Cable News Network, Inc. v. AM. BROADCASTING, ETC., Civ. A. No. C81-871

• Decision Date: 02 December 1981
• Docket Number: C81-1329.,Civ. A. No. C81-871
• Citation: 528 F. Supp. 365
• Parties: CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., et al. CBS INC., et al. v. Ronald REAGAN, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

528 F. Supp. 365

CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., et al.

CBS INC., et al. v. Ronald REAGAN, et al.

Civ. A. Nos. C81-871, C81-1329.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 2, 1981.

John J. Dalton, Robert L. Mote, Ralph H. Greil, Steven W. Korn, Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff in No. C81-871.

D. Robert Cumming, Carey DeDeyne, Sutherland, Asbiell & Brennan, Atlanta, Ga., James Loftis, Bergson, Borkland, Margolis & Adler, Washington, D. C., for American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

David Aufdenspring, Eugene S. Partain, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., David Boies, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for CBS, Inc.

Matt Patton, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Ga., William Hegarty, Cahill, Gordon & Reiniel, New York City, for National Broadcasting Co., Inc.

Robert Castellani, Nina Hunt, Asst. U.S. Attys., Atlanta, Ga., William G. Cole, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for Ronald W. Reagan, James A. Baker, III, Larry Speekes and Alexander M. Haig.

Eugene S. Partain, David R. Aufdenspring, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for plaintiff in No. C81-1329.

ORDER

ORINDA D. EVANS, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss of NABET, or Alternatively, to Transfer Venue or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. The primary grounds for this motion on the part of Defendant National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians AFL-CIO (NABET) are that (1) NABET is not subject to venue in this district and that the Court is "without jurisdiction" over NABET; (2) the Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate claims concerning the invalidity of NABET's contracts with Defendants ABC and NBC because the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims; (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against NABET. For the reasons given below, NABET's motion is DENIED in its entirety.

I. Venue

NABET was joined as a party to this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 on July 16, 1981. Fed.R.Civ.P. 82 provides that the federal rules shall not be construed "to extend or limit" the venue of actions in the federal district courts. NABET has made allusions in its arguments to the limited "jurisdiction" of the federal courts. See Brief of NABET in Support of Motions and in Response to Plaintiff's Trial Brief hereinafter referred to as NABET Brief, at 5. Venue, however, is "primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses," Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560, 87 S.Ct. 1746, 1748, 18 L.Ed.2d 954 (1967), while subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of the federal court's very power to adjudicate, as granted by the Congress and in the Constitution. See generally, Wright, C. & Miller, A., Cooper, E., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3801 (1976 ed.).

NABET does not appear to contend seriously, aside from its claim of NLRB pre-emption which is addressed infra, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this action. The Court on its own motion, however, addresses this question and finds subject matter jurisdiction appropriate on three grounds. First, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as enunciated in this Circuit, a federal court in a federal question case such as the instant one may assert jurisdiction over a new party, even if the claim against the new party does not involve a federal question. See Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968). Second, the collateral issues involving NABET arise from the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, a matter of judicially-created "federal law." See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Third, Plaintiff Cable News Network (CNN) has based assertions on 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(B) and (e). Whether these federal labor law issues are committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB is addressed in Section II, infra.

Neither does NABET appear to contend seriously that this Court lacks in personam jurisdiction over it by virtue of Ga.Code § 24-113.1(a) and the cases which have construed that statute to extend as far as due process permits. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Inc. v. Byrd, 144 Ga.App. 431, 241 S.E.2d 299 (1977). NABET does strongly argue that there is no adequate statutory basis for venue in this district. The Court believes, however, that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides such a basis.

