Cabin Valley Min. Co. v. Hall

Decision Date15 February 1916
Docket Number4902.
Citation155 P. 570,53 Okla. 760,1916 OK 205
PartiesCABIN VALLEY MINING CO. v. HALL.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Under the Constitution and laws of this state the county court may authorize a guardian of a minor to execute an oil and gas mining lease upon the lands of such minor for a period of years extending beyond the minority of his ward.

Error from District Court, Rogers County; T. L. Brown, Judge.

Action by Mary Hall against the Cabin Valley Mining Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Turner J., dissenting.

W. H Kornegay, of Vinita, for plaintiff in error.

Chas Richardson, of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

Geo. S Ramsey, of Muskogee, Samuel W. Hayes, of Oklahoma City, and James B. Diggs, of Tulsa, amici curiæ.

HARDY J.

Defendant in error, who will be hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, brought this action in the district court of Rogers county against plaintiff in error, who will be designated as defendant, seeking to have set aside a decree of the county court of Craig county authorizing one John T. Hall, as guardian of plaintiff, to make and execute a contract for the extension of an oil and gas mining lease theretofore entered into by said guardian on behalf of plaintiff, and to have canceled and annulled a contract for extension of said lease, entered into in pursuance of said order, and for an accounting. At the trial the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, holding said order of the county court to be void, and canceled the contract extending said lease made by virtue of said order, and quieted plaintiff's title in the premises. The principal question presented is whether the county courts of this state have authority to authorize a guardian to execute an oil and gas mining lease upon the lands of his ward for a period of years extending beyond the ward's minority, and in this particular case whether the county court had jurisdiction to authorize the extension of the lease theretofore made by the guardian of plaintiff, to defendant. The extent of the jurisdiction of the county court must be determined by an examination of the various provisions of the Constitution and the statute relating thereto, as they have no inherent jurisdiction. Ozark Oil Co. v. Berryhill, 43 Okl. 523, 143 P. 173; In re Bolin's Estate, 22 Okl. 851, 98 P. 934.

Section 11, art. 7, of the Constitution provides for the establishment of a county court in each county, which is declared to be a court of record, and prescribes the qualifications of the judge thereof and the terms of his office. Section 12 of article 7 provides that the county court, coextensive with the county, shall have original jurisdiction in all probate matters, and until otherwise provided by law shall possess certain civil jurisdiction. Section 13, art. 7, is as follows:

"The county court shall have the general jurisdiction of a probate court. It shall probate wills, appoint guardians of minors, * * * transact all business appertaining to the estates of deceased persons, minors, idiots, lunatics, persons non compos mentis, and common drunkards, including the sale, settlement, partition, and distribution of the estates thereof. * * *"

Construing section 13, art. 7, supra, the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of this state, in the case of Mallen v. Ruth Oil Co., 230 F. 497, reached the conclusion that the county court had authority to authorize a guardian to execute an oil and gas mining lease upon the lands of his ward for a period of years extending beyond the minority of the ward, and, while the opinion therein is not binding upon us in construing the provisions now under consideration, we quote from the opinion in that case as follows:

"The effect of the foregoing constitutional provision, so far as it relates to the question now being considered, is to clothe the county court with full, complete, and exclusive jurisdiction and authority to transact all business appertaining to the estates of minors, including the sale, settlement, partition, and distribution of the same. The jurisdiction is full and complete so far as relates to matters appertaining to business of the estates of minors, because it applies to all business of that character. It must be exclusive, because it is not to be presumed, in the absence of clear provisions to the contrary, that the framers of the Constitution intended there should be any division of authority between the county courts and any other courts of the state relating to this important matter, in view of the embarrassment and confusion which such divided authority would lead to. The jurisdiction is neither in plain terms nor by implication lodged in any other court."

Much of the briefs of counsel is devoted to a discussion of the extent of jurisdiction formerly possessed by courts of probate and chancery courts at common law with reference to the management and control of the estates of minors, and many authorities are cited in which the courts have lavished much learning upon a discussion of this question; but, in view of the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the statutory provisions hereinafter set out, a review of these authorities is not here deemed necessary. It will only be necessary to direct attention to certain sections of the statute which, considered in connection with the constitutional provisions supra, will determine the extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon the county court.

Section 6547, Revised Laws 1910, is as follows:

"Guardians of infants and insane persons are hereby empowered to lease and grant mineral oil and mineral gas, in consideration of a royalty or part or portion of the production thereof, and under the same procedure in the county court, as now provided by law, where such consideration is money."

Section 6569 provides:

"The county court, on the application of a guardian or any person interested in the estate of any ward, after such notice to persons interested therein as the judge shall direct, may authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales, and any other of his ward's [property] in real estate, or in any other manner most to the interest of all concerned therein; and the county court may make such other orders and give such directions as are needful for the management, investment and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances [may] require."

And by section 3330 it is provided:

"In all cases the court making the appointment of a guardian has exclusive jurisdiction to control him in the management and disposition of the person and property of his ward."

Section 6547 confers authority upon the guardians of infants to lease and grant mineral oil and mineral gas in consideration of a royalty under the procedure now provided in the county court for leasing of said lands where the consideration therefor was money. The procedure referred to is that prescribed by section 6569, supra, which requires the guardian to make application to the county court, after notice in accordance with the directions of the judge, whereupon the court is authorized to make such orders and give such directions as are needful, and as the circumstances may require. Duff et al. v. Keaton, 33 Okl. 92, 124 P. 291, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472. There is no limit in this section as to the terms of the lease, nor any limitation as to the time for which same may run; it being left to the judgment of the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to determine what is best for the interest of the minor under the circumstances.

The provisions of Mansfield's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas hereinafter set out, which were extended over and put in force in the Indian Territory by the act of Congress approved May 2, 1890 (c. 182, 26 Stat. 81), were very similar to the provisions of our statute now under consideration. Section 3509, Mansfield's Digest, provided that, when it should be made to appear that it was for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or any part thereof should be sold or leased, his guardian or curator might sell or lease the same upon obtaining an order for such sale or lease from the probate court of the county in which such real estate or the greater portion thereof was situated; sections 3510 and 3511 prescribed the procedure to be followed by the guardian in the premises; and section 3511 further provided that the court, after full examination upon the oath of creditable and disinterested persons, might, if it was for the benefit of the ward, authorize a sale or lease of the real estate under such regulations and conditions as the court should consider suited to the case. The authority conferred by this provision is similar to the authority granted by the sections of our statute now under consideration, and is no broader, if indeed as broad, as the authority granted by our statute. These sections of Mansfield's Digest, as later carried into Kirby's Digest, were reviewed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S.W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659, where the court held that such statutes granted authority to the probate court to authorize a guardian to lease the lands of his ward for a term of years to extend beyond the minority of the ward. The court in that case stated the rule with reference to the powers of a guardian in socage at common law to lease the lands of his ward, and observed that, under the common law or statutes simply declaratory thereof, leases made by the guardian to extend beyond the term of the guardianship are voidable, and cited many authorities in support of this statement. In determining the effect of these statutes the court said:

"But the supreme lawmaking power in our
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