Cadwallader v. West

• Decision Date: 31 October 1871
• Citation: 48 Mo. 483
• Parties: EZRA CADWALLADER et al., Appellants, v. CATHERINE WEST et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

48 Mo. 483

EZRA CADWALLADER et al., Appellants,

v.CATHERINE WEST et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1871.

Appeal from Second District Court.

Glover & Shepley, with D. T. Potter, for appellants.

I. When a deed has been made by a weak person in favor of one who stood toward him in a relation of confidence, and the provisions of the deed are unreasonable or extraordinary, or the consideration is nugatory or insufficient, or when a pecuniary consideration is set forth contrary to the truth--or more strongly still, where practicing or influence has been actually used to induce the execution--the deed will be set aside. If, in such case, an advantage is gained by the grantee, undue influence is presumed. (Hill on Trust. 23, 214, 230; id. 226-7; 3 Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas. Eq. 137-9; 4 Giff. 417; Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. Ch. 10; Griffith v. Robins, 3 Mad. 105; Dent v. Bennett, 7 Sim. 539; Hardy v. Hardy, 11 Wheat. 103; Whelan v. Whelan, 5 Cow. 537; Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533; Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb. 376; 2 Dev. & Bat. 241; 13 Beav. 363; 5 Blackf. 509; 2 Gill, 83; 13 Ves. 127.) It is manifest that the deeds cannot stand as contracts for valuable consideration. The consideration is wholly inadequate An effort is consequently made to hold them up as gifts.

II. The deeds cannot stand as donations or gifts. The same legal presumption attaches in case of a gift as in that of a sale for consideration. A gift confers a pure benefit. A gift by a weak, infirm, aged person like Mr. Cadwallader to Dr. West, who was at the time his medical attendant and business agent, and who had the donor in his own house, subject to his daily influence, is presumed by the law to have been produced by fraud and undue influence. (3 Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas. Eq. 111, 119, 144; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268; Brown v. Moore, 6 Yerg. 272.) That the donor is, at the time of the gift, a member of the donee's family, and residing in his house, is proof of moral duress and undue influence. (Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones' Eq. 264; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 558; Taylor v. Taylor, 9 How. 199; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price, 169; Maitland v. Irving, 15 Tenn. 437; Espy v. Lake, 10 Hare, 262.) There is in this case the clearest proof of active and urgent efforts by Dr. West to procure the conveyances. He had great influence over Mr. Cadwallader, and he used it all, and wholly for his own advantage.

III. The deeds cannot be considered gifts because they are not set up as gifts. The pleadings state them to be contracts for full and adequate consideration. Having failed to show these facts, the defendants cannot, in the face of the pleadings, treat them as donations--free gifts without consideration. (Hildreth v. Sands, 3 Johns. Ch. 35; 2 Sch. & Lefroy, 502; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 628; Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, 387.) No one shall make out a case contrary to his pleading. The deeds are not gifts. They are made for considerations set forth on their face--inadequate and worthless considerations. Every line of the instrument repels the idea of a gift.

IV. The presumption of the law being that in the privacy of the confidential relations existing between the parties, and the ample opportunity which Dr. West had with Mr. Cadwallader in his house--always accessible to his influence for so long a time before the conveyance--to exert at some time or other an undue influence, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove affirmatively that no such influence was ever exerted. (Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; 3 Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas. 144.) It is in any such case next to impossible to make the negative proof which the law demands. But in this case there is no negative proof at all. That Mr. Cadwallader said he made the deeds voluntarily and freely is not negative proof; for he was, at the time of making these statements, in the house of Dr. West and under his influence. The statements labor under the same legal presumption of undue influence as the deeds. The question is not whether he made the deeds willingly, but how his will was created, and lead in that direction. Did Dr. West previously impress his mind for making the deeds? That is the question. A man is about to make his will, and is told falsely that his only brother is dead; and thus unduly influenced, he gives his estate to another person. He does it freely, willingly, but the will is void for the undue and false influence which created the intention of the testator. (3 Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas. Eq. 141, 143; Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Ves. 299; Lyon v. Howe, 6 Eq. Cas. Law, 655; Couts v. Acworth, 8 Eq. Cas. Law, 558; Lee v. Dill, 11 Abb. Pr. 219; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price, 179; Grovesnor v. Sherratt, 28 Beav. 665; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268; Tyler v. Gardner, 35 N. Y. 595; Brown v. Moore, 6 Yerg. 272.) By these deeds Mr. Cadwallader, at ninety years of age, stripped himself of all his property without any provision for future support or any power of revocation. This alone is proof of fraud and undue influence. (Forshaw v. Welsby, 30 Beav. 249.) Frissel, who drew the deed of 1863, was the attorney of Dr. West, procured and brought to the house by him. Dr. West also procured the presence of the witnesses, and took care to have the grantor's mind examined to see if he was competent to make a conveyance of his property. Here is actual practicing to get hold of the property. (Consett v. Bell, 1 Young & Coll. 578; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Young & Coll. 116; Couts v. Acworth, 8 Eq. Cas. Law, 567.) There is a legal presumption of fraud and undue influence in the relations existing between the parties and on the face of the conveyances. Besides, there is proof of actual undue influence, and not a particle of proof to the contrary. The deeds must be set aside.

