Caddell v. Caddell

• Decision Date: 27 October 1910
• Citation: 131 S.W. 432
• Parties: CADDELL v. CADDELL et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

131 S.W. 432

CADDELL v. CADDELL et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

October 27, 1910.

Appeal from District Court, Wise County; J. W. Patterson, Judge.

Action by M. L. Caddell and others against D. Caddell. From the judgment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

McMurray & Gettys, for appellant. R. E. Carswell and Robert Carswell, for appellees.

LEVY, J.

On February 2, 1909, M. Caddell executed to appellant, his nephew, a deed conveying to him all his real estate, consisting of several lots. The consideration for making the conveyance, as expressed in the deed, was $1,400 cash in hand paid. On April 22, 1909, M. Caddell died intestate. The wife and children of deceased brought the suit to annul and cancel the deed to appellant on the ground that the grantor at the date of the execution of the deed was of unsound mind and incapable of understanding the nature or effect of his acts, and that the deed was without consideration, and the appellant obtained the deed through fraud and undue influence practiced upon the grantor while in his enfeebled mental and physical condition. The heirs also sought a partition of the lands as between themselves, if the deed should be canceled by the court. Appellant answered by general denial. The trial was to the court without a jury, and a decree was entered setting aside and canceling the deed, and adjudging the appellees to be the owners of the property and directing a partition between them. The record does not contain any special findings of fact made by the court.

All the assignments except one are directed to the admission of testimony claimed to be incompetent. We have carefully examined these objections to the evidence, and, except as to the objections made to certain parts of the evidence of the notary public complained of in the first and second assignments, we think they should be overruled. As there is sufficient evidence, outside of the evidence of the notary public objected to, to warrant the judgment, we are of the opinion that, if there were error in admitting the evidence of the notary public objected to, it would not constitute reversible error in this case.

By the nineteenth assignment, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the court to invalidate the deed in suit. According to the evidence, the grantor in the deed was well advanced in years when he executed the deed, and for some time prior thereto and until his death, which occurred a little more than two months after the date of the execution of the deed, he was afflicted with a severe kidney disease, and was greatly enfeebled in mind and body, and was constantly under the heavy influence of morphine. The status of his mental condition as to understanding the nature and effect of his acts at the time of the execution of the deed is sharply conflicting. Without entering into a detailed consideration of the evidence, it may be said that that introduced by appellant tends to show that the grantor when he made the deed was of sane mind and fully comprehended the act he was doing. On the other side the testimony offered by appellees, outside of the notary's evidence objected to, as fully warrants the conclusion that, when he executed the conveyance, the grantor's mind was so impaired that he was wholly incapable of understanding the nature and effect of his acts. It is true that, if the portion of the notary's evidence objected to be stricken out, there remains no direct testimony that on the very day of the execution of the deed deceased was insane. But the court was authorized to consider the proof of the mental and physical condition of the grantor both before and after the execution of the deed, as we must assume he did, in determining the condition of the mind of the grantor at the time of the execution of the deed. And this proof is sufficient to support the finding of general imbecility and mental incapacity continuing all during the period before the execution of the deed and until the grantor's death afterwards. In this connection the testimony showed in addition to his old age and enfeebled mental and physical condition and disease that before and after the execution of the deed he was frequently in such a state of stupor continuing for long spells at a time as to be very difficult to arouse, and, when apparently aroused, would not really understand, and that at other times, when he was not in such a state of stupor, his memory failed him and he talked incoherently, and at other times seemed incapable of really comprehending or remembering different acts and things. Several incidents were related of his doings and acts that had the effect of showing that his mind was unsound. Several witnesses for appellees gave it as their opinion, based upon facts within their personal knowledge and efforts at dealings with him, which had...