Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 32103.
Decision Date | 06 September 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 32103.,32103. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dominic CACIOPOLIv.Jeffrey LEBOWITZ. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Frank B. Cochran, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).David S. Doyle, North Branford, for the appellee (plaintiff).DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEACH and SCHALLER, Js.BEACH, J.
The defendant, Jeffrey Lebowitz, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Dominic Caciopoli, finding that the defendant had trespassed on the plaintiff's land and awarding damages. The defendant claims that the court erred by (1) improperly expanding the tort of trespass, (2) denying his motion for judgment, (3) denying his special defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel, (4) finding that the element of intent with respect to the tort of trespass was satisfied and (5) its award of damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant. “The plaintiff ... purchased real property located at 490 Three Corners Road in Guilford, Connecticut, in October, 1978. He chose this property because it was isolated and private. The plaintiff's property was surrounded by forest on all sides, except for the area of the lot though which his driveway passed. In May, 2005, the defendant ... purchased property located at 480 Three Corners Road, which is adjacent to the property owned by the plaintiff. The property line between the two homes was unmarked. The plaintiff's home is more than 100 yards from the property line between the two lots, and the plaintiff's view of the home located at 480 Three Corners Road was obstructed.
In 2008, the plaintiff commenced an action alleging trespass. The defendant filed an answer with special defenses. The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint adding a count seeking treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52–560. Following a trial to the court, the court in its memorandum of decision found that the plaintiff had proven the elements of an intentional trespass action. The court awarded the plaintiff $150,000 for the diminution in the value of his property caused by the defendant's trespass, plus taxable costs. The court declined to award any damages for the value of timber removed. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the court erred in that its damage award improperly expanded the tort of trespass. We disagree.
The court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000 for the diminution in the value of his property caused by the defendant's trespass. The defendant argues that the damage award was improper. 1 He argues that § 52–560 limits the scope of damages recoverable in timber trespass actions, and that diminution in value is not an appropriate measure of damages.
Section 52–560 provides in relevant part: “Any person who cuts, destroys or carries away any trees, timber or shrubbery, standing or lying on the land of another ... without license of the owner ... shall pay to the party injured ... three times the reasonable value of any other tree, timber or shrubbery; but, when the court is satisfied that the defendant was guilty through mistake and believed that the tree, timber or shrubbery was growing on his land, or on the land of the person for whom he cut the tree, timber or shrubbery, it shall render judgment for no more than its reasonable value.”
Common law provides at least three remedies for intentional trespass in situations in which trees have been removed. In an action for timber trespass, Eldridge v. Gorman, 77 Conn. 699, 701, 60 A. 643 (1905). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canton Village Construction, Inc. v. Huntington, 8 Conn.App. 144, 147, 510 A.2d 1377 (1986). Cases subsequent to Eldridge which allowed for damages for diminution in market value, either in principle or in practice,3 include Canton Village Construction, Inc. v. Huntington, supra, at 146–48, 510 A.2d 1377, and Stanley v. Lincoln, 75 Conn.App. 781, 787, 818 A.2d 783 (2003) (). Of particular interest is the case of Palmieri v. Cirino, 90 Conn.App. 841, 880 A.2d 172, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 927, 889 A.2d 817 (2005). In that case, damages were not allowed for the replacement cost of arborvitae trees, but this court recognized that damages for the diminution in value of the land may have been available. Id., at 850–51, 880 A.2d 172.
Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 158–61, 881 A.2d 937 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S.Ct. 1913, 164 L.Ed.2d 664 (2006), raises but does not decide the issue of whether § 52–560 preempts common law. In that case, the cross claim plaintiffs alleged that the cross claim defendants intentionally trespassed on property and cut trees. Id., at 158, 881 A.2d 937. The cross claim plaintiffs sought treble damages pursuant to § 52–560 based on the replacement cost of the cut trees. Id. No evidence was presented as to the value of the trees or the diminution in value of the land. Our Supreme Court questioned a statement in Stanley v. Lincoln, supra, 75 Conn.App. at 788–89, 818 A.2d 783, that suggested that the statute provided for remedies other than the value of the trees, and clarified that “although damages for the reduction in pecuniary value of the land—determined by the replacement cost of the trees, if appropriate—were available under the common law, the plain language of § 52–560 authorizes treble damages only for the value of the trees as commodities, not for the reduction in the pecuniary value or for the replacement cost of the trees.” Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, supra, at 160, 881 A.2d 937. In a footnote, however, the Supreme Court stated that no party made a common-law claim in that case, so the court did not need to decide whether § 52–560 preempted the common-law cause of action. Id., at...
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Caciopoli v. Lebowitz
...of his property caused by the defendant's trespass, plus taxable costs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 131 Conn.App. 306, 308–10, 26 A.3d 136 (2011). The trial court declined to award any damages under § 52–560 for the reasonable value of the trees as timber bec......
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...275 Conn. at 158–61, 881 A.2d 937], raises but does not decide the issue of whether § 52–560 preempts common law.” Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 131 Conn.App. 306, 313, 26 A.3d 136, cert. granted, 303 Conn. 913, 32 A.3d 965 (2011). In Caciopoli, the defendant's petition for certification to appeal......
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