Caciopoli v. Lebowitz
Decision Date | 25 June 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 18894.,18894. |
Citation | 309 Conn. 62,68 A.3d 1150 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Dominic CACIOPOLI v. Jeffrey LEBOWITZ. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stuart C. Johnson, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Kurtis Z. Piantek, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).
David S. Doyle, North Branford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether General Statutes § 52–5601 preempts a common-law cause of action for intentional trespass in situations in which the trespasser has removed trees from another person's land. The defendant, Jeffrey Lebowitz, appeals, following our grant of his petition for certification,2 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Dominic Caciopoli. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant had trespassed on the plaintiff's land and removed multiple trees without the plaintiff's permission. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff reflecting the diminution in the value of his land as a result of the removal of the trees. On appeal in this court, the defendant claims that § 52–560 provides the exclusive measure of damages in a tree cutting case and, therefore, the Appellate Court improperly determined that § 52–560 does not preempt the common law. In response, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court properly concludedthat § 52–560 does not preempt the common law, but instead enhances the common law by providing for treble damages when the reasonable value of the trees as timber is the proper measure of damages. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts and procedural history:
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 131 Conn.App. 306, 308–10, 26 A.3d 136 (2011). The trial court declined to award any damages under § 52–560 for the reasonable value of the trees as timber because the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the value of the trees.
Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia,3 that the trial court's award of damages was improper. Specifically, the defendant claimed that § 52–560 limits the scope of damages recoverable in tree cutting cases and that diminution in property value is not an appropriate measure of damages under the statute. The Appellate Court disagreed with the defendant and concluded that § 52–560 does not preempt a common-law cause of action but, rather, provides enhancement of common-law damages by providing for treble damages in circumstances where the reasonable value of the timber is sought. This appeal followed.4
On appeal, the defendant claims that the plain language of § 52–560 demonstrates that it provides the exclusive remedy for intentional and unlawful removal of trees from another person's land. Specifically, the defendant contends that the statute applies to “ ‘any’ ” person who impermissibly removes trees and, therefore, the statute is applicable to all such actions. The defendant further contends that, because the statute provides that trespassers who violate the statute “ shall pay [damages] to the party injured,” the damages provided for under the statute are mandatory. (Emphasis in original.) Additionally, although the defendant acknowledges that courts in this state have recognized both a common-law cause of action as well as an action under § 52–560, the defendant contends that, in light of the plain languageof the statute and the history surrounding its enactment, those cases were wrongly decided. Specifically, the defendant claims that, because the enactment of this state's first tree cutting statute in 1726 occurred before a common-law cause of action was recognized in this state, the statute was intended to provide the exclusive remedy for such trespass actions and, therefore, this court should never have recognized additional remedies under the common law.
In response, the plaintiff claims that § 52–560 does not preempt the common law, but rather enhances the common law by providing treble damages in certain situations where the reasonable value of the trees as timber is sought as damages. Thus, the plaintiff claims that parties seeking to recover damages for trespass involving the unlawful removal of timber can pursue either the remedy provided by § 52–560 or common-law damages reflecting the diminution in value of his land. The plaintiff therefore contends that he properly brought his claim under the common law and was, therefore, entitled to seek damages reflecting the diminution in the value of his property as a result of the unlawful removal of the trees. We agree with the plaintiff.
The issue in this case presents a question of statutory interpretation that requires our plenary review. See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). ...
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