daughter" and told [the district court] that in his opinion the child was purchased from the adoption agency by Respondents for $13,000.00. [Appellant] argues that he has a good heart, that he was falsely accused of domestic assault, that he needs to have visitation with his "daughter." This further demonstrated his contempt and disregard for the adoption and the Respondents as [A.D.'s] parents.
. . . .
14. Contact with the [appellant] will interfere with the parent child relationship between the Respondents and the child. [Appellant] has not been respectful of Respondents role as the child's parents and is likely to continue to be disrespectful of the parameters of the contact.
The record in this matter supports the vast majority of the district court's findings of fact. Respondents provided an affidavit from Jennifer Patrick, the director of the adoption agency that placed A.D. with respondents, that states that since appellant entered into the contact agreement with respondents, she has witnessed "extreme hostility and volatility from [appellant] towards agency representatives" and toward the adoption itself. Appellant's hostility has caused Patrick "grave concerns about the physical and psychological safety and well-being" of A.D. Patrick's affidavit also states that her 13 years of experience as a social worker and her involvement in hundreds of adoptions has led her to believe that continued contact with appellant would be "extremely detrimental" to A.D.
A separate affidavit from Karissa Stel, office manager of the adoption agency, details similar abusive conduct by appellant. Stel's affidavit states that appellant became enraged when he called the agency and she told him that Patrick was not available to take his phone call. He threatened to sue the agency for $45,000 and called Stel a "f__king b-tch."
Respondents submitted an affidavit that states that appellant has used abusive language toward them...
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