Cabrales v. State

Decision Date03 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 14-94-00115-CR,14-94-00115-CR
Citation932 S.W.2d 653
PartiesJuan Enrique CABRALES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Tom Moran, Michael Olsen, Houston, for appellant.

Carol H. Cameron, Houston, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C.J., and AMIDEI and ANDERSON, JJ.

OPINION

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Juan Enrique Cabrales, appeals a jury conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d)(3) (Vernon 1992). 1 The trial court sentenced appellant to thirty (30) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant brings fourteen points of error, contending (1) the trial court improperly allowed testimony about the price of cocaine and the method of manufacturing "crack" cocaine; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objections and motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's comments concerning his post-arrest silence; (3) the evidence was legally, or alternatively, factually insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court improperly overruled his motion to suppress. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

On May 7, 1992, Officers Allen Ray Meeks and Michael Ellison of the Harris County Sheriff's Department, Organized Crime Unit, pulled over a white Ford Explorer for a traffic violation. Both the driver, Francisco Avila, and appellant, who was a passenger in the vehicle, gave written consents to search the Explorer. The officers subsequently discovered four, locked duffel bags, which they determined to contain seventy-eight packages of cocaine.

In his eleventh point of error, appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment. Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In doing so, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Ransom v. State, 789 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010, 110 S.Ct. 3255, 111 L.Ed.2d 765 (1990). In conducting this review, we are not to re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence, but act only to ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993); Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Rather, the jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Soto v. State, 864 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct. 190, 102 L.Ed.2d 159 (1988)). If there is evidence to establish the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trier of fact believes that evidence, we cannot reverse the judgment on insufficient evidence grounds. Soto, 864 S.W.2d at 691 (citing Moreno, 755 S.W.2d at 867).

To support a conviction for unlawful possession, the State must prove the accused (1) exercised care, control and management over the contraband; and (2) knew the matter possessed was contraband. Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd); Campbell v. State, 822 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is found, the State must present additional independent facts and circumstances that affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Washington, 902 S.W.2d at 652. The affirmative link must raise a reasonable inference that the accused knew of and controlled the contraband. Id. Some factors on which various courts have relied to provide this affirmative link include (1) the place where the contraband was found was enclosed; (2) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (3) the accused was the owner of the place where the contraband was found; (4) the quantity of the drugs found; (5) the accused possessed a key to the locked location of the drugs; (6) a tip by an informant that the accused was in possession of contraband; (7) the accused was in close proximity to a large quantity of contraband; and (8) drug paraphernalia was found on or in plain view of the accused. Id. (citing Stokes v. State, 853 S.W.2d 227, 239 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1993, no pet.); Ettipio v. State, 794 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 817 S.W.2d 344 (1991); Richardson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 786 S.W.2d 335 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct. 448, 116 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991)).

In the present case, Officer James Pruitt, an experienced narcotics officer with the Organized Crimes Unit, testified that a white Ford Explorer, with two individuals who were subsequently identified as appellant and Avilas, drove into the garage of a residence that he was surveying. The driver then closed the garage door. Officer Pruitt further testified that approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later, the garage door opened, the Explorer pulled out of the garage, and appellant "walked out, looked around, up and down the street, and then got into the Explorer." Officer Pruitt stated that based on his experience as a narcotics officer, appellant's conduct was consistent with the behavior of an individual carrying drugs. Moreover, the police discovered the cocaine in an enclosed place, namely the backseat and rear area of the vehicle. Appellant was also located in close proximity to an extremely large quantity of cocaine when the police arrested him. Further, although appellant informed the arresting officers that he did not know who owned the duffel bags, he directed the officers to the hidden keys which unlocked the bags. Upon thorough review of the record and in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find sufficient evidence exists whereby a rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's eleventh point is overruled.

In points one through four, appellant argues that during the guilt/innocence phase, the trial court improperly allowed the State to present evidence of the street value of cocaine and the method of manufacturing crack cocaine. Appellant contends that such evidence was not relevant to whether he intentionally and knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver. See TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 402. Specifically, appellant complains of the following testimony of Officer James Pruitt elicited by the State:

[PROSECUTOR]: Have you had the opportunity, to talk to, in addition to that, other Narcotics Officers concerning--uh--the current price--uh--or value of a kilo of cocaine?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Yes ma'am.

[PROSECUTOR]: Have you also talked to those drug dealers about the value of a kilo of cocaine?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Yes ma'am.

[PROSECUTOR]: How recently have you spoken to some of these drug dealers about the value of a kilo?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Last night.

[PROSECUTOR]: In your experience, what is the value of one kilo of cocaine?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object to that as not being relevant, Judge.

[COURT]: That's overruled.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There's not--I further object, Judge, that there's nothing in the indictment that requires the State to prove the value of the cocaine, only the weight of cocaine.

[COURT]: That's an objection that's overruled.

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Okay, you're talking about wholesale or street value of the cocaine?

[PROSECUTOR]: Street value.

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Street value of the cocaine is going about a hundred dollars a gram right now.

[PROSECUTOR]: How about for an entire kilo? What would the street value be of an entire kilo?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Uh, a hundred thousand dollars, if you cut it down and sell it by the gram.

[PROSECUTOR]: I'm sorry?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: You--if you just took the kilo of cocaine and just grammed it out without cutting it or anything else.

[PROSECUTOR]: When you talked about "gramming it out," what is the usual dose of cocaine that's sold on the street?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Uh, normal dosing is one-quarter gram.

[PROSECUTOR]: How much is that usually sold for?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Uh, a gram is going for a hundred twenty-five to--say quarter-gram would go for about 40 bucks.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me. This has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of Mr. Cabrales, the how much, unless he's been caught on the street selling it by gram, unless he's been--something like that.

This has to do with whether he knowingly possessed some quantity of cocaine. How much it sells for, you know, how much it's--how it's cut up, has nothing to do--to do with this case and it's completely irrelevant.

[COURT]: What's your objection?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My objection is it's not relevant.

[COURT]: Overruled.

....

[PROSECUTOR]: What is the difference between powder cocaine and crack cocaine?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Crack cocaine is the most purist form of it. It's dissolved down and all the impurities are taken out.

[PROSECUTOR]: How is that generally done?

[OFFICER PRUITT]: It's usually cooked.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This isn't a case involving crack cocaine, so I object to anything about crack cocaine being irrelevant.

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, it has to do with the value of [sic] the street, Your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They don't have to prove value, they have to prove weight.

[COURT]: Overruled. You may proceed.

[OFFICER PRUITT]: Repeat the question, ma'am.

[PROSECUTOR]: How is that generally done?

...

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