Caballero v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y
Decision Date | 17 August 2021 |
Docket Number | 05-19-01054-CV |
Parties | ANTONIO CABALLERO, Appellant v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court Dallas County Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-04357
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Smith [1]
Appellant Antonio Caballero sued appellee Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, (Wilmington) for breach of contract relating to a deed of trust on property located at 14105 Rocksprings Court, Dallas, Texas, 75254 (Property). Wilmington moved for summary judgment, asserting Caballero's suit was barred by res judicata. After response from Caballero and a hearing the trial court granted Wilmington's motion for summary judgment. Caballero raises one issue to our Court. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Caballero purchased the Property in 2006 after borrowing $514, 450 from World Savings Bank pursuant to a thirty-year note and a deed of trust. In 2016, the note and deed of trust were assigned to Wilmington as trustee for Normandy Mortgage Loan Trust. In 2017, Caballero sued Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC (Rushmore) and Wilmington to stop a foreclosure on the Property. The trial court's cause number in this first case was DC-17-07665, and the case was assigned to the Honorable Judge Eric Moye. In this first suit, Caballero alleged causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, breach of the deed of trust, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, usury, and suit to quiet title. Caballero sought damages and injunctive relief.
During this first suit, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order barring the foreclosure. Thereafter, Rushmore and Wilmington moved for summary judgment on Caballero's claims. The trial court granted summary judgment against Caballero, and he appealed to this Court. Both Rushmore and Wilmington were the appellees in the prior appeal. After review of the briefs and the record, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Caballero v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Services LLC, No. 05-19-00298-CV, 2020 WL 1685418, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On March 27, 2019, Caballero filed a suit against Wilmington with a verified petition stating:
Thus, Caballero's suit is based upon Wilmington's alleged failure to give Caballero required notices under the "security documents and property code." Wilmington answered and filed a motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2019. Wilmington's summary judgment asserted, in part, that Caballero's claim was barred by res judicata. Caballero responded, [2] and Judge Moye held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2019. The following exchange occurred during the hearing:
The trial court granted summary judgment on the record and entered a written order, which states:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all relief sought.
Caballero appealed thereafter.
Caballero raises a single issue on appeal:
Whether the Trial Court Erred in granting Appellee's No-Evidence and Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment in spite of the fact that there is more than a "scintilla" of evidence in support of Appellant's claims.
We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). "Our de novo standard of review extends to both traditional and no evidence summary judgments." Flood v. Katz, 294 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied)). "When a trial court's order does not specify the grounds for its summary judgment, an appellate court must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious." Headington Royalty, Inc. v. Finley Res., Inc., 623 S.W.3d 480 ( ), reh'g denied (May 21, 2021) (quoting Fitness Evolution, L.P. v. Headhunter Fitness, L.L.C., No. 05-13-00506-CV, 2015 WL 6750047, at *22 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh'g)).
A. Res Judicata
"Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit." Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992); see also Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007). Accordingly, res judicata bars claims when there is "(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action." Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 449; see also Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). We next address whether these elements apply to the case before us.
Wilmington asserts the first suit was resolved on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Neither Caballero's briefing nor response to the motion for summary judgment dispute this assertion. The record contains the trial court's prior order granting summary judgment against Caballero from the first suit. In our prior opinion, we addressed the alleged breach of the deed of trust claim as a breach of contract:
Caballero, 2020 WL 1685418, at *4 (emphasis added). We further held in the first appeal that the trial court did not err in granting Wilmington and Rushmore's summary judgment in the first suit as they specified elements of each of Caballero's causes of action-on which Caballero had the burden of proof-that lacked evidentiary support. Caballero, 2020 WL 1685418, at *7 (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i)). Thus, the trial court's summary judgment in the first suit, which we affirmed, disposed of all parties and issues in...
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