Cadigan v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2018-CA-01759-COA,2018-CA-01759-COA |
| Citation | 301 So.3d 779 |
| Parties | Jeffery Scott CADIGAN, Appellant v. Stefany Anne (Cadigan) SULLIVAN, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN PAUL BARBER, Biloxi
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: DAVID JEFFREY WHITE
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.
GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In 2018, Scott Cadigan was ordered to pay child support to Stefany (Cadigan) Sullivan for their minor son, A.B.1 Scott appeals from the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court, claiming the special chancellor erred by finding that Stefany was not in arrears, that he was not entitled to an offset of his child-support obligation by the amount of Stefany's arrearage, that Stefany was not in contempt, and that he was not entitled to attorney's fees. Scott also claims that the special chancellor erred by failing to consider his claim for injunctive relief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Scott and Stefany divorced in November 2004 in Okaloosa County, Florida. Pursuant to the Marital Settlement Agreement and Shared Parenting Agreement ("SPA"), Scott and Stefany had joint legal custody of their minor son, A.B. However, Scott was designated the "primary residential parent," and Stefany was the "secondary residential parent." In December 2006, Stefany was ordered to pay child support to Scott in the amount of $428 per month, effective January 1, 2007.
¶3. At some point, Scott and Stefany discussed reconciliation, and in November 2010, Stefany moved from Florida into Scott's house in Mississippi. In December 2010, Scott assumed Stefany's child-support obligation. He submitted the child-support payments through the designated depository on Stefany's behalf, and the money was routed back into his bank account.
¶4. Around March 2011, Scott and Stefany determined that reconciliation was not possible. However, in an email to Stefany, Scott stated that he would not demand child support as long as they were equally involved in raising A.B. Specifically, Scott stated, In April 2011, Stefany moved out of Scott's house. And A.B. began staying with Stefany on Mondays and Tuesdays and with Scott on Wednesdays and Thursdays, alternating weekends.
¶5. In 2011, Scott and Stefany petitioned the Florida court to modify the child-support payment procedure to allow Stefany to pay Scott directly instead of submitting payments through the depository.2 In an affidavit, Scott stated that Stefany was current on child support payments as of October 31, 2011. And in November 2011, the court held that future child-support payments could be paid directly to Scott.
¶6. According to Stefany, she and Scott continued their "50/50 arrangement." In an email dated May 20, 2013, Scott stated, in part:
Several years ago, after you moved back to the area, even though we had a valid Shared Parenting Agreement limiting your visitation with [A.B.] to one evening a week and every other weekend, we agreed in [A.B.'s] best interest to evenly split visitation time with each other and forego you having to pay me child support. Since then, with the exception of a few instances, the visitation schedule has worked well for all of us.
¶7. However, in January 2014, Stefany received a letter from Scott, which stated, According to Scott, he realized their "50/50 arrangement" was not "50/50," and Stefany was forfeiting a lot of her visitation with A.B.3 After receiving Scott's letter, Scott and Stefany reverted to the visitation schedule set forth in the SPA. However, according to Stefany, Scott did not demand child support, the SPA did not address child support, and she was still sharing equally in A.B.'s expenses. So Stefany did not pay child support. According to Scott, he paid for all of A.B.'s expenses, with a few exceptions.
¶8. In June 2014, Scott requested that the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) enforce the Florida child-support order "going forward." Scott did not request enforcement of child-support arrears.4 According to Scott, he informed DHS that Stefany was not current on child-support payments. But he signed an affidavit stating that she was current through June 2014. According to Stephany, in August 2014, she was notified that DHS had started withholding a portion of her income for child support.5
¶9. On October 8, 2014, Stefany filed a "Petition to Enroll Foreign Judgment, For Temporary Relief, Modification of Judgment and Contempt" in the Harrison County Chancery Court. Stefany claimed that a portion of her income was being withheld for child support at a higher rate than allowed by Mississippi law. She requested a hearing to grant an abatement of child-support payments or, alternatively, to modify the amount to conform with Mississippi's statutory guidelines. Stefany also asked the court to find Scott in contempt and grant her custody of A.B., child support, and attorney's fees.