Thos. C. Fletcher, Jno. L. Thomas, and Abner Green, for respondents.

I. The mere fact of the existence of the relation of medical adviser and patient is not sufficient, of itself, to raise the presumption that undue influence was exercised, and does not put the onus on respondent of showing the transaction to be fair, as in case of other confidential relations. (Sto. Eq. Jur., § 313; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 313; Newl. Cont. 556-8; Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 118; Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60-68; Jones v. Thomas, 2 Young & Coll. 498; Gibson v. Jayes, 6 Ves. 266; 1 Sto. Eq., § 310.)

II. It is not strictly a relation of confidence, and is not so named by Fonblanque, nor by Sugden or Chitty, and Bouvier does not so treat it. (2 Sugd. Vend. 887; Chit. Cont. 294; 4 Bouv. Inst., § 3858.)

III. In adjudged cases, where it has been held that a relation of confidence existed on the part of the person who was the physician, the courts have refused to lay down any rule as to the presumption of law arising from such relation. (Billings v. Southee, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 37; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; Dent v. Bennett, 4 M. &. Craig, 296; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Young & Coll. 104; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1; Doggett et al. v. Lane et al., 12 Mo. 215.)

IV. There is no actual fraud shown by the evidence nor attending circumstances from which the law will raise the inference of fraud, nor to corroborate such an inference. There was no suggestion of falsehood nor concealment of the truth. (1 Sto Eq., §§ 188, 191, 204.)

V. The evidence shows that the transaction, in reference to the deed of January 15, 1863, was a fair one on the part of Dr. West. The consideration was a good one (1 Bouv. Inst. 236, 239; Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329; 16 Johns. 189; Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. 216; Doe v. Hurd, 7 Black, 510; 9 Yerg. 418; 7 Johns. 26; Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms. 432; Coney v. Stafford, Amb. 520; 19 Ind. 271; 9 Ind. 330; Scott v. Carruth, 9 Yerg. 418; 46 Me. 154; 30 Barb. 292; 25 Me. 326; McNeilly v. Rucker, 6 Blackf. 391.)

VI. It is very clear from the evidence that the grantor, Cadwallader, wallader, was a man of extraordinarily strong mind for one of his age, and disposed of his property in accordance with longentertained and often-expressed intention. But the court will not inquire into and gauge the measure of his intellect if it appear that he had a competency of understanding. (Willard's Eq. Jur. 196; 4 Cow. 207; 20 Wend. 226; Dean's Med. Jur. 555.) If he was legally compos mentis he was a disposer of his property, and his will stands instead of a reason. (1 Fonb. Eq., book 1, ch. 2, § 3; 1 Sto. Eq., § 244; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 148; 1 Ves. Jr. 19; Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa, 60; Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. 142; 26 Wend 255; 1 Houst., Del., 269; Watkins v. Stockett, 6 Harr. & J. 435.)

VII. The deed was the pure, voluntary, well-understood act of a man of excellent judgment, sound reasoning powers, extraordinary memory and great firmness of purpose, as is overwhelmmgly shown by the evidence; therefore it must stand, no matter what confidential relations Dr. West sustained to him, and no matter whether the consideration was adequate or not. (Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Ves. 273; Harrison v. Guest, 6 De G., McN. & G. 431; Hunter v. Adkins, 3 Mylne & Keen, 113.)

VIII. The grantor, Cadwallader, being without parents, wife or children, and entertaining a strong personal dislike to his collateral kin, with reasonable cause, and which Dr. West neither produced nor fomented, his jus disponendi being absolute, he obtained all he wanted for the land, and the court will uphold the exercise of his right of disposal under all the circumstances. Take away the right to so dispose of it, and the incentive to accumulate is destroyed, and an old man would be precluded from purchasing the care and comforts necessary to old age with the many acres acquired by the frugality and labor of earlier life. (Stevenson v. Stevenson, 23 Penn. St. 469; Hadley v. Latimer, 3 Yerg. 537.)

CURRIER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by the heirs at law of Isaac Cadwallader, deceased, to set aside the latter's deed to the late Dr. William West, dated January...