C.V. Landfill, Inc. v. Environmental Bd.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-012,91-012
• Parties: C.V. LANDFILL, INC. v. ENVIRONMENTAL BOARD.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 145

610 A.2d 145

158 Vt. 386

C.V. LANDFILL, INC. v. ENVIRONMENTAL BOARD.

No. 91-012.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 8, 1992.

John B. Kassel and Martin K. Miller of Miller, Eggleston & Rosenberg, Ltd., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Atty. Gen., and Conrad W. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montpelier, for defendant-appellee.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

MORSE, Justice.

Plaintiff C.V. Landfill, Inc. appeals the Washington Superior Court's dismissal of its request for a declaratory judgment that Act 250 did not apply to its landfill operation. C.V. challenges the court's invocation of discretion to dismiss the complaint. C.V. claims that the court did not have discretion under the declaratory judgment provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 V.S.A. § 807, and the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA), 12 V.S.A. §§ 4711-4725, to refuse to reach the merits. Alternatively, C.V. claims that if such discretion existed, it was abused. C.V. also appeals the court's dismissal of its request to enjoin Act 250 proceedings against it.

C.V. and its predecessor operated a landfill in East Montpelier since the mid-1960's. The landfill was a pre-existing development under 10 V.S.A. ch. 151 (Act 250), because it was in operation before June 1, 1970. Therefore, it was not required to obtain an Act 250 permit, absent a substantial change. 10 V.S.A. § 6081(b).

Under certification by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) aimed at reducing potential pollution from its landfill operation, C.V. was required to eliminate the flow of surface water and leachate through an existing culvert system. C.V. implemented the ANR requirement by capping off the old system, extending an existing ditch, and installing subsurface tanks, a pumphouse, and pipes, but made no change in accepting and processing waste. In March 1990, the local District Environmental Commission Coordinator issued a written advisory opinion indicating that C.V.'s surface water and leachate diversion required an Act 250 permit because the project constituted a substantial change under Environmental Board Rule 2(G). The opinion also advised that C.V. could appeal to the Environmental Board and that failure to do so or to apply for a permit might trigger an Act 250 enforcement proceeding. C.V. did neither and instead filed suit against the Board in Washington Superior Court.

In its complaint, C.V. claimed that its efforts to meet ANR requirements did not constitute a substantial change within the meaning of Rule 2(G) and therefore, as a preexisting landfill, it was exempt from obtaining an Act 250 permit. The trial court dismissed C.V.'s action on the basis of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" because, in its view, the Environmental Board was the more appropriate forum to decide the issue.

I.

Under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," courts may refrain from exercising jurisdiction when an alternative tribunal with expertise in the subject matter is available to decide the dispute. See generally 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 22:1-22:2 (2d ed. 1983) (disposition of the case by administrative agency charged by statute to adjudicate disputes in a particular specialty promotes utilization of expertise and uniformity of interpretation); see also Smith v. Highway Board, 117 Vt. 343, 349, 91 A.2d 805, 809 (1952) (courts ordinarily do not grant relief prior to an agency decision where the agency has primary jurisdiction).

Environmental Board Rule 3(C) provides that

An advisory opinion of a district coordinator may be appealed to the executive officer of the board. An advisory opinion of the executive officer may be appealed to the environmental board by means of a petition for a declaratory ruling.

While the DJA and § 807 of the APA allow parties to seek a declaratory judgment in superior court, Rule 3(C) provides an alternative administrative remedy.

Our cases underscore the importance of prior adjudication by administrative bodies, and we conclude that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was particularly suited to this case. In In re State Aid Highway No. 1, 133 Vt. 4, 8, 328 A.2d 667, 669 (1974), we stated that "proceedings under various declaratory judgment statutes cannot be substituted for adequate and available remedies of review ... by administrative tribunals." Courts must, then, consider at the outset whether another body is better suited to resolve the issues before it. I.C.C. v. Maine Central R.R., 505 F.2d 590, 594 (2d Cir.1974) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play when resolution of the issues under regulatory scheme requires the special competence of an administrative body). See also Committee to Save the Bishop's House v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont, Inc., 136 Vt. 213, 218, 388 A.2d 827, 830 (1978) (when properly applied, doctrine of primary jurisdiction serves as guide in determining whether court should " 'refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency' " has considered the issue) (quoting 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.01, at 3 (1958)).

The DJA, enacted in 1931, was designed to provide litigants "at an early stage of the controversy a right to petition for relief not heretofore possessed." Gifford Memorial Hospital v. Town of Randolph, 119 Vt. 66, 70, 118 A.2d 480, 483 (1955). The Act provides that a superior court "shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." 12 V.S.A. § 4711.

Section 807 of the APA was enacted later, in 1968. It gives the Washington Superior Court jurisdiction to determine the applicability of an agency rule. Under § 807,

[t]he validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the Washington superior court if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.

The APA, invoked by C.V. in this case, is limited to issues of administrative law, serving as the vehicle enabling a litigant to seek a declaratory judgment on the validity or applicability of any agency rule in the Washington Superior Court. C.V. maintains that the DJA, made applicable in this case by § 807, significantly limits the court's discretion to dismiss. In our view, the court's authority was not so limited as to deny it the discretion to dismiss C.V.'s complaint.

C.V. relies on 12 V.S.A. § 4716 of the DJA (entitled "Refusal to enter judgment; discretion of court"), which states that "[t]he court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." C.V. argues from this language that discretion to dismiss exists only when a declaratory ruling, if given, would not resolve the controversy. By implication, it maintains, no discretion exists in any other circumstance.

We refuse to impose upon the Washington Superior Court the obligation to retain jurisdiction based on this limited reading of the DJA urged by C.V. Other cases of this Court, which C.V. cites in support of this reading, are distinguishable because they are based solely on the DJA and do not account for the administrative statutory scheme or the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Neal v. Brockway, 136 Vt. 119, 121-22, 385 A.2d 1069, 1070 (1978) (error for court to dismiss, under the DJA, request to declare parties' rights to property jointly held because "bare existence of another adequate remedy ... provides an insufficient basis" for a dismissal); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Papandrea, 121 Vt. 386, 392, 159 A.2d 333, 337 (1960) (court should not have dismissed request for declaration of insurer's duty to defend where the decree would have the effect of "clarifying the legal relations of the parties or ... terminat[ing] the uncertainty and insecurity of the controversy").

The Legislature's instruction that a declaratory action "may" be dismissed...