Caba v. Barker
Decision Date | 16 June 2004 |
Citation | 93 P.3d 74,193 Or.App. 768 |
Parties | Sandra CABA and Floy Jones, Appellants, v. Anthony J. BARKER, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Thomas W. Sondag, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Lane Powell Spears Lubersky LLP.
Brian R. Talcott, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue LLP.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and LINDER and ORTEGA, Judges.
Plaintiffs, residual beneficiaries of a will prepared by defendant, appeal, assigning error to the trial court's dismissal of their claims for professional malpractice and breach of contract. We conclude, under Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987), that plaintiffs, as donee beneficiaries of defendant's promised performance, have pleaded legally sufficient claims both for negligence and for breach of contract. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
In reviewing the trial court's dismissal pursuant to ORCP 21 A(8), "we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts" in the operative pleading, plaintiffs' third amended complaint, giving plaintiffs "the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn" in their favor. Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 372, 72 P.3d 96 (2003). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged the following material facts: In October 1999, the testator, Laura Carnese (Carnese), was suffering from the effects of a stroke. Carnese had formulated an estate plan that included residuary bequests to plaintiffs Caba, a relative by marriage, and Cammann, a blood relative.1 Charles Carnese (Charles), an attorney, was Carnese's relative by marriage and had previously represented Carnese on other matters. Charles was aware of Carnese's testamentary plan.
On or before October 22, 1999, Charles arranged for defendant, another Oregon attorney, to meet with Carnese in the hospital and to prepare a will for her. Charles and defendant were friends and former professional colleagues. Before defendant met with Carnese, Charles informed defendant of Carnese's estate plan, and defendant knew or should have known that Carnese's will would include gifts to Charles.
Defendant promised to prepare Carnese's will. That promise included "an implied promise to make the will invulnerable to a will contest so as [to] achieve [Carnese's] plan to maximize gifts to residuary beneficiaries, including [plaintiffs]." Defendant prepared a will, which Carnese executed on October 22, 1999. Under the will, Charles received a gift of $35,000, was named a residual beneficiary, and was appointed executor of Carnese's estate. Carnese died in November 1999, a few weeks after she executed the will.
Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant had been unable to provide independent legal services to Carnese for various reasons, including his relationship with Charles, Charles's involvement in arranging for and facilitating execution of the will, and defendant's failure to sufficiently communicate with Carnese or properly consider her health. Plaintiffs' allegations pertaining to breach of contract concluded:
With respect to the legal malpractice claim, plaintiffs reiterated that "[d]efendant assumed the duty [to] make the will invulnerable to a will contest so as to achieve [Carnese's] plan to maximize gifts to residuary beneficiaries, including [plaintiffs]," and further pleaded 12 specifications of negligence:
Defendant moved to dismiss both the breach of contract and negligence claims. In particular, defendant argued that, under Hale, in the absence of a "specific promise" to benefit a nonclient third party, only the client could recover damages for a lawyer's breach of contract or negligence. Defendant further contended that plaintiffs' pleadings were legally insufficient in that they were predicated upon, and alleged, merely an implied promise to make Carnese's will "invulnerable to a will contest." The trial court agreed:
On appeal, the parties reiterate their arguments before the trial court. Plaintiffs argue as follows: (1) Under the test prescribed in Hale and Lord v. Parisi, 172 Or.App. 271, 19 P.3d 358, rev. den., 332 Or. 250, 27 P.3d 1044 (2001), they sufficiently alleged that they were intended beneficiaries of defendant's promise to Carnese. (2) Defendant's promised performance necessarily included an implied promise to act in accordance with the standard of care owed by attorneys in drafting wills, and the third amended complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant's conduct negligently breached that standard of care. (3) Finally, and in addition, defendant's alleged implied promise to make the will "invulnerable" to challenge, so as to maximize the residuary gifts, was a contractual obligation, independent and distinct from defendant's obligation under the general professional standard of care; thus, defendant's breach of...
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Caba v. Barker, CC 0107-07280.
...claims for losses suffered as a result of defendant's failure to perform in conformance with his implied promise. Caba v. Barker, 193 Or.App. 768, 93 P.3d 74 (2004). We allowed review and, for the reasons that follow, reverse the decision of the Court of Because this is an appeal from a tri......