Cabe v. Union Carbide Corp.
Decision Date | 17 January 1983 |
Citation | 644 S.W.2d 397 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Parties | Virginia H. CABE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION and Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. 644 S.W.2d 397 |
Robert W. Knolton, Oak Ridge, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert R. Campbell, Knoxville, for defendants-appellees.
This is a worker's compensation case. The Plaintiff, suffering an adverse judgment in the Chancery Court, has presented the following issue for review by this Court: whether there can be a recovery of benefits under the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act for death due to a heart attack immediately precipitated by acute or sudden emotional stress as opposed to physical exertion, where the necessary causal connection is properly established by the proof.
Plaintiff is the widow of the decedent. She seeks the benefits payable to a dependent widow under the worker's compensation laws. Union Carbide Corporation employed the decedent as an assistant general supervisor of utilities. He earned an average weekly wage in excess of that amount required for payment of maximum benefits to him or his widow under the worker's compensation laws. On March 18, 1980, Robert Leonard Cabe, Jr., died on the job while acting within the course of his employment and while performing his usual and normal duties as a supervisor of the utilities sections of the Union Carbide Corporation. The cause of Mr. Cabe's death was acute myocardial infarction. Minutes before his heart attack, the decedent, a safety conscious supervisor, had verbally reprimanded a worker for failing to wear required safety glasses while working. Both had raised their voices and an "active argument ensued which lasted about five minutes." The worker left to get his safety glasses, and he returned to find Mr. Cabe lying on the ground. Other employees of Union Carbide were immediately called, but upon their arrival Mr. Cabe had no heart beat or respiration. Recovery efforts proved unsuccessful and Mr. Cabe was pronounced dead one hour and five minutes later.
On January 3, 1980, the plant physician examined the decedent and reported no history of cardiovascular problems, and the electrocardiogram done on that date was normal. The physician further testified that the immediate precipitating cause of a myocardial infarction can be nothing, or that exertion, and conceivably a severe emotional upheaval, can cause enough spasm to cause a myocardial infarction and that it is conceivable that a heated argument with an employee could have been one of the things that contributed to the blockage. A cardiologist testified in response to a hypothetical question that, in his opinion, the emotional stress that was a result of a heated argument could be the precipitating factor bringing on a myocardial infarction.
The chancellor's opinion admits of only one interpretation. Finding that "the decedent's experience with [the worker] immediately prior to the myocardial infarction was a contributing factor to [his] death; that this incident, while not foreign to the duties of a supervisor, was unusual; that there is expert medical testimony that this [incident] 'could be' a precipitating factor [of the heart attack] ...," the court went on to hold that "the plaintiff's version of the events does not qualify as a kind of mental stimulus, fright or shock contemplated in Jose v. Equifax ..." Although the court found that the mental stress resulting from the argument was a cause of the decedent's heart attack, the court was of the opinion that the incident before the heart attack did not constitute an "accident" within the meaning of the worker's compensation laws. The defendants, in their brief, concede that the chancellor's finding of causation is supported by evidence. But they advance the position that there is material evidence to support the court's finding that the event could not be considered an injury by accident under the existing law of Tennessee. The chancellor made certain findings of fact and, based upon the law of Jose v. Equifax, concluded that the event did not constitute an injury by accident. The question before us is, therefore, not one of fact, but of law; and, as such, it is not reviewable by the material evidence standard.
Our past cases dealing with compensable heart injuries adumbrate the outer limits of recovery for injuries brought on by the job environment. We have been cautious in prescribing limits to recovery because we are mindful of our duty to liberally construe the worker's compensation statutes and because we realize that we are unable to foresee every situation in which a claimant might...
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Bacon v. Sevier County
...the alleged precipitating event and the breakdown itself given existing mental and physical problems. However, in Cabe v. Union Carbide Corporation, 644 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn.1983), this Court found that the plaintiff's heart attack was compensable. The plaintiff's fatal heart attack occurred on......
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Burr v. Md. State Ret. & Pension Sys. of Md.
...accidents. Ms. Burr also pointed us to a number of out-of-state cases, but none of them ultimately helps her either. Cabe v. Union Carbide Corp., 644 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn.1983), for example, tracks Harris in holding that a heart attack suffered by an employee after an argument with a co-worker ......
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Jones v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 1
...Jones, on the other hand, argues that her case is more analogous to Black v. State, 721 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn.1986), and Cabe v. Union Carbide Corp., 644 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn.1983), in which we held that workers' compensation benefits could properly be awarded for injury or death resulting from a he......
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Houston v. People Ready, Inc.
...preferences. Similarly, assaults that result from the enforcement of an employer's policies have an inherent connection to employment. In Cabe, the decedent had verbally reprimanded a for failing to wear required safety glasses. 644 S.W.2d at 398. Both the decedent and the worker had “raise......