Cabell v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 22 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1397-21-3 |
| Parties | JERMAINE DARELL CABELL, A/K/A JERMAINE DARNELL CABELL, A/K/A JERMAINE D. CAMELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY Anne F. Reed, Judge
Jennifer T. Stanton, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General; Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Fulton, Ortiz and Senior Judge Petty Argued at Lexington, Virginia
Jermaine Darell Cabell appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, of possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Cabell asserts that the Augusta County Circuit Court ("trial court") erred in denying his motion to strike when it found the evidence sufficient to prove that he knowingly and intelligently possessed methamphetamine. For the following reasons, we disagree, and affirm the conviction.
On appeal, we recite the facts "in the 'light most favorable' to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court." Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom." Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)).
On December 7, 2020, Virginia State Trooper Jason Cappo initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for failing to maintain its lane. When Trooper Cappo approached the vehicle, he noticed the vehicle's registration was expired; Nicole Alexander was the driver, and Cabell was the front seat passenger. Because Cabell did not have his seat belt engaged, Trooper Cappo obtained his identifying information along with Alexander's.
Augusta County Sheriff's Deputy Gale testified that he responded to the stopped vehicle to assist Trooper Cappo. It was dark, and the vehicle was lit up by the lights from the police car. While Trooper Cappo spoke with Alexander, Deputy Gale spoke with Cabell. Deputy Gale observed that Cabell was "fidgety, moving, hands moving, [and] talkative." Deputy Gale further testified that while Cabell was still sitting in the front passenger's seat, Cabell was "maneuvering his hands in a way that [Gale] couldn't really see, so [Gale] had him step out of the vehicle."
After Trooper Cappo confirmed Cabell and Alexander's identities and learned that the vehicle was registered to neither Cabell nor Alexander, he returned to the vehicle and asked for Alexander's consent to search the vehicle. Cabell then interjected that he was the owner or potential purchaser of the vehicle. Cabell, however, could not provide any ownership documentation. Deputy Gale could not remember any direct statements Cabell made about ownership of the vehicle but did remember that Cabell was "in the process of purchasing the vehicle."
Alexander consented to the search, and Trooper Cappo began on the vehicle's passenger side. He found a "black zippered pouch on the passenger seat next to the center console," which contained a "broken glass pipe with residue and a blue and white pipe." "Directly next to the passenger seat on the floor near the door was a clear-small clear plastic baggie with white residue." Trooper Cappo did not "have to look very hard to find [the plastic bag]" as "it was very apparent to [him]" when he began searching. Field testing confirmed that the white residue in the plastic bag was methamphetamine. In addition, several clear plastic tubes with white residue were on the passenger side floorboard and under the passenger seat.
When Trooper Cappo asked Cabell about the items found in the vehicle, he initially denied knowledge of the narcotics. Cabell was arrested and transported to the sheriff's office, where Trooper Cappo spoke with Cabell again and inquired about the plastic tubes' purpose. Cabell stated that the plastic tubes were used to change gears. Cabell also admitted that he had consumed methamphetamine four days earlier. Trooper Cappo acknowledged that Cabell was cooperative but observed that he was "defensive" and became "extremely hyper, [and] very emotional" when questioned about the items found.
After the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Cabell moved to strike, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove he knew the illicit drugs were in the vehicle. He asserted that his mere proximity to the drugs was insufficient. The trial court overruled the motion.
Cabell testified that he and his then girlfriend, Alexander, were moving into his cousin's home in Fishersville because they had been living in homeless shelters and staying with other relatives. They were traveling in Alexander's recently purchased vehicle when Trooper Cappo stopped them. The vehicle was difficult to drive because the gearshift was malfunctioning, and items had to be inserted into the gearbox to change gears. Cabell claimed that because he suffered from epileptic seizures, he was unable to drive. When Trooper Cappo asked him about the plastic tubes found in the vehicle, he thought the trooper was discussing the pen he had used to change the gears from neutral to park. He denied knowledge of the plastic bag Trooper Cappo recovered from the passenger side floorboard and stated that the day of the stop was the first time he had been in the vehicle. He asserted that in the weeks before, Alexander had allowed individuals she knew from the shelter to sleep in the vehicle. Finally, Cabell insisted that he had told Trooper Cappo that Alexander was buying the vehicle, not him.
After the close of the evidence, Cabell incorporated a renewed motion to strike within his closing argument. He argued that his apparent statements about ownership are not dispositive because mere ownership of the vehicle is insufficient to establish that he knew about the drugs or constructively possessed them. And although he made statements regarding his recent methamphetamine use, his general knowledge of methamphetamine did not create an inference that he was aware of the plastic bag on December 7. The drugs, he argued, were not found in plain view because the bag was shoved between the door and the seat. It was dark when the stop occurred, and he did not see the bag before he entered the vehicle. Furthermore, there is no evidence that he was in the vehicle for a significant amount of time. Although there is evidence of other drug paraphernalia, that evidence was never tested, and it is unclear what type of residue was on those items. Consequently, he argued, the Commonwealth only established a suspicion of guilt.
The trial court disagreed and convicted Cabell of possession of methamphetamine. The trial court found that the drugs were located between the passenger seat and the door. Cabell had admitted to consuming methamphetamine before this incident and that he was emotional when talking about the items found. The court also found that Cabell's testimony at trial conflicted with "statements Trooper Cappo testified [Cabell] made at the time" of the stop. Cabell's prior statements indicated that he was purchasing the vehicle; Cabell's testimony at trial, however, was that he had no ownership in the vehicle. The court reasoned that this discrepancy was "telling." The court sentenced Cabell to two years of incarceration for possession of methamphetamine, with all but nine months suspended. This appeal followed.
"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, '[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). "In such cases, '[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). "Rather, the relevant question is whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). "If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" McGowan, 72 Va.App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)).
Cabell asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to strike because the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew of the presence, nature, and character of the methamphetamine or that it was subject to his dominion and control. He argues that he did not own the vehicle but was merely a first-time passenger and had not been in the vehicle for a significant amount of time. Even if he asserted ownership, however, that alone is insufficient to prove he exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine. Indeed, he maintains that it would be irrational for him to claim ownership of the vehicle if he was aware of the presence of methamphetamine. He further contends that the drugs were not found in plain view and that he made no incriminating statements nor movements indicating he was aware of the presence of methamphetamine. Emphasizing the lack of forensic evidence, Cabell maintains that his...
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