Cabral v. State, SCWC–28669.
Decision Date | 09 May 2012 |
Docket Number | No. SCWC–28669.,SCWC–28669. |
Parties | Jason Lanakila CABRAL; the Estate of Joseph Pu Kaikala; Lynda Evadna Kaikala, individually, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Shawn Kaikala, and as Guardian Ad Litem for minors: Shantel Kaiuola Cabral, and Iokepa John Kaikala; John E. Krause, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for minors: Kahekili John Krause, Keanu Kaikala Krause, and Kawena Kaikala Krause, Petitioners/Plaintiffs–Appellants, and Mark Kale Cabral, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Defendant/Cross–Claim Plaintiff/Cross–Claim Defendant/Appellee, and Joni Marie Scott, Defendant/Cross–Claim Defendant/Cross–Claim Plaintiff. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Joy A. San Buenaventura and Peter Van Name Esser, for petitioners/plaintiffs-appellants.
Donna H. Kalama, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent/defendant/cross-claim plaintiff/cross-claim defendant/appellee.
Petitioners/Plaintiffs–Appellants Jason Lanakila Cabral; Estate of Joseph Pu Kaikala; Lynda Evadna Kaikala, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Shawn Kaikala and GAL for Minors Shantel Kaiuola Cabral, Mark Kale Cabral1 and Iokepa John Kaikala; John E. Krause, individually and as GAL for Minors Kahekili John Krause, Keanu Kaikala Krause, and Kawena Kaikala Krause (Collectively, Petitioners) filed a timely application for writ of certiorari (Application), urging this court to review the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) August 11, 2011 judgment on appeal in support of its July 28, 2011 Opinion, which dismissed Petitioners' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We accepted the Application on December 5, 2011. Oral argument was held on March 15, 2012.
Petitioners' Application presents the following questions:
(Emphases in original.)
Based upon the specific, unique factual circumstances of this case, we hold that the ICA erred by concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Petitioners' appeal. As discussed herein, Petitioners in this case relied on a trial court's order that: (1) was issued prior to the expiration of the 30–day jurisdictional time limit for filing a notice of appeal; (2) extended the time to file a notice of appeal; and (3) was later deemed invalid. Under these circumstances, we may excuse Petitioners' otherwise untimely notice of appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's dismissal of Petitioners' appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand the case for consideration on the merits.
This case arises from a July 20, 2000 fatal car accident that occurred on Highway 11 in the County of Hawai‘i, which resulted in the death of Shawn Kaikala (Decedent). Decedent's vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Joni Marie Scott (Scott). On October 16, 2001, Petitioners filed a civil complaint against Scott and Respondent/Defendant–Appellee State of Hawai‘i (Respondent or State), asserting claims for negligence and wrongful death.2 Petitioners settled their claims against Scott prior to the commencement of trial.
A seven-day bench trial began on July 10, 2006. On November 1, 2006, the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (circuit court) entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State was negligent in the "design, construction or maintenance" of Highway 11.3 The legal cause of the accident and resultant death of Decedent was attributed solely to the negligence of Scott. On April 20, 2007, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the State and against Petitioners.
HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A) (2006) (emphases added).
Three days before Petitioners' July 9, 2007 deadline, the parties submitted a written stipulation to extend time to file notice of appeal (Stipulation). Although HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A) specifies that a request for an extension of time may be granted upon motion, and upon a showing of good cause, Petitioners made their request via the Stipulation signed by both counsel for the parties, and neglected to state the underlying basis or need for the extension of time. Despite Petitioners' non-compliance with HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A), the circuit court "approved and so ordered" the Stipulation which extended Petitioners' deadline to file a notice of appeal to July 23, 2007.
In an ex-parte motion dated July 18, 2007 (Ex–Parte Motion), Petitioners requested another extension to file their notice of appeal by September 19, 2007. The declaration attached to the Ex–Parte Motion stated the need for another extension: the parties were involved in settlement negotiations and a hearing on a motion to withdraw from representation of one of the Plaintiffs was pending and scheduled for hearing on September 5, 2007. The circuit court did not rule on the Ex–Parte Motion by July 23, 2007, and Petitioners, aware of the circuit court's (presumptively valid) July 23, 2007 extended deadline, filed their notice of appeal on that day.
The Ex–Parte Motion, although dated July 18, 2007, was not filed and granted until September 7, 2007. The Ex–Parte Motion was granted on the basis of "good cause," and Petitioners' deadline to file their notice of appeal was extended by the court to August 8, 2007.6 By the time the circuit court granted the Ex–Parte Motion, however, Petitioners had already filed their notice of appeal.
Significantly, the above facts reveal that Petitioners' notice of appeal was filed based on reliance on the circuit court's order extending the deadline to July 23, 2007. Notably, the record shows that Petitioners were cognizant of the deadlines for appeal in this case: (1) Petitioners requested an extension three days prior to the expiration of the original July 9, 2007 deadline; and (2) when the circuit court had not ruled on the Ex–Parte Motion (seeking another extension) by July 23, 2007—the date of the presumptively valid extended deadline—Petitioners filed what they assumed to be a timely notice of appeal on that date. Thus, had the circuit court not "approved and so ordered" the Stipulation extending Petitioners' deadline to July 23, 2007, Petitioners could have, and likely would have, filed their notice of appeal within the original June 9, 2007 deadline.
Petitioners filed their opening brief with the ICA on March 14, 2008, challenging the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the underlying tort claim. Although the State did not challenge the Petitioners' statement regarding appellate jurisdiction, the ICA sua sponte raised the issue of jurisdiction and requested supplemental briefings. Both parties filed the requested supplemental briefs.
In their supplemental brief, the Petitioners argued that the circuit court's order extending the deadline to file a notice of appeal to July 23, 2007 was entitled to great deference. Petitioners argued that their notice of appeal was filed in reliance of the extended July 23, 2007 deadline—the date on which they filed what was assumed to be a timely notice of appeal. Petitioners further contended that any untimeliness of their notice of appeal was cured by the circuit court's September 7, 2007 order granting the Ex–Parte Motion, which extended the deadline to notice the appeal to August 8, 2007.
In its supplemental brief, Respondent argued that the ICA did not have jurisdiction to hear Petitioners' appeal. Respondent admitted that while it stipulated to the extended July 23, 2007 deadline, the present issue was a matter of jurisdiction, which "can neither be agreed to nor waived by the parties." Respondent argued that the Stipulation to extend the filing deadline was improperly granted because Petitioners neglected to state any justification for the extension of...
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