¶10. Subsequently, Scott filed an answer to Stefany's petition and raised the defense of unclean hands. Scott also filed a counter-complaint for contempt and attorney's fees, and he asserted that Stefany had been filing "untrue pleadings."
¶11. On November 3, 2014, the parties entered an agreed temporary order. The order modified the amount of Stefany's child-support obligation to $224 per month, beginning November 1, 2014. However, the order stated:
[Scott] reserves all right to preserve his defenses of unclean hands, voluntary reduction of income, and any other defenses or factual matters which may, following a trial on the merits result in a finding by the [c]ourt that child support should not have been reduced and reinstating the original figure to include payment of amounts voluntarily reduced during the pendency of this action.
¶12. Scott and Stefany continued to file various pleadings. Then, in August 2016, A.B. indicated that he wanted to live with Stefany. As a result, in September 2016, Scott filed a "Third Amended Counterclaim." Scott asserted that it would be in A.B.'s best interests to award custody to Stefany, subject to his visitation rights. Scott re-asserted that Stefany was in contempt and that he was entitled to attorney's fees. He also requested an offset of any future child-support payments by the amount of Stefany's arrearage. And he requested a permanent injunction to enjoin Stefany from disparaging his character with respect to his relationship with Stefany's other son.
¶13. Subsequently, Stefany filed an answer to Scott's third amended counterclaim. She denied that she was in arrears or that she owed any child support. And, among her defenses, she asserted estoppel and unjust enrichment.
¶14. In September 2016, Stefany filed a motion to amend the temporary order. She requested that the court suspend her child-support obligation and asserted that Scott should be ordered to return all payments and pay child support retroactively to August 7, 2016. She also requested sole physical custody of A.B., subject to Scott's visitation rights.
¶15. On December 2, 2016, the parties entered another agreed amended temporary order. The order gave Stefany sole physical custody of A.B., and it suspended her child-support obligation. But the parties reserved all issues regarding "child support owed by either party or arrearage owed by either party" until trial. That same day, the court entered an "Order Enrolling Foreign Judgment."6
¶16. After a trial, on October 5, 2018, the special chancellor entered a final judgment.7 The special chancellor awarded joint legal custody with sole physical custody to Stefany, subject to Scott's visitation rights. With respect to child support, the special chancellor found that Scott had suggested an agreement in which child support would be suspended based on Stefany assuming partial custody. The special chancellor further found that Scott and Stefany shared equal or nearly equal time with A.B. According to the special chancellor, a judgment against Stefany would permit unjust enrichment and ignore the affidavits that Scott had executed with the Florida court and DHS. Therefore, the special chancellor held that Stefany was not in arrears. Additionally, the special chancellor held that neither party was in contempt nor entitled to attorney's fees. Scott was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $856.74 per month, retroactive to December 2016, and the arrearage Scott owed was $18,848.28.
¶17. Before the court entered its final judgment, Scott filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment. Scott argued that the special chancellor's finding in his opinion letter that Stefany was not in arrears was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. He requested that his child-support obligation be offset by the amount of Stefany's arrearage. And he argued that the special chancellor erred by finding that Stefany was not in contempt and by refusing to award attorney's fees.
¶18. After the denial of his post-trial motion, Scott appealed. Scott claims the special chancellor erred by finding that Stefany was not in arrears, that he was not entitled to an offset of his child-support obligation by the amount of Stefany's arrearage, that Stefany was not in contempt, and that he was not entitled to attorney's fees. Scott also claims that the special chancellor erred by failing to consider his claim for injunctive relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19. This Court's review of domestic relations matters is strictly limited. Bryant v. Bryant , 924 So. 2d 627, 630 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). We do not...
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