Section 1391(c) provides that a "corporation" may be sued in any judicial district in which is it "doing business." It is settled that a labor union is a "corporation" for purposes of the statute. See Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562, 87 S.Ct. 1746, 1750, 18 L.Ed.2d 954 (1967). Although there is some controversy on the question — one of federal law — whether "doing business" within the meaning of Section 1391(c) extends to the limits of due process, this Court believes that the better view is that it does. See Patin v. Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 984, 986 (W.D.La.1966); Wright, C. & Miller, A., Cooper, E., supra, § 3811 at 65, and cases cited at n.45 (1976 ed.); 1 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 0.142, at 1411 (2d ed. 1981). Since NABET is properly subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court, a fact that will be more fully apparent in the discussion infra, it does not seem unfair that venue be laid here. This view accords with the generally expansive purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). See generally Wright, C. & Miller, A., Cooper, E., supra, § 3811. Even if a higher threshold were required for federal venue, the Court is not persuaded that NABET's contacts with the forum are insufficient to meet that more rigorous standard.

NABET International has its principal place of business in Bethesda, Maryland. The International is governed by a convention made up of delegates from the various locals it has chartered. See Deposition of Edward M. Lynch, NABET International President, October 29, 1981 hereinafter referred to as Lynch Deposition, at 20. At present, NABET has no locals in the state of Georgia. Id. at 29; Affidavit of Edward M. Lynch, September 3, 1981, accompanying NABET Brief. NABET does not appear to be a party to any existing contracts made in Georgia. Lynch Deposition, supra, at 29.

Local 15 of NABET, however, has filed a petition with the NLRB seeking certification to represent certain of Plaintiff CNN's Atlanta employees. See Exhibit A, attached to Plaintiff Cable News Network, Inc.'s Supplemental Brief in Response to NABET's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, to Transfer Venue, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment hereinafter referred to as CNN's Supplemental brief. Local 15's jurisdiction includes the entire United States east of the Mississippi. It represents freelance film workers or technicians who are NABET members. See Lynch Deposition, supra, at 32.

A negotiating committee made up of representatives from various locals having members who are network employees controls the negotiation of the ABC and NBC contracts which are at issue in this case. Id. at 22-23. The international president of NABET, as coordinator of this committee, negotiates on its behalf. Id. at 23. With the exception of the network and certain other special contracts, including, apparently, film contracts, the International has the authority to negotiate agreements for locals. Id. at 22. Although it is unclear to the Court that any contract negotiation resulting from a successful organizational effort on the part of Local 15 among CNN's Atlanta employees would be under the direct authority of the international president, it would at least be his "ultimate responsibility." Id. at 21-22.

Local 15's By-Laws indicate that membership in the Local requires accreditation of both the International and the Executive Board of the Local. See Local 15 By-Laws, § 2.1, Exhibit D, attached to CNN's Supplemental Brief. Local membership also entails financial obligations to the International. Id. at §§ 2.1, .6.

The locals act autonomously with regard to daily operations, subject to the limitations of the International constitution. Lynch Deposition, supra, at 26. The International has the power to put a local in trusteeship for violations of the International constitution and of other obligations. Id. For Local 15 to engage in organizational activities, approval of the International is required. See Local 15 By-Laws, supra, § 8.8(f).

Under these facts, particularly the International's place in approving organizational activity and accrediting new members, the financial resources it derives from such new membership, and its final say in negotiation of any contract for such members, the Court believes that Local 15's organizational efforts can fairly be imputed to the International which chartered it. Cf. International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America v. Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729, 733-34 (1946) (International liable for Local's wrongful expulsion of member). Such conduct is relevant to whether venue in this district is proper. Cf. Moran v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 139 N.J.Eq. 561, 52 A.2d 531 (Ch.1947) (in suit for admission into local, personal jurisdiction over International proper).

The contrary cases cited by NABET are not controlling. The question now is whether Local 15's organizational activities can fairly be imputed to NABET for the purpose of determining whether NABET has had meaningful contacts with this forum. Whether the Local's activities would be attributable to NABET for the purpose of charging an unlawful act such as conspiracy under the antitrust law, the question in United Brotherhood of...